Abstract
Neta C. Crawford is a Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford. In 2003, she was a recipient of the best book award from the American Political Science Association for her book Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (2002). Among many other contributions to the field of international studies, The Pentagon, Climate Change, and War: Charting the Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Emissions provides a crucial assessment of U.S. military emissions alongside foreign policy and energy policy logic.
With increasing discussion of climate change as a national security issue in the U.S., Crawford examines U.S. military rationale and actions that resulted in puzzling outcomes such as increased fossil fuel dependency while the U.S. military was also one of the first major advocates for climate change action in the U.S. government. Although the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has greatly reduced its emissions over the years and openly supports climate change action, it remains “the largest fossil fuel user in the federal government and… its largest greenhouse gas emitter” (p. 7). Not only is it the largest emitter in the federal government, but these emissions are comparable to the “emissions of entire countries” with annual emissions “larger than the combined emissions of many small countries” (p. 8). Crawford urges that shifting away from long-held historical beliefs on the significance of fossil fuel energy to U.S. national security is essential to reducing U.S. military emissions.
U.S. military strategy that has historically determined fuel energy was central to its success in stabilizing international conflict, the U.S. economy, and domestic safety. This essential role of fuel led to the prioritization of access to and use of fossil fuels. Alternative fuel sources were pursued such as clean and renewable energy or obtaining stockpiles of other nation’s fuel. Regardless of the source, the belief that access to fuel energy was a critical vulnerability to U.S. national interests was an important underlying belief seamlessly enacted in U.S. policy. Crawford argues that these fuel determinations have intentionally resulted in discounted U.S. military emissions from climate change measurements and prioritizing U.S. military operations over climate change considerations.
Part 1, the deep cycle, traces the U.S. military use of coal to petroleum. Crawford outlines a descriptive and historical account of U.S. military leaders proactively seeking access and expanding access to fossil fuels starting from coal during the War of 1812 through the transition to oil during World War 1 and beyond. The U.S. military was the leading consumer of fossil fuels in the U.S. first before becoming widely adopted into civilian life. The effectiveness of fossil fuels for the U.S. military supported growing bases along fuel lines of interest, to increase military response capacity to national security anxieties. U.S. leaders reiterated the essential role of fossil fuels in national security which became a foundational U.S. military belief. Crawford explains that at the core of “cycle[s] of violence and political radicalization” in Gulf security frameworks, as argued by Duan Chapman, is prevalent U.S. military policy that is similarly “a deep and self-reinforcing long-term cycle of economic growth, fossil fuel use and dependency, expanding military power, and increasing military spending” (pp. 94–95).
In Part 2, the U.S. Military and climate change, Crawford describes U.S. leaders’ findings of early accounts of climate change impacts and quantifies a first-of-its-kind comprehensive account of U.S. military emissions. Despite these accounts, to maintain military capability, the U.S. military leadership avoided tracking and restricting their emissions in major international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement in 2015. Since U.S. military estimates were previously unknown, Crawford provides longitudinal estimates of U.S. military emissions using contemporary data on U.S. military emissions and military-industrial emissions.
Part 3, U.S. military doctrine and national security strategy, examines the central narrative of the national security community’s understanding of the impact of climate change, largely based on the concept of climate change having a threat multiplier impact. The impact of climate change under the security lens has largely focused on noticing military vulnerability. This vulnerability is akin to longstanding fears of vulnerability by U.S. military leadership. Climate change–conflict research has emerged, highlighting fears of climate change sparked wars. Crawford urges cooperative approaches to reduce climate stressors and that reducing emissions is key to less climate conflict.
In Part 4, the way ahead, Crawford tracks U.S. military responses to climate change and DoD beliefs about climate change impacts in the future. The U.S. military has historically been concerned about fuel efficiency as a part of the solution to fuel dependency. Fuel efficiency has also been the DoD response to climate change by reducing military bases and vehicles and turning to green operations. This transition involved integrating sustainable vehicles and renewable energy. The DoD has focused on adaptive policies, and these policies are supported by the long-held belief that the U.S. must be military ready and that devastating climate change impacts are unavoidable. Crawford argues that the underlying beliefs to maintain military capability that guide major U.S. policies are better understood as beliefs to maintain military superiority. A history of U.S. military operations and policies and their role in climate change discussions in U.S. leadership has unsurprisingly led to a militarized response to climate change in the U.S. Crawford argues that although U.S. military emissions have declined, an end to the deep cycle must occur for greater and lasting reductions in U.S. military emissions by closing installations and bases, reducing dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and rethinking armed competition policies “premised on fear, and great-power rivalry” to real risks (p. 289).
