Abstract
In this article, we examine the ways conflict can drive climate change vulnerability and, in turn, argue that conflict mitigation can act as a means of climate change adaptation. We identify three key ways in which conflict mitigation enhances adaptation opportunities: (a) addressing conflict dynamics increases opportunities to address climate risks; (b) grounded analysis of conflict dynamics often reveals high-value opportunities for climate change-oriented programs as well as potential maladaptations to be avoided; and (c) conflict mitigation interventions which rely heavily on governance can be leveraged in climate change adaptation efforts. This has multiple implications for global climate change policy, especially when one considers key climate security outcomes emanating from international policy discussions such as COP 28. We conclude this article by identifying three under-examined—and practical—lines of inquiry that would address key knowledge gaps in how to fortify climate resilience in conflict-affected regions.
1. Introduction
Historically, the relationship between climate change and conflict has primarily been framed as a threat multiplier (e.g., Goodman & Baudu, 2023; Vogler, 2023), whereby climate change exacerbates conflict risk through different pathways that link ecological shocks with social, cultural, and political risks (Dabelko et al., 2022; Mercy Corps, 2023b; Sitati et al., 2021). However, focusing solely on how climate change can affect conflict is limiting (Abrahams & Carr, 2017), and often elides the many ways in which conflict can increase vulnerability to climate change by decreasing adaptive capacity (Dabelko et al., 2022; Mercy Corps, 2023b; Sitati et al., 2021). Conflict can exacerbate climate change vulnerability by negatively altering, among others, local poverty rates and market functions, political inclusion, gender equity, and social cohesion (Sitati et al., 2021; Vivekananda et al., 2014).
The outcomes at the 28th Conference of Parties (COP 28) of the United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change underscore how the international climate change policy community has begun to consider the unique climate risks facing conflict-affected areas. The first-ever formal focus on peace and conflict at COP 28 led to the Relief Recovery and Peace Act (COP 28, 2023). Over 82 parties, including the United States, agreed to scale up financing in fragile and conflict-affected settings, consider how best to incorporate conflict-sensitive approaches to adaptation, enhance vulnerability mapping and information exchange, and lessen the technical and bureaucratic barriers to implementation.
The outcomes from COP 28, in particular addressing the finance gap, are welcomed; however, overcoming barriers to adaptation in fragile and conflict-affected settings is much more than a financial challenge. It is about the political, physical, and even temporal barriers (Abrahams, 2020; Barnett, 2020; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Mercy Corps, 2023b). With limited, if any exception, conflict and violence also degrade institutions’—public and private, as well as formal and informal—capacity to respond to climate change (Dabelko et al., 2022; Mohamed-Katerere, 2014). Given this, more needs to be done both theoretically and practically to make these sorts of declarations actionable. This means, first, disentangling the pathways by which conflict underpins and exacerbates vulnerability to climate change. Unlike how climate change can affect conflict, this is an under-examined body of literature and therefore an area ripe for research. Second, the case should be more clearly made that conflict mitigation is often essential for climate change adaptation or resilient outcomes in fragile settings. Third, we need to understand how the tools for examining, addressing, and measuring conflict and conflict sensitivity can be applied to climate change adaptation efforts. Otherwise, we risk driving unintended consequences that can feed, rather than resolve, cycles of vulnerability (Dabelko et al., 2013, 2022; Meijer & Remling, 2023). These risks exist at the local, national, and subnational scales (Dabelko et al., 2022; Swatuk & Wirkus, 2018); the identification of such risks enables a higher likelihood of programmatic success for both climate and conflict-related interventions.
2. Conflict exacerbates climate change vulnerability
The joint effects of climate change and conflict are reinforcing and act as a dual burden (Ahmadnia et al., 2022; Bremberg et al., 2022; Busby, 2019; IPCC, 2023; Mercy Corps, 2023b). The reasons for this are well understood; the factors that make a place vulnerable to climate change (e.g., exclusive political institutions, low economic development, inequitable distribution of key resources) are the very same factors that make a place vulnerable to conflict (Black et al., 2022; Busby, 2021; Mach et al., 2019). The impacts of conflict, both physical and institutional, further degrade the systems needed to remain resilient to climate shocks. Below we list commonly identified ways that conflict worsens sensitivity, exposure, and/or adaptive capacity—that is, the elements that determine climate change vulnerability (Adger, 2006; Carr, 2020; Mortreux & Barnett, 2017). This list is not intended to be exhaustive but instead reflects how conflict is an acute driver of climate vulnerability.
Destruction of crops and other natural resources: Violence can disrupt food production since armed encounters can physically destroy crops and food reserves, and lead to the plundering of livestock (Lin et al, 2022; Pergis-Lozada et al., 2022). For example, violent cattle raiding in East Africa has led to loss of human life and property, reduction in livestock numbers, limited access to water and pasture resources, and forced migration depleting individuals’ access to and capacity to deploy natural capital (Schilling et al., 2012).
Curtailing livelihood options: Conflict can cause detrimental and long-lasting effects on livelihoods and human capital (Akresh et al., 2012; Justino, 2011). Insecure environments induce farmers to forgo investment in long-term crops, decrease their ability to access markets, and limit their ability to harvest crops due to acute risks to personal safety. In the Philippines, this has meant that farmers earned 60% less income in comparison to peers in non-conflict affected areas (Pergis-Lozada et al., 2022).
Degrading community support and social cohesion: Conflicts sap energy, confidence, and trust in others (Easton-Calabria, 2022). The displacement of people and other forms of forced migration caused by conflict often places an additional burden—if only perceived—on economic resource bases, which can increase tensions between receiving and displaced communities resulting in less access or support to resources for newcomers (Van Baalen & Mobjörk, 2018). For instance, people from Ethiopia and Djibouti routinely perceived refugees as depleting natural resources, despite data showing this was not the case (Smith et al., 2021).
Increasing elite exploitation and local grievances: Often, local resource conflicts can be linked to greater national or regional power struggles. In some cases, elites actively instigate or fuel inter-group violence for a variety of reasons, including to divert attention away from their shortcomings, to stifle political opposition, or to increase their wealth (Van Baalen & Mobjörk, 2018). This can create new marginalized groups and/or new vulnerabilities to climate change. In Nigeria, for example, elites’ investment in the cattle industry has led to increased tension between herders and farmers. Elites supply herders and the groups that protect them with weapons, which increases the level of hostility between community members and herders seeking access to land for grazing (Brottem, 2020).
Decreasing functioning of and trust in government and institutions: Conflict is both a by-product and an accelerant of bad governance. Conflict contexts often induce high levels of corruption, weaken the rule of law and accountability, and complicate and disrupt the state’s ability to deliver basic services (Hegre & Nygård, 2015). And, in some cases, governments themselves may be the source of grievance and violence, actively creating and/or exacerbating the vulnerabilities of their citizens (Daoudy, 2020; Selby et al., 2017). However, strong, trusted institutions are necessary to create an enabling environment and support the capacities of communities and individuals to overcome vulnerabilities because of the way they are connected and nested in existing structures and systems (Adger et al., 2009; Ribot, 2014).
Shifting scales and sites of need: In some cases, conflict induces new patterns of movement, which can render rigid, place-based climate change adaptation efforts limited or ineffective. Protracted conflict and resulting displacement in countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine underscore this reality (Avis, 2019; Sturridge, 2023). Protracted conflict also jeopardizes the chances for sustainable solutions of return for displaced populations (Solf & Rehberg, 2021), meaning that new and growing adaptation needs of different populations in different locations need to be taken into account (Ober et al., 2023).
3. How conflict mitigation acts as a form of climate change adaptation
We propose that there are three primary ways in which conflict mitigation can act or aid in adaptation and resilience. First, addressing conflict dynamics increases opportunities and capacities to address climate risks. Second, grounded analysis of conflict dynamics often reveals high-value opportunities for climate change-oriented programs and how potential maladaptations may be avoided. Third, conflict mitigation interventions rely heavily on governance infrastructure—both formal and informal—that can then be leveraged in adaptation programs.
3.1. Addressing conflict increases adaptation opportunities
The ways in which conflict and fragility define an operating environment inherently challenge climate change adaptation programming. For example, poor infrastructure, safety risks for implementing staff, and the high financial costs of working in conflict zones all act as barriers to implementation (Abrahams, 2020; Mercy Corps, 2023c). One way this challenge plays out is in the temporal focus of implementers and program recipients (Abrahams, 2021). Conflict-affected countries are, by definition, in a state of flux—development interventions must be nimble in the face of change. This also means that long-term planning—including planning for longer-term climate change and even shorter-term climate variability—is less likely to be executed.
Access constraints, too, including government denial of the need for assistance, willful restriction/obstruction of delivering humanitarian services, restriction of movement, and even physical obstacles, can challenge and even stymie adaptation and the development of adaptive capacity (Abrahams, 2020; Mercy Corps, 2023c). For example, ACAPS (2022) found that between just July and October 2022, crisis-affected populations in more than 80 countries were not receiving the humanitarian assistance they needed because of these access constraints; they highlight Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Niger, PNG, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, as examples of such phenomena. Because of these constraints, conflict makes implementing adaptation programs more costly, complicated, and dangerous, thereby challenging implementation and feeding into the finance gap referenced above (Cao et al., 2022; ICRC, 2021; Mercy Corps, 2023a; UNDP, 2021).
Because of these barriers, preventing and mitigating conflict, even at a small scale, creates a more effective enabling environment for addressing climate change. Addressing conflict also leads to more equitable resource management, increased social cohesion, and more functional economic systems—all of which increase resilience to climate shocks (Kurtz & Elsamahi, 2023). And, finally, conflict resolution creates vital windows of opportunity whereby communities can be brought together to identify ways to manage a shared resource, laying the foundation for broader peacebuilding efforts (Ide et al., 2021; Johnson et al., 2021, 2023).
3.2. Conflict assessments enable a better understanding of adaptation pathways
Although not designed specifically for climate change adaptation, conflict assessment tools provide grounded, granular information that aligns with adaptation outcomes in areas where such data and insights can be hard to access. Conflict-oriented assessments, which are often designed to be rapid, emphasize the socioeconomic systems that, along with exposure, encompass climate change vulnerability and climate change resilience (Ahmadnia et al., 2022; Mercy Corps, 2023b). Furthermore, the very nature of conflict means that the contexts of vulnerability will shift rapidly, and require (re-)assessments that take into account and respond to rapid change.
In aiming to reduce climate change vulnerability in the context of a complex situation, well-intentioned adaptation can worsen the situation for those targeted in the intervention as well as for other groups (Atteridge & Remling, 2018; Barnett & O’Neill, 2010; Eriksen et al., 2015, 2021; Schipper, 2020). This reflects an important environmental justice question that is heightened in the context of conflict. Adjusting systems, or responding to shocks, can easily further burden marginalized communities and particular identities if they are not included or considered in the intervention. This may inadvertently incite new or exacerbated conflict at varying scales (Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Carr, 2013, 2019, 2020; Dabelko et al., 2013, 2022). For example, DanChurchAid et al. (2020) found that, in Mali, climate change adaptation measures caused conflict in communities due to disputes over proposed land usage, as well as over reforestation projects on arable land. In addition, in conflict-affected states, political and economic elites are often organized in such a way as to give themselves privileged access to and control over resources and opportunities related to climate change adaptation, which may only serve to further reinforce the capital and capacities of those in power (Black et al., 2022; Ide, 2020). Identifying such risks can enable simple adjustments to interventions that increase the likelihood of long-term efficacy.
Finally, the production and delivery of the type of information captured by a conflict assessment can, in and of itself, be an adaptation intervention. The exact information one would glean from conflict assessments such as a detailed, place-based understanding of power relations, conflict history, and the ways environmental stressors affect socioeconomic dynamics serve as the basis of, for example, shared use agreements. (Carr, 2019; Dresse et al., 2019; Ide et al., 2021; USAID, 2024). These interventions do more than decrease conflict risk, they are proven to increase adaptive capacity in the face of climate shocks (Kurtz & Elsamahi, 2023).
3.3. Conflict mitigation provides critical “governance infrastructure”
Addressing governance systems—both formal and informal—is a proven means of increasing adaptive capacity (ICRC, 2023; Krampe et al., 2021; Mercy Corps, 2023c). Yet, by some measures, governance does not feature in many current adaptation projects (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021), especially in fragile and conflict-affected regions (Sitati et al., 2021; Williams et al., 2021). Conversely, dominant adaptation discourses tend to privilege largely technocratic adaptation solutions (Henstra, 2016; Kehler & Birchall, 2021), ranging from building sea walls to planting more drought-resilient crops to increasing access to climate data (Owen, 2020; Ulibarri et al., 2022). Sometimes, these interventions are explicitly dependent on higher-level government support, which often can be mismatched to fragile and conflict-affected spaces that have limited or non-functioning government institutions (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011). Indeed, even seemingly technocratic interventions rely on effective institutions—for example, uptake of drought-tolerant crops, irrigation expansion, and investment in flood risk mitigation necessitate a degree of confidence in land rights (Murken & Gornott, 2022).
This is not to suggest that addressing governance issues is a silver bullet. But not addressing them means potentially glossing over core drivers of climate change vulnerability. For example, after the 2010 floods in Pakistan, donors mobilized more than $1 billion in financial and technical aid, including for flood mitigation purposes (Deen, 2015). However, these efforts did not necessarily address longstanding, underlying political reasons underpinning vulnerability, such as clientelism, high wealth inequality and debt, and a lack of effective service delivery by state actors (Ide, 2020). In 2022, when floods came again, infrastructure and livelihood destruction, and displacement remained widespread (Islamic Relief, 2022).
Studies on the management of resilience in socio-ecological systems in which people and the environment dynamically interact identified governance categories that are also useful for climate change adaptation. These include, among others, participation and deliberation, accountability, and effective functioning of institutions (Lebel et al., 2006; Moser, 2001). These factors of governance all speak to core principles of conflict prevention and peacebuilding while having clear benefits for resilience and adaptive capacity. For example, community mobilization for dispute resolution, the promotion of the rule of law, land rights and access, and building institutional capacity all serve as vehicles for adaptation even when program design is centered on conflict mitigation and prevention (Ahmadnia et al., 2022; Ide et al., 2021).
3.3.1. Reflecting on lessons from practitioners
The categories above are not merely theoretical. Various aid donors and implementers are already demonstrating the importance of deploying conflict assessments and/or addressing governance issues in conflict-affected and fragile environments to support adaptation outcomes. In Yemen, for example, UN Peacebuilding Fund implementers, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Organization for Migration identified water-related disputes arising from poor management and use rather than water scarcity itself. This meant that the first order of business was to reactivate or support Water Users Associations (WUAs)—local community associations created to address local water management issues. Training and other capacity-building activities were provided for Conflict Resolution Committees and the WUAs, covering conflict resolution strategies, social cohesion, and natural resource management. These institutions then served to ensure community consultation, buy-in, and collaboration in support of the solutions identified to address local water issues (Gaston et al., 2023).
Similarly, in the Karamoja region of Uganda, where cattle raiding and conflict over resources is prevalent, Mercy Corps with support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), implemented the “Securing Peace and Promoting Prosperity” program (EKISIL). This program developed resource-sharing agreements and policies that govern access and use of land and water across different groups, as well as supporting the local government’s ability to enforce them. These efforts were developed and designed by local peacebuilding committees. With these policies in place, resources have become more accessible and equitably shared, and fighting has decreased (Mercy Corps, 2023c; USAID, 2021).
In Central Asia, International Alert deployed conflict analysis to identify where to allocate adaptation community grants so as not to incite new or additional water-related conflicts. Project participants also received conflict sensitivity training. This approach helped community members to understand climate-conflict challenges and also “sensitized stakeholders to the power dynamics around access to and use of natural resources and helped foster empathy for the perspectives and needs of all user groups and stakeholders” (International Alert, 2024, p. 10). These examples highlight how peacebuilders are essential to ensure impactful, longer-term adaptation programming in fragile and conflict-affected settings (see also Gaston et al., 2023; ICRC, 2022, 2023; Mercy Corps, 2023a).
4. Conclusion
Individuals, households, and communities respond to environmental shocks in strategic and adaptive ways, but their ability to do so is mediated by structural conditions, ranging from national governance capacities to the social constructs of a household (Adger et al., 2009; Barnett, 2020; Blaikie et al., 2014; Carr, 2013, 2019, 2020). Violent conflict changes those structural conditions perhaps more than any other external factor. And, simultaneously, conflict also alters and challenges the feasibility of implementing climate change adaptation programming (Abrahams, 2021; Black et al., 2022; Mercy Corps, 2023a; Vogler, 2023). The increasing severity of climate shocks and increasing rate of conflict worldwide means this dangerous—and deeply inequitable—dynamic may prove to be the defining challenge of international development in the coming decade.
In this article, we make the case that there are a variety of ways in which conflict mitigation may be critically important or even a means to adaptation. First, we have demonstrated that there are unique barriers to climate change adaptation success in fragile and conflict-affected settings, which often necessitates addressing conflict dimensions themselves. Second, we find that conflict-oriented assessments are not only a necessary first step to ensure conflict-sensitive adaptation but also identify granular detail on local dynamics as they relate to shifting sites of power and risk—often defining factors of vulnerability and adaptive capacity. A failure to consider the unique contexts presented by conflict can, at a minimum, severely hinder program efficacy and in some cases create new conflict dynamics (Ide, 2020). Third, we argue that, when tailored to context, climate and peacebuilding programming may find alignment, particularly when the emphasis is on building and reinforcing the strength and legitimacy of local governance structures (Läderach et al., 2021; Peters et al., 2020; Wennmann, 2023). As such, we argue that a broader set of actions, especially those traditionally framed as conflict mitigation measures, may be utilized to advance climate change adaptation directly or build adaptive capacity more generally.
Given the rising call for more and targeted climate financing to fragile and conflict-affected countries well exemplified by the Relief Recovery and Peace Declaration at COP 28 (Cao et al., 2022; ICRC, 2021; Mercy Corps, 2023a; UNDP, 2021), one must consider the goals of these (potential) funds and how the deployment of such funds would achieve their targeted ends. If the goal is to increase adaptive capacity, traditional conflict mitigation efforts will necessarily be a part of the equation and at times enable powerful co-benefits that ought not be discounted. While there is initial ground-level evidence on how peacebuilding affects climate resilience (Kurtz & Elsamahi, 2023), we recognize there are still many practical and theoretical applications to be explored.
At its core, this article is a call for additional, applied research and direct implementation on an oft-ignored side of the climate–conflict relationship: Namely, how conflict drives climate change vulnerability and how conflict mitigation can stem that tide. Based on our experiences as practitioners, researching climate security dynamics, and our review of the contemporary literature on this topic, we see three critical lines of inquiry for development and climate security communities of practice to pursue.
First, how do current climate change adaptation efforts in stable environments translate—or fail to translate—in conflict-affected places? Knowing how climate change adaptation can work or be sustained in varied contexts is a key component in identifying best-case programming and leveraging limited resources. That necesitates careful examination not only of existing adaptation efforts in conflict-affected contexts, but also of efforts driven by local peacebuilding institutions implemented without an explicit adaptation lens but with identified adaptation co-benefits.
Second, how can the joint risks of climate change and conflict best be understood and measured? In the face of multiple stressors, it will be difficult to disentangle climate and conflict progress both individually and in parallel. A comprehensive consideration of the risks communities face and the risks of programs to fail or succeed—however defined—will be essential for the distribution of development and humanitarian resources. That is, identifying where key types of risks overlap, could greatly aid governments and international donors in identifying and evaluating high-impact adaptation efforts.
Finally, what are the grounded policy implications for considering conflict mitigation as a means of adaptation? Neither international frameworks and agreements, domestic policies, nor metrics used for program evaluation presently capture conflict mitigation’s impact on climate resilience and vulnerability. Yet, as we have argued here, the implications of such an approach could have profound impacts on many of the places struggling under the dual burden of climate change and violent conflict.
Collectively, answering these questions offers an opportunity to advance climate security practice in a way that is direct and meaningful. Failing to, however, risks the security and safety of those most at risk of a changing climate.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr. Richard Morgan for support in the initial framing of this review. We would also like to thank Dr. Edward Carr for his thoughtful review of an earlier draft of this article. We also thank Dr. Tegan Blaine for her insight into an earlier version of this draft. We appreciate USAID’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization’s Center for Conflict and Violence Prevention and USIP for their support, time, and guidance in producing this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily the views and opinions of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Institute of Peace.
Data Availability statement
N/A.