The effectiveness of joint basin institutions in managing international water disputes

While cooperative interaction so far outnumbers conflictive ones between states sharing transboundary water resources, the trend of interstate disputes is on the rise due to climate variability, mismanagement, and increasing demands. The formation and operation of joint interstate institutions, such as treaties and river basin organizations, can help states manage their shared water disputes. However, the exact mechanisms by which these institutions can be effective in conflict management remain inconclusive within the literature, largely due to differences in defining effectiveness along with uncertainty about the role of institutional design. By focusing specifically on effectiveness in the context of conflict management, this study argues that three design features—data exchange, notification mechanisms, and conflict resolution mechanisms—are important. By studying the Joint Water Committee in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, the Mekong River Commission, and the Permanent Indus Commission, we find that the institutional design indeed shapes whether and how institutions can address conflict over shared water resources in their basin, and we show how different design elements play different roles in dispute management at different stages of a dispute process.