Explaining Reverse Outcome Tight Control: A Case Study of Mindless/Mindful Governance

Abstract

In reverse outcome tight control, controlees’ behavior is correctly aligned with tight controls, but this results in harm to the project. Using the lens of mindfulness, our case study of a construction project reveals why mindless enactment of controls leads to reverse outcome tight control—controllers replace project feedback with feedback from controls. When a project has both unknown unknowns and tight control, controlees respond to tight controls instead of to unknown unknowns. Controlees behave as controllers expect, leading controllers to be unaware of brewing problems. One solution is “unprocess”—deliberately seeking information outside of standard project routines.

Keywords

reverse outcome tight control mindlessness mindfulness unknown unknowns

Introduction

Controllers enact controls to achieve expected outcomes. However, how much control should be enacted and the kinds of control to enact remain an unsolved problem (Heumann et al., 2015; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016). The enactment of a high level of control has been captured as control tightness (Bonner, 2005; Merchant & Otley, 2006; Van Der Stede, 2001). While tight control is normally effective for directing controlee behavior and improving project performance (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016; Van Der Stede, 2001), there are indirect costs of tight control, such as operating delays and negative morale (Bonner, 2005; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016). There is, thus, a curvilinear relationship between control tightness and project performance—increasing control tightness beyond a point results in decreased performance (Bonner, 2005; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016).

There are at least two possible forms of tight control failure: (1) where performing behaviors in accordance with tight control directly decreases project success, and (2) where tight control causes workplace resistance. Our interest is entirely with the first form of failure. Reverse outcome tight control arises when properly enacted tight control (controlees behave according to controls) results in decreased performance by controlees.

While there is a large literature on workplace resistance (Anteby & Chan, 2018; Cardinal et al., 2004; Lim et al., 2011), reverse outcome tight control is little analyzed. Unlike workplace resistance, reverse outcome tight control is not easily or immediately identified, but is common. The literature is replete with examples where controllers enact tight control to the point where control benefits are lost (Bonner, 2005; Cardinal, 2001; Fairholm, 2015; How, 2017; Mankins et al., 2014). Mankins et al. (2014) highlighted how one weekly meeting (a behavior control) cost a company 300,000 worker-hours per year. Deloitte has demonstrated compliance with internal rules cost Australian businesses almost US$160 billion a year with no benefit (McGrath, 2014). Graeber (2018) highlights two kinds of pointless and unnecessary jobs, associated with tight control—box tickers who check that certain things are done and taskmasters who create extra work for people. Merchant and Van der Stede (2016) showed how strict key performance indicators (KPIs) on customer-service calls reduced customer satisfaction. Liu and Chua (2020) document a project where, instead of fixing known problems with known solutions, engineers filled out forms to absolve themselves from blame.

There is a large research gap in trying to (1) explain why controllers enact reverse outcome tight control and (2) identify ways to stop controllers from doing this. A rational controller should never enact control beyond where its marginal cost exceeds its benefits or creates losses. Nevertheless, as documented here, reverse outcome tight control exists. The purpose of this article is thus to answer why reverse outcome tight control exists and how to overcome reverse outcome tight control through an interpretive case study of a large Chinese government construction project that faced extensive delays; where, post-project, many participants attributed delays partially to reverse outcome tight control.

We find one reason reverse outcome tight control arises is because control feedback is employed as a proxy for project feedback. Positive control feedback (controlees behave as expected) convinces the controller all is well. However, many projects have unknown unknowns (Loch et al., 2008; Pich et al., 2002; Ramasesh & Browning, 2014), which should cause controlees to deviate from expected behavior, but because of tight controls, do not. Thus, controllers are unaware something is wrong. Our research suggests the use of unprocess to identify reverse outcome tight control and overcome associated problems. The controller or a proxy (project management office [PMO], internal auditor, consultant) deliberately and proactively seeks project information not systematically obtainable through traditional control feedback cycles, such as visiting the project site without specific intention. Discrepancies between information gathered from unprocess and control processes suggest reverse outcome tight control is occurring.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the control literature and the unsolved reverse outcome tight control gap. We then introduce mindfulness as a theoretical lens to explain this gap. We next present our research methodology. Findings, discussion, and conclusions follow.

Literature Review

Behavior control theory argues controllers enact controls to increase the probability that controlees perform tasks (Kirsch, 1996, 1997, 2004). Controls are grouped into two categories—formal and informal control (Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1979)—with controls falling into five modes within these categories. Formal controls include input, behavior, and outcome control, whereas clan and self-control are informal controls (Tiwana & Keil, 2009; Wiener et al., 2016).

Behavior control theory posits a rational controller who enacts a portfolio of control modes based on factors such as project environment (Zwikael & Smyrk, 2015), controlee’s experience and expertise (Liu et al., 2014), behavior and outcome observability, and the controller’s knowledge and skill (Kirsch, 1997). Control is enacted in an enabling or coercive manner (Wiener et al., 2016) at varying degrees of intensity (Rustagi et al., 2008). Generally, more control (tight control) helps controllers attain desired results (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Henderson & Lee, 1992; Rustagi et al., 2008). When performance is less than expected, control is normally increased (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Rustagi et al., 2008).

However, there are documented instances where tight control leads to negative outcomes (Cardinal et al., 2004; Lim et al., 2011; Liu & Chua, 2020). Red tape, excessive bureaucracy or adherence to rules and formalities (Bozeman, 1993), is a widely acknowledged form of excessive tight control. Excessively tight process control draws controlees’ attention away from important tasks decreasing project performance (Bonner, 2005). Workplace resistance (Anteby & Chan, 2018) is often a manifestation of tight control as workers revolt against perceived excessive rules (Prasad & Prasad, 2000). Alternative structures, structures by the controlee to impede control so work can get done; disincentivization, where controls encourage the controlee to do the opposite of what the controller desires; and the multiple-controller problem, where controls enacted by multiple controllers contradict each other (Chua & Myers, 2018) are other examples of tight control leading to negative outcomes.

A curvilinear relationship between the level of control and project performance thus exists. At some point, tight control becomes excessive and negatively impacts project performance. Tight control can negatively impact project performance directly—controlees behave in accordance with the tight control, and thus, project performance deteriorates; or indirectly—performance deteriorates because workplace resistance arises, which negatively impacts project performance. Our focus is wholly on decreased project performance as a direct result of excessive tight control. We define this as reverse outcome tight control.

While reverse outcome tight control is well documented (Fairholm, 2015; How, 2017; McGrath, 2014; Mankins et al., 2014), it is operationally difficult to separate, because indirect effects of tight control like workplace resistance often simultaneously manifest. For example, Lim et al. (2011) recount where the client blamed the vendor rather than the innovative nature of the project for delays and so correspondingly monitored the vendor more, requiring more updates, and so forth. This slowed the project (reverse outcome tight control), and performance improved only when the client relaxed controls. However, reverse outcome tight control in Lim et al. (2011) is conflated with workplace resistance—the vendor mutinied and thus did not perform to control expectations.

For controlees to behave in accordance with tight control, two things must occur (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016). First, controlees must behave as intended. Second, controlees do not engage in workplace resistance (Alter, 2015). Thus, reverse outcome tight control is where a reverse outcome arises when controlees behave in accordance with tight control (Perlow et al., 2017). Reverse outcome tight control has three parts:

Controlees behave as intended: A reverse outcome tight control enactment requires that controlees not only know the control exists, but also what correct behavior is associated with the control and enact it (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016). If controlees misinterpret a control, they are not behaving in accordance with the control and thus it is not so much the outcome that is reversed as the controlee’s behavior is incorrect. For example, there is a rule that controlees leaving the office have to punch out for safety reasons—during an evacuation we need to know how many people are on the premises. Controlees, however, believe this reduces their hourly pay and therefore find excuses not to leave the building. This is not reverse outcome tight control, because controlees interpret the control differently from the controller and behavior is unexpected.

Compliance is nonmalicious: Controlees are not enacting workplace resistance but faithfully enact behaviors as intended by the controller. A controlee enacting workplace resistance, for example, working to rule (Alter, 2015), could be performing to the letter of control, but not its spirit. This is not reverse outcome tight control.

Ceteris paribus, performance improves if control is removed: By definition, if a reverse outcome tight control is removed, the reverse outcome is removed and, hence, performance improves. One clear example of reverse outcome tight control is a mandated meeting where a controlee performs no role and receives no information to change behavior. If the controlee stops going to the meeting and does their work, more tasks are completed on time. When the meetings (amount of control) are reduced, productivity improves (Perlow et al., 2017).

Reverse outcome tight control challenges thinking that project management is rational. A controller who realizes control enactments are not producing anticipated results (but are producing anticipated behaviors) should rationally change the control. Thus, what causes reverse outcome tight control, and how it can be avoided or minimized, is an interesting unsolved question. We address this through the organizational mindfulness literature.

Organizational Mindfulness

Organizational mindfulness occurs when organizations pay attention to discriminatory detail about unexpected events and respond in a timely manner (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). In contrast, with organizational mindlessness, organizations react based on preexisting ways of doing things, irrespective of their appropriateness (Vu et al., 2018). Mindlessness provides a plausible explanation for organizationally irrational actions like reverse outcome tight control. The symptoms of oganizational mindfulness/mindlessness will be discussed as follows.

Mindfulness and Control

Organizational mindfulness occurs when an organization is attentive to its surroundings and responds to unexpected signals (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). It comprises five dimensions (Weick, & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al., 1999): (1) Preoccupation with failure refers to regularly and robustly discussing potential threats (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). (2) Reluctance to simplify interpretations pertains to decision makers resisting simplifying assumptions about the world (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). (3) Sensitivity to operations refers to sustained understandings of operations in the moment (Weick et al., 1999). (4) A commitment to resilience involves an increase in the capability to adapt to unexpected events (Van Dyck et al., 2005). Finally, (5) deference to expertise occurs when the right to make decisions is given to those with the greatest expertise with the problem at hand, regardless of hierarchy (Ray et al., 2011).

Mindful control can thus be characterized as:

Preoccupation with failure

Mindful controllers are prepared for unexpected events. They proactively engage in discussion and analysis of the signs of such events once signs appear.

A nuanced understanding of current situations

Most events have many interpretations. The controller avoids being trapped in a narrow context and routines by maintaining a wide attentional breadth and embraces changes brought by new information. When performance problems occur, mindful controllers identify root causes by searching for various meanings from different people, rather than only following their beliefs and feelings (Hoy, 2003).

Sensitivity to project situations

Mindful controllers continuously and proactively receive and monitor new information (Hoy, 2003), instead of passively receiving information. For example, mindful controllers may use control mechanisms such as on-site monitoring and weekly meetings to not only track controlees’ behaviors but also to be informed of the project situation on the ground.

Awareness of new control configurations

Mindful controllers are committed to resilience and respond to the current situation with changes in control configuration when needed. They create new or adjust existing control configurations based on an analysis of issues from multiple perspectives.

Awareness of empowerment

As controllers are not necessarily equipped with all knowledge and skills required, mindful controllers seek feedback from those familiar with the situation with relevant expertise.

Mindlessness and Control

In contrast, mindless organizations operate with low levels of attention and alertness. They are governed by predefined rules and procedures, regardless of present circumstances (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). They are characterized by a rigid application of existing categories, automatic actions, and fixation on a single point of view (Weick et al., 1999). A rigid application of existing categories refers to overusing familiar routines regardless of whether they are appropriate (Rerup, 2005). Automatic actions refer to the situations where organizations ignore new information and mechanically employ rules-based behavior (Fiol & O’Connor, 2003). Fixation on a single point of view occurs when organizations are locked in a single perspective without considering other possible perspectives (Rerup, 2005).

Thus, mindless controllers are identified via three characteristics:

Reliance on historical controls

Mindless controllers rely on historical control modes with which they are familiar or ones previously successfully implemented, without consideration of the effectiveness of these controls in the current context. For example, Cardinal et al. (2004) recount where management of a moving company managed controlees via personal relationships rather than rules. This continued as the moving company expanded and the number of employees increased, making maintaining the web of interrelationships infeasible.

Automatic enactment of controls

Mindless controllers automatically enact the same controls in the same way without considering the current situation. For example, mindless controllers insist every step of a bureaucratic process be strictly followed regardless of whether such is meaningful for the current situation.

Ignoring control feedback

The commitment to existing control makes mindless controllers reluctant to change and thus ignore negative control feedback. Lim et al. (2011) describe a client who enacted tighter and tighter controls on a vendor as a project got more delayed. The real problem was the complex client requirements that were difficult to communicate, resulting in scope creep. The client ignored vendor complaints, which eventually resulted in a vendor mutiny: the vendor unilaterally froze the requirements document, changed the locks on the meeting room door, and refused to meet the client.

Mindless control is likely to lead to a failure to correct reverse outcome tight control once it occurs. In contrast, with mindful control, controllers continuously discern discriminatory details about emergent issues and quickly respond with newly appropriate controls (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).

Institutional and Contextual Causes of Mindfulness/Mindlessness

Despite the importance of organizational mindfulness, there is little literature about antecedents of organizational mindfulness and mindlessness (Kalafatoğlu & Turgut, 2019; Reb et al., 2015; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Moreover, the research is not systematic and is underdeveloped about when, where, and how organizational mindfulness/mindlessness occurs (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). Articles focus on specific factors explaining mindfulness/mindlessness rather than developing overarching frameworks. Studies have explored the influence of organizational practices, including employee relations, climate, and training (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003); physical work environments (Barry & Meisiek, 2010); and leadership (Ray et al., 2011) on organizational mindlessness/mindfulness. For example, Rerup (2009) found organizational audits and communication across different levels/units enabled the organization to cultivate greater attention to weak cues. Therefore, there is a need to explore the antecedents of mindful/mindless control systematically.

Research Framework

The preceeding discussion leads to the research framework in Figure 1. We posit reverse outcome tight control is caused by organizational mindlessness, and the correction of reverse outcome tight control requires the controller organization to obtain mindfulness. However, as mentioned previously, the factors influencing controller’s mindless and mindful control are still not systematically explored. Identifying these factors, which would allow us to determine how reverse outcome tight control can be avoided, is the focus of this article.

Figure 1.

Research framework.

Methodology

It is difficult to observe reverse outcome tight control in practice, because it is often conflated with other behaviors (e.g., workplace resistance). Thus, it is hard to perform a large sample study to answer this research question. Instead, we used an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995) of a Chinese government construction project where reverse outcome tight control occurred and was corrected.

Field Site

The case site is a large (US$123 million) Chinese government construction project for a unique building. A project management company with more than 10 years experience was the primary contractor. The project management company made contracts with and directed subcontractors, managed daily operations, and reported directly to the government. After project completion, the building was handed to its user, a government-funded group. For this article, the project management company is the controlee and the supervising government organization is the controller, because the supervising organization structured and exercised a portfolio of control modes to ensure the project management company acted as expected. The user group is a critical stakeholder, but not the controller as it had no authority over the project management company. Indeed, we have much data where the user wanted the project management company to do something, but was overruled by the controller.

Initial construction discussions began in 2009. The project was completed in 2019, one year after planned completion in 2018. The controlee (the project management company) felt they experienced two episodes of control: reverse outcome tight control and functioning tight control. During the first episode, the controlee felt unproductive pressure from the controller and considered the controls to negatively influence project progress. In the second episode, the controlee perceived the controller had relaxed control and became more involved, accelerating project progress. Interviewees explicitly mentioned control and gave specific examples, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Project timeline.

While the controlee felt they experienced reverse outcome tight control, the controlee behaved according to controls. They did not resist, work around, or otherwise try to mitigate reverse outcome tight control. As the project management company noted:

“We know it is time-consuming to follow everything required by the government. However, if we break the regulations, we will be punished. …. If we want to reduce risks and gain more opportunities to work for the government in the future, we need to follow them.” (project management staff, 2019)

Data Collection

Data comprised semistructured interviews, telephone calls, and documents, including archival records. Eleven interviews were conducted, each lasting 30 minutes to two hours. Interviewees were managers and staff in the project management company (controlees) who interacted directly with the government controller (see Table 1). These individuals were interviewed because all controls were enacted through government interaction with them. The interview guide is in the Appendix at the end of the article.

Table 1.

Summary of Interviews

Interviewees	Number of Interviews
Senior manager	2
Project manager	2
Project management staff (2)	2
Supervision manager	2
Supervision management staff (2)	2
Construction cost manager	1

We did neither obtain permission nor interviewed any controller representatives. However, we obtained archival material capturing controls issued by the controller, including official documents related to the government management system, status reports, major events reports, special events reports, and feedback from the controller, as illustrated in Table 2. This material is important to understand controller/controlee interactions, because the controller required the controlee to strictly follow procedures and report the project status and any project changes in the form of documents. The controller then gave feedback through the documents. The controller also gave feedback and requirements for work mainly in the form of documents. Therefore, this material complemented and helped triangulate interviews to enhance our understanding of controller/controlee interactions (Klein & Myers, 1999). It also provides a comprehensive understanding of the project since it recorded events not mentioned in interviews.

Table 2.

Summary of Documents

Documents	Number of Documents
Weekly and monthly reports	122
Project verification and change requests (including special events reports and major events reports)	58
Correspondences	37

We also clarified events and issues with the senior manager and the heads of the project management and supervision department in the project management company. Other interviewees mentioned that the senior manager communicated with government employees to further understand controller intentions for the project. The heads of the project management department and supervision department worked on this project for its duration and were therefore very familiar with issues that emerged. We also circulated drafts of the case to informants and solicited feedback to ensure we accurately reported case events (Yin, 2009).

Data Analysis

Content analysis techniques were used to code data (Flick, 2013). We began data analysis by assembling the raw data into chronological order. We then employed temporal bracketing to segment data into episodes (Langley, 1999). In temporal bracketing, episodes are blocks of activity representing a stable continuity. Encounters are blocks of activity that interrupt episodes causing one episode to transition to another (Newman & Robey, 1992). Using our theoretical framework (see Figure 1), we segmented our data into two episodes, the reverse outcome tight control and functioning tight control episodes (see Figure 2).

The natural breakpoint between episodes—the encounter—occurred when the user group badgered the controller about project status at the beginning of 2019. The existing building of the user group was scheduled for condemnation in August 2018. The user group negotiated a delay in building demolishment until the new building was ready, for a cost. As these payments affected the user group’s bottom line, they exerted pressure on the controller through various channels. The controller then became more involved in the project and changed its portfolio of controls.

After segmenting our data, we manually coded data based on mindlessness/mindfulness (Flick, 2013). While we theorize mindlessness may be a source of reverse outcome tight control, we did not code data following this logic. Instead, we looked for evidence of mindfulness/mindlessness in both episodes. Evidence was coded as mindless control if it satisfied at least one of the three dimensions of mindless control (Weick et al., 1999) and mindful control if it satisfied at least one of five dimensions (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). See Table 3 for descriptions of codes and examples.

Table 3.

Summary of Mindfulness/Mindlessness Codes

Mindless Control	Mindful Control
Automatic enactment of controls: Controls were enacted based only on government regulations without considering the meaningfulness under the current situation. “The government insisted on going through each process of decision makings even under time pressure.” (supervision manager, 2018)	Preoccupation with failure: Controller paid attention to unexpected events and took measures to prevent recurrences. “Right now they were also concerned about the delays of the project. Then they came frequently to solve issues quickly.” (construction cost manager, 2019)
Reliance on historical controls: Controller insisted on using historical controls despite demonstrable evidence of their ineffectiveness. “They [the controller] mainly relied on weekly/monthly reports to be informed of the situation… They were unfamiliar with the site… There were a few situations they failed to understand the situation appropriately and could not make decisions.” (project manager, 2020)	A nuanced understanding of current situations: Controller listened to controlee suggestions or acted on feedback from other parties. “They finally accelerated approval of funding after our continuous comminication.” (senior manager, 2019)
Ignoring control feedback: After control was proven ineffective, controlee voiced to controller that control had negative implications, but controller continued to enact control. “The decision makings were not efficient. We then tried to remind them of the urgency of the project through informal communication and phone calls. But it did not work well.” (senior manager, 2020)	Sensitivity to project situations: Controller was more concerned about project status instead of only fulfilling job responsibility. “The frequency [of visiting the site] was increasing… This helped them better understand and monitor the situations.” (construction cost manager, 2019)
	Awareness of new control configurations: Controller adapted controls to the current situation.“At a later stage, they were aware of time-consuming processes. They had ad hoc meetings for urgent issues.” (supervision manager, 2019)
	Awareness of empowerment: Controller was flexible in decision-making structures.“Sometimes if the issue was not that major but waiting for the reply may lead to a suspension in the work, we could make decisions first.” (senior manager, 2020)

The dimensions of mindless/mindful control are not independent of each other and their interdependence or independence is not relevant to this analysis. For example, openness to control feedback may lead to adoption of new controls. Regardless, both are evidence of mindfulness. The analysis results suggested mindless control was a source of reverse outcome tight control, whereas mindful control facilitated functioning tight control.

We then applied a grounded approach to compare the episodes to find causes of mindless/mindful control (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We identified three common themes: (1) controller agents are themselves controlled by a set of rules, (2) institutional traditionalism versus rational authority, and (3) conflict between self-interest and overarching organizational goals. By controller agents are controlled, we mean controller agents were subordinate to others and performed actions based on particular rules. By institutional traditionalism, we mean Weber’s (1958) idea that institutions are governed in three possible ways—charisma, tradition, and rational authority. In the institutional traditionalist style of governance, processes are enacted because, “they have always been this way” (Weber, 1958). By rational authority, we mean Weber’s concept of a logical and systematic approach to governance. By conflict between individual self-interest and overarching goals, we mean individuals are incentivized to perform behaviors detrimental to organizational goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this case, bureaucrats were incentivized to enact controls detrimental to organizational goals by institutional traditionalism, leading to organizational mindlessness. Once bureaucrats were incentivized to enact controls via rational authority, organizational mindfulness occurred. These points are elaborated on as follows.

Findings

This construction project was proposed by the user group to expand its workplace and update its equipment. However, the user group had insufficient funds and applied for government funding. After the application was approved, the government designated a government organization to manage it, a cross-government project management office (PMO). Because of historical high failure rates (75% in road and rail projects) (Ansar et al., 2016) attributed to cost overruns, the government organization principally focused on cost containment, and its default suite of controls, such as requiring approval before scope changes could be implemented, emphasized this.

Mindless Control Episode

Construction began in 2016. The government organization was principally staffed by bureaucrats who were not incentivized for project completion, but on orderly completion of routine bureaucratic processes—for example, whether proper paperwork for a change process was filed.

“… In the future, please strictly follow the [government]’s ‘administrative measures of the construction funding management, approval, payment, on-site visa, and engineering change,’ and ‘further requirements’ to obtain the preapproval through ‘forming a special report,’ submitting it to the agent construction center for approval, and then implementing after approval.” (government’s reply to controlee change request, 2019)

The actual changes in the project were not in their scope of work. Indeed, because such changes could potentially fall outside of routine bureaucratic processes, bureaucrats were often reluctant to approve them.

“It is their system problem …. They worked in the administrative department, so they were responsible for everything but they were not responsible for anything. They were required to monitor the project but they did not have to be accountable for problems.” (project manager, 2020)

In novel projects, changes in process are common—controlees who encounter problems naturally request changes. The slow approval of necessary changes slowed the project down. Despite this, the controlee adhered to bureaucratic processes in part because the controlee could be sanctioned for failure to follow bureaucracy, but would not be sanctioned for project delays if they followed bureaucratic processes.

“We all know, it is the culture of the government to emphasize adherence to procedures. Sometimes it is forgivable if you do not perform well but strictly follow the procedures. In contrast, if you perform well but break the protocol, you might be punished…” (project management staff, 2019)

Time-consuming bureaucratic procedures led to payment delays and disrupted project progress. For instance, this project needed to pay for a road repair because the installation of piping damaged the road outside the building. The service fee was required to be paid within five days of ordering it. However, the funding allocation took at least 20 days to process and could not be accelerated even though the controlee reported the issue to the bureaucrats. Because payment was not on time, the road repair was not started. The controlee had to go to different departments for an extension until payment was finalized.

“Our project could not meet those payment requirements because the procedures for funding allocation were too long. The form needed to be signed by many people and we also needed to wait for the meeting… It was normal that this procedure took 20 or 30 days. … We… could not complete the repair activities in line with our schedule.” (project manager, 2020)

The regulations also required the controlee to report any potential deviations costing more than RMB 10,000 (approximately US$1,410). These changes had to be approved before execution. As with funding allocation, change request approval procedures were long. The bureaucrats would not hold meetings to give final decisions until documents were signed by all required departments. Moreover, the meeting was only held when all relevant bureaucrats were available and this uncertainty put further pressure on the controlee.

“The procedures were too long and time-consuming, and we needed to wait for them to hold meetings. You never knew when they would have meetings. Therefore, you had no idea when and how you could deal with the changes …” (supervision manager, 2018)

Progress was also slowed by bureaucrats’ unfamiliarity with the actual project situation. Regulations did not specify what bureaucrats should monitor. Thus, bureaucrats did not visit the site frequently, choosing to be informed mainly through weekly/monthly reports. It was hard to make decisions only based on formal documents, which often did not provide important contextual details about changes. Consequently, the controlee had to go to relevant bureaucrats’ offices to explain potential changes. However, bureaucrats were often skeptical of the necessity of changes, asking “Why do you want to change?” and “Is this change absolutely necessary?” They insisted the controlee provide additional information before giving suggestions. After explaining the issue and getting suggestions from bureaucrats, the controlee would follow the formal procedures to submit forms and wait for bureaucrats’ internal meetings for final decisions.

“After getting their opinions, we submitted the required forms and material. Then different hierarchies reviewed the documents in order. After all the hierarchies approved, we waited for them to have an internal meeting to give the final decisions. But you had no idea when that meeting would be held.” (project manager, 2019)

Any significant change involving large amounts of money took a very long time. For example, the controlee suggested replacing the current material for the facades. Before submitting the formal documents, the controlee went to bureaucrats’ offices to discuss the issue. Nonetheless, the bureaucrats did not give any opinions, but instead, “just asked us to go to other offices for suggestions” (project manager, 2020). Later on, the bureaucrats came to the site and held a meeting with the controlee and design company to understand the issue more comprehensively. However, as bureaucrats “were too careful and afraid of taking accountability” (project management staff, 2019), they did not give any clear replies as to whether the change would be approved. They simply required the design company to submit formal documents and go through formal procedures. After the submission, the bureaucrats asked another professional department to assess the necessity of the change and held meetings with the controlee and the design company. After that, no reply was given as to whether the work could proceed.

“We did not dare to take any action, because no one wanted to be accountable for continuing work using the current material. However, we were really concerned about it as the project was at a key point. We kept making phone calls and going to the bureaucrats [to illustrate the urgency of the issue and ask for updates on the request]. However, they just told us they were still discussing it.” (the senior manager, 2020)

Finally, the bureaucrats denied the change request. The entire cycle took three months.

Even though following procedures took time, the controlee learned it was better than taking their own initiative. Often, the final decision the bureaucrats made was not in line with what the controlee felt was most appropriate. For example, the user wanted to change the flooring of a room from brick to wood and add other fittings such as a mirror. Initially, the bureaucrats did not approve these significant, costly changes. However, after negotiation between the user and one bureaucrat, an informal agreement was reached. The controlee was then required to go through formal approval procedures again. Surprisingly, the approval was rejected by other bureaucrats. Back-and-forth negotiations occurred for three months before the changes were finally approved and construction could begin.

“… It [the decision] changed again and again. We negotiated for so many times. They [the bureaucrats] also held formal meetings many times. During this time, we could not continue our work. If this part was delayed, the whole project would be delayed.” (project manager, 2020)

Faced with the controller’s slow decision-making, the controlee learned the only feasible option was to remind bureaucrats to make decisions more quickly. This was generally ineffective.

“… [I]t [reminding the bureaucrats] did not work well, but they [the bureaucrats] were our superiors. We could not use sticks to push them but negotiate with them. This is their current status.” (project manager, 2019)

The bureaucrats did not change their processes even when the project slipped its deadline.

Encounter

The existing building was to be condemned in August 2018. The user had to pay for delays related to demolition of the old building and exerted pressure on the controller through various government channels. For example, the user sent correspondence to the bureaucrats to urge them to speed up approvals:

“Since the start of the construction project of [the name of the building], In order to make sure that the project will achieve the outcomes as expected, the project management company led the user, the construction company and the design company to visit the site, communicate and negotiate many times. Finally a number of change plans were reached. All the change plans have been submitted to your department.”

“Currently, the construction has entered the countdown stage. The delivery time is imminent. we hope that you will continue to fully support the project to make sure the construction project will be completed successfully.” (user letter to government organization, 2019)

Consequently, bureaucrats became more involved in the project and changed the portfolio of controls.

Mindful Control Episode

The bureaucrats changed orientation and thinking. They not only held meetings with all parties to stress time pressure and clarify current issues but also talked to different participants individually. The bureaucrats also became more involved. They visited the site more frequently and broadened the scope of their information gathering. This provided a convenient channel for all parties to communicate, saving time.

“For example, [user] required additional lights and a logo on the playground, but they [bureaucrats] initially rejected this requirement. However, the user insisted on adding lights and the logo and communicated with the representative on-site directly. Since the representative was on-site… he knew the situation well. He could report and explain the situation to other departments, and it reduced the frequency for me to go to their offices.” (project manager, 2020)

The frequent site visits helped bureaucrats become familiar with operations on the ground. They realized with surprise that many outstanding issues needed to be addressed. Thus they did not interrogate the controlee as extensively when changes were requested. They saw the necessity of the changes themselves.

“For example, when the gas company required us to make changes, we reported the issue to them. However, their first reaction was the changes could be avoided by negotiating with the gas company. After they got involved in the negotiation, they realized it was not negotiable.” (project manager, 2020)

The bureaucrats furthermore relaxed formal controls. They agreed paperwork for key issues could be done later, while nonessential issues that would not influence the project progress could continue to be solved through bureaucratic processes. This alleviated the controlee’s administrative burden and facilitated project progress. For example, bureaucrats allowed the controlee to pave the bricks outside the building while simultaneously going through formal reporting procedures.

“We needed to pave the bricks, which would cost tens of thousands of dollars. Since the bureaucrats on the site understood the necessity of the issue, they directly talked to their colleagues and superiors. After their informal discussion, their superior agreed to undertake the activities first. Therefore, we paved the bricks while following the [administrative] procedures to prepare documents and wait for the formal reply.” (project manager, 2020)

Moreover, they made decisions more quickly. They sometimes arranged meetings for emergent issues in advance.

“There were several times they made decisions so quickly. I remember there was a time when I submitted the documents for a change request, they were going to hold a meeting. Consequently, they discussed the issue immediately and gave a reply in two hours. This was the fastest time we ever experienced.” (project manager, 2020)

Finally, the project was transferred to the user in August 2019. The key points of our findings are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4.

Summary of Findings

Mindless Control	Encounter	Mindful Control
Insistence on fulfillment of processes, regardless of current situation Slow decision-making due to unfamiliarity with the actual project situation and/or strict implementation of administrative processes Ignorance of feedback from controlee	Feedback from user	Relaxing fulfillment of paperwork and simplifying some procedures Frequent visits to site and a broader scope of information gathering Increase in informal discussion with controlee Nuanced understanding of the project and quick reaction to issues
Outcome: reverse outcome tight control	Feedback from user	Outcome: functioning tight control

Discussion

While reverse outcome tight control was not the sole determining factor for delays in this project, it was a significant contributor. The controlee spent considerable time not performing tasks, because they were ordered not to do things until the controller (government organization) made decisions. The data reveal three fundamental drivers for reverse outcome tight control.

The first driver was that controller agents were controlled. The bureaucrats who were controller agents were themselves controlled by rules and controlled controlees based on those rules. This is common in large projects. Increasing project complexity creates a distance between the project owner and the people performing the project that is spanned by controller agents.

The second driver is institutional traditionalism versus rational authority. The controller agents were bureaucrats in a large government bureaucracy. Government bureaucracies are generally institutional traditionalists (Weber, 1958). Enacted rules are expected to be obeyed regardless of whether they make sense given a particular situation. Unlike rational authority where the authority modifies rules if doing so is rational, a controller agent in most government organizations can only make judgment calls within the constraints of the rules.

Apart from the controled controller agents and insitutional traditionalism, conflict between individual self-interest and overarching goals also contributed to reverse outcome tight control. The exception to the preceeding two conditions occurs if controller agents act selflessly (Davis et al., 1997; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2020); they break rules for the benefit of the project. However, doing so would endanger their own careers. It is in the bureaucrats’ self-interest to mindlessly adhere to rules, as the case data indicate.

Bureaucrats thus behaved in a rational manner, but this led the government organization to control the project management company in a mindless manner. The previous argument, however, suggests government projects are forever doomed to be controlled mindlessly, raising the issue of whether projects can be controlled mindfully by government project management organizations. Our data suggest mindful control can arise if necessary feedback is obtained. Control has two aspects—monitoring and rewards/sanctions (Maestrini et al., 2018). Rewards and sanctions are principally awarded to the controlee based on information the controller obtains (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2016). Wrong or incomplete information causes the controller to enact wrong rewards and sanctions. The information the controller obtains is divisible into two categories: (1) processual, information obtained as a result of well-defined processes; and (2) nonprocessual, information obtained as a result of processes not defined a priori as belonging to the project.

Certain kinds of information are generated regularly by defined processes in projects. In our case, this included principally health and safety information (which controllers obtained on site visits), and cost and change request information (obtained via change request forms). In our case, processual information suggested the controlee was being appropriately controlled. The controlee passed the requisite safety checks and dutifully filled out the forms correctly.

What transformed the controller’s enactment of controls was obtaining nonprocessual information, where the origin of information was not the controlee. The controlee produced substantial nonprocessual information suggesting the project had problems. The controlee highlighted delays due to slow decision-making, such as being unable to work on the façade until decisions were made, and problems with the road from slow procurement of funds.

The problem with nonprocessual information from the controlee is that controllers often do not trust controlees. Standard control assumptions are that moral hazard and adverse selection exist (Darrough & Stoughton, 1986). By implication, controllers believe controlees produce information to benefit controlees and do not listen to controlees. The literature has documented this through phenomena such as the deaf effect (Keil & Robey, 2001) and self-justification bias (Cheng et al., 2009).

The controller only reacted to nonprocessual information originating from the user who complained that delays were costing the user. Unlike the controlee, there was little risk of moral hazard or adverse selection from the user who had every incentive to have the building constructed cheaply and efficiently. Furthermore, user complaints were likely to negatively impact controller self-interest because negative feedback would make the government organization look bad. Thus, the controller took user complaints at face value, and realized its controls were malfunctioning. As per the literature (Cardinal et al., 2004; Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Gregory et al., 2013), the controller then revised its portfolio of controls to properly incentivize the controlee, and the project turned around and was completed.

The Problem With Not Knowing

The problem with nonprocessual information is that trying to capture such information in processes is a contradiction in terms. There will always be critical information about a project existing processes do not capture. By definition, projects are unique—they are “a unique, transient endeavour, undertaken to achieve planned objectives, which could be defined in terms of outputs, outcomes or benefits (Association for Project Management [APM], 2012, p. 12).”

In contrast, process formalization either assumes information is available or can be procured.

Fortunately, not having information is addressable in a straightforward way—seek the information one does not have. However, if one does not know that one does not have information, no actionable process can be defined. For example, one can define a process for engaging with the gas company to provide service if one knows the gas company’s policies. However, the controller not only did not know the gas company’s policy of not negotiating, but also did not know it did not know. Thus, the controller insisted the controlee negotiate—a futile effort. It was only after the controller learned about the nonnegotiation policy that it could enact more appropriate action—approving the controlee’s existing actions.

The fundamental situation creating mindless control then is unknown unknowns (Ramasesh & Browning, 2014), which arises from unanticipated and unpredicted situations. Because controllers do not directly observe the situation on the ground, but instead are informed by controlees, unknowns become known only when controlees behave in unpredicted ways (Ramasesh & Browning, 2014). However, controls are attempts to shape and make controlee behavior predictable (Kirsch, 1996). If controls are particularly strong, controlees behave according to controls even though the situation on the ground does not call for it. Our results suggest this is when reverse outcome tight control occurs. The reverse outcome tight control then causes an “illusion of consensus” problem, where controllers believe things are better than they really are (Watkins & Bazerman, 2003). This then creates a vicious circle between mindless control and reverse outcome tight control.

The Enactment of Unprocess

Given observing controlees does not work when unknown unknowns arise, a strong controller must obtain information about unknown unknowns from other sources. One approach emphasized to convert unknown unknowns to known unknowns is frequent and effective communication across hierarchical levels (Canonico & Söderlund, 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Sakka et al., 2013; Sakka et al., 2016; Taipalus et al., 2020). The literature argues such communication is best facilitated through flexible organization/project structure design (Loch et al., 2008; Ramasesh & Browning, 2014; Simangunsong et al., 2012) and/or fostering a culture of trust and collaborative behavior (Ramasesh & Browning, 2014; Rerup, 2009; Sanderson, 2012). However, flexible structure design is not suitable for public projects, which necessarily contain a certain level of bureaucracy. Moreover, cultural change is not practical in the compressed time environments of most projects.

Our data suggest a different approach to transforming unknown unknowns into known unknowns: a controllers’ enactment of “unprocess.” An unprocess is a series of actions controllers use to proactively seek project information not obtainable through standard project processes (controls) within a block of time. Unprocess in our case occurred when the controller began visiting the project site without a clear objective in mind. In the mindless control episode, the controller visited the project site with specific purposes in mind (evaluate the concrete mix) and focused only on obtaining specific information necessary for controlling particular activities. In contrast, in the mindful control episode, the controller was more receptive to unanticipated information. For example, contrast the way the controller handled the need to pave bricks versus when a room needed to be redone. In the room case, the controller focused entirely on information collected on standard forms, required three months to make a decision, and flip-flopped on decision-making. This was because the critical information needed was not on the forms that it did not know about and therefore did not know to ask for. In contrast, the brick-paving case was handled smoothly, because the controller was on-site, had a full grasp of the issues, and therefore could make a rational decision.

Unprocess as a concept has begun to be captured in modern project thinking. For example, in agile development, there is a call for controllers and controlees to work together (Dybå & Dingsøyr, 2008; Serrador & Pinto, 2015). One benefit of doing so is that controllers are more likely to obtain unsolicited information.

Unprocess is similar to but not identical to interactive control systems (Simons, 1995). Interactive control systems emphasize controllers’ active use of feedback from specific control systems through debate and face-to-face dialogue with controlees (Simons, 1995). Thus, information seeking in interactive control systems occurs within the control system itself. With unprocess, information outside of what the control system provides is sought. The problem with tight control is that it encourages controlees to behave in a particular way, restricting the kind of information available within the control system.

The concept is also captured through mechanisms such as independent project audits, where third parties are included midway through the project for a review. However, we observe these audits often fail, because the audit scope is defined too narrowly and thus the amount of nonprocessual information collected and analyzed by the auditor is constrained (Hung & Cheng, 2018).

The key distinction of an unprocess is that it is not structured. The project manager or associated agent performing an unprocess is not predictable, seeking information in a pseudorandom manner to identify discrepancies. Unprocess is akin to troubleshooting—the controller or a proxy actively investigates the project to collect undefined information.

Ironically, mindfully engaging in unprocess requires controllers to be unfocused and nonspecific, whereas mindless management is focused and specific. Focusing by controllers narrows vision, preventing controllers from observing phenomena counter to their beliefs.

Practical Issues in Implementing Unprocess

The problem with unprocess is that it flies in the face of traditional project management thinking where project work is specified as a series of well-defined, costed tasks with a well-defined outcome. Actionable unprocess has no defined outcome, no defined amount of time consumed, and no defined sequence of activities and therefore cannot be accurately costed. If one does not know what one does not know, how does one know that one has learned it?

Furthermore, unprocess is not a panacea, being neither sufficient nor necessary for project success. It is not sufficient as it is possible that one is open to information, but information is never obtained until after it is difficult to action it. Consider the change in façade material example. The controller had to employ professional experts to assess the situation even after visiting the site. Enacting unprocess is expensive. While the controller was on-site, the controller was not performing other administrative functions.

Unprocess is also not necessary. The user pointed out to the controller that the project was going to be late. It is possible to obtain nonprocessual information serendipitously. However, without unprocess such information often arrives too late. By the time the controller was alerted the project had already been unavoidably delayed—it finished a year late.

Nevertheless, we argue that without unprocess control will necessarily be mindless. Recall mindful control has five parts: (1) preoccupation with failure, (2) a nuanced understanding of current situations, (3) sensitivity to project situations, (4) awareness of new control configurations, and (5) awareness of empowerment (Weick et al., 1999; Weick, & Sutcliffe, 2001). To be aware of multiple perspectives, one must learn what those perspectives are. Similarly, openness to control feedback requires one to solicit feedback. Finally, one cannot determine the appropriateness of the control configuration without scanning the environment.

Contributions to Control Theory and Practice

Our research thus enriches control theory in three ways. First, drawing on tight control theory and mindfulness theory, we conceptualize reverse outcome tight control and document an example of it. Although reverse outcome tight control is common in practice, prior literature mainly focuses on the more general concept of control failure (e.g., Anteby & Chan, 2018), since it is difficult to isolate reverse outcome tight control empirically. Our research provides not only conceptual clarity on reverse outcome tight control but also a documented and analyzed empirical example of reverse outcome tight control.

Second, our research reveals reverse outcome tight control exists due to mindless control. While the prior literature focused on how excessively tight control influences project performance (Bonner, 2005; Merchant, & Van der Stede, 2016), it did not explain why excessively tight control exists. Additionally, the literature on control enactment mainly focuses on coercive or enabling enactments (Gregory & Keil, 2014; Wiener et al., 2016), missing the essential role of the controller’s state of mindfulness. Our case study shows mindless controllers only focus on information about control and thus do not know they do not know information outside control. This may cause reverse outcome tight control.

Therefore, we introduce our third contribution, a solution to mindless control—unprocess. We highlight that beyond traditional feedback cycles, controllers should spend time searching for information on true project status unobtainable through existing control processes. Although unprocess has been implicitly discussed in previous literature, such as agile management, it has not been clearly articulated. Our research elaborates on this concept and documents how unprocess can be an effective way to improve project performance.

This study also provides implications for practice. It suggests the necessity of a block of time for controllers to actively seek information outside routine and well-defined tasks. Apart from following traditional feedback cycles, the controller should be open to new information and troubleshoot to proactively check for potential issues. The implication is the importance of free time for controllers or their proxies. Far too often, controllers are overwhelmed with the minutiae of managing projects that they fail to observe the obvious.

Conclusion

This research set out to explore the unsolved puzzle of reverse outcome tight control. We argue one reason reverse outcome tight control arises is mindless control. Controllers substitute the idea of feedback about the project with feedback from control. When feedback from control is positive, controllers believe all is well. Our research not only contributes to clarifying reverse outcome tight control but also suggests a solution is for the controller to enact unprocess: the controller or a proxy (e.g., PMO, internal auditor, or external consultants) deliberately seeks information about the project outside project routines. The need for proactive information seeking is increasingly important, because routinized behavior is no longer sufficient to deal with the dynamic and turbulent environments associated with many modern projects.

Given ours is a Chinese government construction case, it might be objected that the transferability of our results is limited by the nonprofit, Chinese institutional setting. However, our research remains meaningful, because infrastructure investment in China is about US$3.6 trillion per year (CBNEditor, 2020).

Furthermore, we believe our insights into reverse outcome tight control are transferrable to other types of projects. Reverse outcome tight control is common. We verified mindless control is a source of reverse outcome tight control, which, in turn, reinforces mindless control through unknown unknowns. Therefore, we suggested one way to overcome mindless control is to reduce unknown unknowns via unprocess. This is similar to agile thinking, which encourages interactions between the project team and the user to identify and react to potential issues timely (Fernandez & Fernandez, 2008; Maruping et al., 2009). That our research echoes others suggests our research is transferrable to other settings.

Our research also has implications for future research. First, the concept of unprocess developed here needs more exploration. We propose the enactment of unprocess to increase the width and vividness of attention. Since the notion of unprocess is newly developed, future research can build on ours to enrich this concept.

Furthermore, while our research was conducted at the organizational level, we found rationality at the individual level might lead to organizational level mindlessness. Future research can extend ours to explore how individual mindfulness affects organizational mindfulness, thereby influencing project performance.

We also acknowledge the limitations to this research. While our research aims to explore reverse outcome tight control, we did not get access to the controller. Although the controller interacted with the controlee mainly through formal documents, it would be beneficial to study the interpretation of the controller.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Wenxin Chen

Author Biographies

Wenxin Chen is a PhD student in the School of Business at University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia. She received her Master’s degree in Financial Management from the Management School of Ocean University of China, Qingdao, Shandong Province, China. Her research focuses on corporate governance, project governance and project management. She can be contacted at wenxin.chen@student.adfa.edu.au

Cecil Eng Huang Chua is an Associate Professor at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He received a PhD in Information Systems from Georgia State University, a Master’s in Business by Research from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and both a Bachelor’s in Business Administration in Computer Information Systems and Economics and a Master’s certificate in Telecommunications Management from the University of Miami, Florida, USA. Cecil has published several articles in journals, including Information Systems Research and MIS Quarterly. He is on the editorial staff of AIS Transactions on HCI, Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Project Management Journal^®, Information & Management and Information Systems Journal. Cecil has consulted for entities such as Daimler SEAsia, General Motors Singapore, the Singapore Ministry of Defense, and Fonterra (the New Zealand milk cooperative). He can be contacted at cchua@mst.edu

Raymond Young is a Senior Associate Professor at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China, and specializes in the field of project governance. Raymond’s earlier career was as a management consultant with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu that culminated in a CIO role in a joint venture company between Fujitsu Australia and Bell Atlantic. He can be contacted at Raymond.Young@xjtlu.edu.cn

Xudong Xu received his Master’s degree in Civil Engineering from Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, Sichuan Province, China. With years of experience in construction industry, he is a senior engineer and senior member of Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), Chengdu, Sichuan Province, China. He can be contacted at xuxudong@cdcy.cn

Appendix. Interview Guide

The interviewee was informed of the nature of the study and was asked if he/she would agree to the interview being taped. The interviewee was also advised that all the information will be completely anonymous.

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