Abstract
This book aims to inform its readers concerning the philosophical, psychological and jurisprudential aspects of remorse – subjects which the authors assert have been the subject of previously scant treatment – through interdisciplinary study in a way which is intended to inform and assist practitioners with an academic or professional interest in these fields and to stimulate further research. One of its ambitions is to contribute to a better mutual understanding between psychologists and lawyers on the topic – arguably a lofty one in view of the disdain apt to be shown to the former by the latter, notably in the UK jurisdiction and especially when, there, a psychologist aims to assist a court to understand an offender's bad behaviour, to exculpate him or to undermine the strength and reliability of a (usually prosecution) witness's testimony.
The chapters cover the issues comprehensively: the relevant history and the importance of remorse in human experience – an analysis of remorse from a philosophical perspective in terms of its characteristic beliefs, feelings, desires and volitions – a psychological account of remorse and the related emotions of regret, guilt and shame and the distinctions between these – the interpersonal effects of remorse and its assessment by judges by reference to relevant clues – the extent to which remorse should be treated as a mitigating factor, and its absence an aggravating one, for sentencing outcomes – the value of remorse in the therapeutic and restorative justice settings.
The authors are both based in Australia and are, respectively, a psychologist with some clinical experience, notably with criminal offenders (Proeve) and a lawyer with an academic background in philosophy and law who has practised as a lawyer (Tudor).
The book is comprehensive of its subject matter, exceptionally well researched by reference to very extensive source material, attractively formatted and constructed and its contents flow sequentially towards a well-argued set of conclusions. It is, therefore, a remarkable academic piece and achieves its stated objectives – to expose the workings of remorse to the world, to encourage future debate and to stimulate judges to take it or, appropriately, its lack into account when sentencing offenders.
The target readership includes research and clinical psychologists, the judiciary, practising lawyers, legal academics and policy advisers.
In their successful endeavour to be thorough the authors have risked the creation of impenetrability in a way that tends to render their underlyingly useful messages opaque. It is therefore questionable as to whether casual readers (which most busy lawyers and judges are) may be deterred or prevented from identifying the book's useful essence as a result of getting stuck in what they may perceive is the thicket created by its such detailed and convoluted contents. This is unfortunate and involves a missed opportunity, especially in the UK jurisdiction where, owing to recent Government failure to resist the populist siren call for retribution and public disinclination to consider the causes of bad behaviour and their remedies – as reflected in a huge rise in its prison population over the past 10 years – ‘remorse’, except as indicated in guilty pleas, has almost become a dirty word and prison sentence lengths are effectively set in stone by policy-makers. It is not everywhere so in other Commonwealth jurisdictions – typically in New Zealand, where there is a significantly healthier and more liberal approach to the desirability of restorative justice initiatives and, as concepts, forgiveness and a recognition that punishment per se will not eradicate criminality or, at least, substantially reduce it without more.
There can be no question that, as the book persuasively argues, genuine – and, thus, altruistic – remorse can reduce the affects of wrong-doing for its sufferers and act as a stimulant for redemption and character improvement in those who sense and express it. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge, in the assessment of the genuineness of remorse and the significance of its absence, that, first, actions may speak louder than (lawyers’ or politicians’) words and, second, that those whose childhoods have been blighted and personalities harmed by psychopathologically damaging influences – often wholly beyond their control – may be singularly ill equipped either to feel or, still less, show remorse.
Those, notably sentencers and the probation officers and lawyers who assist them, who are involved in assessing the need for the punishment of offenders, would do well to be familiar with the book's essential conclusions – but it is a pity that the likelihood of this happening is limited through the constraints of potential readers’ time and patience.