The Arbitrator Views the Industrial Engineer

The rare exception would be where management decides that it should back the foreman and make the arbitrator the scapegoat. This is one of the functions of arbitration that most arbitrators deplore even though they recognize that occasionally it may be necessary. In the usual situation, management should be under less compulsion to resort to this strategy than the union since the latter operates with a complex, internal political situation that management normally can and should override.

Prof. Griffen Daniel L. Jr. , has suggested that in technical cases a pre-hearing brief is frequently desirable. I agree that in a technical case a pre-hearing brief or statement will assist the arbitrator in his comprehension at the time of the hearing and thus may be more significantly important than a post-hearing brief.

In previous writing on the arbitration process, I have frequently urged dispensing with post-hearing briefs in the interests of expediting cases and reducing costs. In technical cases, however, I would be inclined to the view expressed herein. For a more complete analysis of the pros and cons of briefs and transcripts, see my “The Proper Uses of Arbitration,” Vol. IX, Labor Law Journal (February 1958), 119–126. In six years of arbitration under Deere-UAW contracts post-hearing briefs were filed with me in only one case. Transcripts, however, were made on many of the more technical hearings. The need for briefs was minimized by the knowledgeability and experience in presentation of both management and union representatives. See my “The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitration System,” in McKelvey Jean T. , ed., Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1957), pp. 161–192.

One of the most illuminating recent studies in this area is the research volume edited for the Industrial Relations Research Association by Somers Gerald A. Cushman Edward L. Weinberg Nat , entitled Adjusting to Technological Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

The term “automation” should be reserved for that kind of technological change that involves the use of machines to control other machines, embodying the principle of automatic self-regulation. See my Contemporary Collective Bargaining (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 291. A vivid description has recently been offered by Charles C. Killingsworth in these words: “Automation is essentially the substitution of mechanical devices for the human nervous (or sensorimotor) system—the iron hand on the stamping line for the flesh-and-blood hand, the electric eye on the camera for the human eye, the electronic computer for certain kinds of brain functions and mechanical or electric linkages or circuits for human button-pushing or lever-pulling.” See Killingsworth comments on Unterberger paper, cited below in reference 6, at pp. 258–259.

Unterberger S. Herbert , “Automation and Job Evaluation Techniques,” in Labor Arbitration and Industrial Change, Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Kahn Mark L. , ed. (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1963) pp. 238–257.

For a full discussion of the arbitrator's duty to the contract in grievance arbitration, see my “The Arbitrator Views the Agreement,” Vol. XII, Labor Law Journal (December 1961), 1161–1176. See also my “The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbitrator,” Vol. XXXVI, Notre Dame Lawyer (March 1961), 138–145.

Perhaps the most celebrated recent withdrawal is that of Kaiser Steel in connection with its productivity gains sharing plan. One aspect of this plan involves “buying out” of incentive workers. For a discussion, see The Kaiser-Steel Union Sharing Plan, National Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 187, 1963.

“Are Wage Incentives Becoming Obsolete?” Vol. II, Industrial Relations (October 1962), 73–96.

In Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration, cited supra, reference 3, p. 97.

“Arbitration of Disputes Involving Incentive Problems: An Industry View,” in ibid., p. 64.

Belcher David W. , Wage and Salary Administration (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 408. Perhaps the most searching critiques of time study as a non-scientific and subjective discipline are those of Adam Abruzzi and William Gomberg. See Abruzzi Adam , Work, Workers, and Work Measurement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) and Gomberg William , A Trade Union Analysis of Time Study (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955).

For example, one may cite the excellent study by Reynolds Lloyd G. Taft Cynthia H. , The Evolution of Wage Structure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956). A very recent study, worthy of special mention here, is that of MacDonald Robert M. , Collective Bargaining in the Automobile Industry: A Study of Wage Structure and Competitive Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

The most perceptive analysis to come to my attention on the subject of why unions behave as unions in the area of wage determination is that of Ross Arthur M. , Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948). Ross properly underscores the basic consideration that a “trade union is a political agency operating in an economic environment” (p. 28).