KoikeKazuo, “Human Resource Development and Labor-Management Relations,” in YamamuraKozoYasuhaYasukichi, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 1: The Domestic Transformation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 298–330; and LincolnJames R.McBrideKerry, “Japanese Industrial Organization in Comparative Perspective,”Annual Review of Sociology, 13 (1987): 298–312.
2.
Accounting for the slow progress of work redesign, Bradley and Gelb consider that “apart from technical advantages there is less incentive for such experiment in Mondragon. Worker ownership provides an alternative means to generate consensus and integrate the workforce.” BradleyKeithGelbAlan, Cooperation at Work: The Mondragon Experience (Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), p. 36. WhyteWhyte, on the other hand, emphasize incidental external economic pressures that divert management's efforts and implementation problems due to inexperience. WhyteWilliam FooteWhyteKathleen King, Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1988), pp. 125–127.
3.
JonssonBerthLankAlden G., “Volvo: A Report on the Workshop on Production Technology and Quality of Working Life,”Human Resource Management, 24 (Winter 1985): 455–465.
4.
PetersThomas J.WatermanRobert H., Jr., In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 137.
5.
PetersWaterman, op. cit., pp. 175–177.
6.
Koike, op. cit., pp. 319–321.
7.
LincolnMcBride, op. cit., p. 300.
8.
BradleyGelb, op. cit., p. 16.
9.
For a comprehensive discussion of worker participation in Mondragon, see WhyteWhyte, op. cit., pp. 113–127 and 209–213.
10.
ForsebackLennart, Industrial Relations and Employment in Sweden (Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1980).
11.
von WerssowetzRichard O.BeerMichael, “Human Resources at Hewlett-Packard,” Case Study 9-482-125, Harvard Business School, 1982.
12.
LincolnJames R.KallebergArne L., “Work Organizations and Workforce Commitment: A Study of Plants and Employees in the U.S. and Japan,”American Sociological Review, 50 (December 1985): 738–760.
13.
BradleyKeithGelbAlan, “Cooperative Labour Relations: Mondragon's Response to Recession,”British Journal of Industrial Relations, 25 (January 1985): 77–97.
14.
SatoKazuo, “Saving and Investment,” in YamamuraKozoYasubaYasukichi, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 1: The Domestic Transformation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 137–185.
15.
ClarkRodney, The Japanese Company (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).
16.
BradleyGelb, Cooperation at Work, p. 34; BradleyGelb, “Cooperative Labour Relations,” pp. 88–90.
17.
HauckWarren C.RossTimothy L., “Sweden's Experiments in Productivity Gainsharing: A Second Look,”Personnel, 64 (January 1987): 61–67.
18.
LeveringRobertMoskowitzMiltonKatzMichael, The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984), p. 144.
19.
AokiMasahiko, “The Japanese Firm in Transition,” in YamamuraKozoYasubaYasukichi, eds., Political Economy of Japan, pp. 263–288.
20.
BradleyGelb, “Cooperative Labour Relations,” p. 18.
21.
Levering, op. cit., p. 144.
22.
“The company had distributed $64 million in cash profit-sharing bonuses in the previous five years, and about half the employees were participating in a stock-purchase program.” AthertonRoger M.CritesDennis M., Hewlett-Packard Company (A): Problems of Rapid Growth, Case 0208 (Dover, MA: Lord Publishing, 1976), p. 7.
23.
LincolnMcBride, op. cit., pp. 296–297.
24.
Kolke, op. cit., pp. 308–309.
25.
Volvo personnel department, personal communication, Feburary 1989.
26.
JangenäsBo, The Swedish Approach to Labor Market Policy (Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1985).
27.
“Rather than run the risk of ‘big’ layoffs, Hewlett-Packard has declined to bid on short-run government contracts. It has also avoided getting into product lines where there are wide fluctuations in sales volume, such as in many consumer products.” “Since the company had policies of keeping employment steady and operating on a pay-as-you-go basis, both Hewlett and Packard believed minimal debt would be more consistent with these policies and the weakening U.S. economy.” “Their financial strategy has been to use profits, employee stock purchases, and other internally generated funds to finance growth. They have avoided long-term debt and have resorted to short-term debt only when sales growth exceeded the return on net worth.” AthertonCrites, op. cit., pp. 7, 4, 4.
28.
OuchiWilliam G., Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1981), p. 188.
29.
Koike, op. cit., pp. 319–321; MincerJacobHiguchiYoshio, “Wage Structures and Laber Turnover in the United States and Japan,”Journal of the Japanese and international Economies, vol. 2 (June 1988), pp. 97–133.
30.
BradleyGelb, Cooperation at Work, p. 17.
31.
“Even though their Individual stock holdings in 1975 were worth some $700 million, Hewlett and Packard still ran an egalitarian company. They drew salaries of only $156,000 each, and few top officers made more than $100,000.” AthertonCrites, op. cit., p. 7.
32.
WiegnerK. K., “John Young's New Jogging Shoes,”Forbes, November 4, 1985, pp. 42–44.
33.
StandingGuy, Unemployment and Labour Market Flexibility: Sweden (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1988).
34.
Wiegner, op. cit.
35.
There are important non-economic factors that can inhibit participation such as habit, history, and culture. In addition, there are some technologies where the costs of participation will always outweigh the gains, and some workers who are not interested in participating. The additional factors required to maintain management and union support are discussed in LevineDavid I.StraussGeorge, “Employee Participation and Involvement,” in Investing in People, Report for the Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency, Background papers, Vol. II, paper 35b, U.S. Department of Labor, September 1989, pp. 1893–1948.
36.
AokiMasahiko, “The Japanese Firm in Transition,” in YamamuraKozoYasubaYasukichi, ed., The Political Economy of Japan; Volume 1: The Domestic Transformation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 265.
37.
JonesDerek C.PliskinJeffrey, “The Effects of Worker Participation, Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing on Economic Performance: A Partial Review,” Working Paper 88/13, Department of Economics, Hamilton College, NY, 1988, p. 26.
38.
On the other hand, there have been several cases when the fear of layoffs has inhibited the success of participation. KochanThomasKatzHarryMowerNancy, “Worker Participation and American Unions,” in KochanThomas, ed., Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 290.
39.
BluestoneIrving, “Comments on Job Enrichment,”Organizational Dynamics, 2 (Winter 1974): 47.
40.
Quote from DeutschMorton, “Is there a tradeoff between economic efficiency and equity?” Asilomar Conference, April 17, 1988. This evidence is summarized in LevineDavid, “Cohesiveness, Productivity, and Wage Dispersion,” Working Paper 14, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley, January 1989.
41.
WitteJohn F., Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 162; BermanKatrina, “The Worker-Owned Plywood Cooperatives,” in LindenfeldFrankRothschild-WhittJoyce, eds., Workplace Democracy and Social Change (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1982), p. 171; BradleyKeithGelbAlan, Cooperation at Work: The Mondragon Experience (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983); on Japan, see OuchiWilliam, Theory Z, (New York, NY: Avon, 1981), VogelEzra, Japan as Number 1 (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 120, 140–141, and RohlenThomas, “The Company Work Group,” in VogelEzra, ed., Japanese Organization and Decision-making (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975); LawlerEdward E.III, Pay and Organizational Development (Reading, MA: Addison-Welsley, 1981), p. 225; BeerMichaelSpectorBert, Managing Human Assets (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1984), p. 145.
42.
BernsteinPaul, Workplace Democratization (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 75.
43.
Ibid.
44.
FreemanRichardMedoffJames, What Do Unions Do? (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984).
45.
SteiberJack, “Employment-At-Will: An Issue for the 1980's”1983 IRRA Proceedings (1984), p. 2.
46.
There is evidence that economic crises can prod management, workers, and unions to initiate participatory experiments; nevertheless, demand stability reduces the costs of maintaining participation.
47.
The results of this section are elaborated in SternDavid, Managing Human Resources: The Art of Full Employment (Boston, MA: Auburn House Publishing, 1982).
48.
ShleiferAndreiSummersLawrence, “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,” in AuerbachAlan, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 33–56.
49.
In Japan, for example, there is an average of over two conferences on quality circles every day. ColeRobert, Strategies for Change (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).