This study sought to examine the effects of increasing the number of bargainers armed with punitive power in a three-person bargaining game. 48 student nurses participated in the bargaining game under conditions in which: (1) all three players had punitive power; (2) two players had punitive power; (3) one player had punitive power; (4) none of the players had punitive power. The results indicated that increasing the number of players armed with punitive power led to increased competition as reflected in game choice and pre-trial communications.
References
1.
DeutschM.Bargaining, threats and communication: Some experimental findings. In ArchibaldK. (Ed.), Strategic interaction and conflict. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Univer. of California, 1965. Pp. 19–40.
2.
DeutschM.KraussR.The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 181–189.
3.
EdwardsA. L.Experimental design in psychological research. New York: Rinehart, 1960.
4.
GumpertP.Some antecedents and consequences of the use of punitive power by bargainers. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia Univer., 1967.
5.
KelleyH.Experimental studies of threats in interpersonal negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9, 79–105.
6.
ShomerR. W.DavisA.KelleyH.Threats and the development of coordination: Further studies of the Deutsch and Krauss trucking game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 119–126.
7.
SiegelS.Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956.
