“Irrational” attributions of responsibility (attributing more responsibility to a victim when his misfortune is greater and attributing more responsibility to a weaker rather than a stronger victim) were more common when decisions were hurried and among people who characteristically assign causes of actions to persons. People whose moral judgments are more sophisticated in Kohlberg's schema made fewer irrational attributions generally.
References
1.
GutkinD.An analysis of the concept of moral intentionality. Human Development, 1973, 16, 371–381.
2.
KohlbergL.From is to ought: how to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In MischelT. (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. Part II: B. New York: Academic Press, 1971. Pp. 151–235.
3.
LairdJ. D.BerglasS.Individual differences in the effects of engaging in counterattitudinal behavior. Journal of Personality, 1975, 43, 286–304.
4.
RestJ.Manual for the Defining Issues Test: an objective test of moral judgment development. Minneapolis: Univer. of Minnesota, 1974.
5.
SadowD.LairdJ. D.Irrational attributions of responsibility: who's to blame for them?European Journal of Social Psychology, 1981, 11, 427–430.
6.
ShaverK. G.Defensive attribution: effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14, 101–113.
7.
ShawM. E.SulzerJ. L.An empirical test of Heider's levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 39–46.
8.
WalsterE.Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3, 73–79.
