A test for the effects of framing of decisions and for biases associated with the judgmental heuristics of representativeness, anchoring, and availability was given to college students. The items were modifications of the original items reported by Kahneman and Tversky, reworded for simplicity and familiarity. The subjects were instructed to try to imagine actual situations described in problems. The framing effects and the biases were replicated except in the case of insensitivity to prior probabilities.
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