351 research participants in groups of three harvested resources from a slowly regenerating, shared pool in a computer-assisted game. Feedback after each round of play consisted of information about the status of the resource pool, information about the other participants' harvesting choices, or no feedback at all. Exploitation was either not punished or punished by individual or group. Analysis showed that either form of punishment improved harvests from the common resource but that feedback had no such influence.
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