Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT Tottering?

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is in deep trouble–but not only because of last year's nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the threat of “loose nukes” from Russia's disintegrating facilities, and the actions of Saddam Hussein and other nuclear-weapon wannabes. It is also under threat from its own internal contradictions and stresses.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) enhanced review process, set up when the treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, was intended to strengthen the regime; instead it has exposed serious problems.

The new process includes at least three preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs) during the five-year period between review conferences. The second preparatory meeting, held in May 1998, was a mess. Delegates could not agree on anything except when and how to hold the next meeting, which will take place in New York in April.

Last year's meeting deadlocked over two important issues: the Middle East–specifically Israel's nuclear weapons–and nuclear disarmament. All eyes are now on the third PrepCom, with frantic preparations among key players determined to avoid another impasse, which they fear could weaken the credibility of the treaty in the run-up to 2000.

The “Western group” of more than 40 countries, which includes the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australasia, is likely to focus on reinforcing the regime by inducing India and Pakistan to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Tr eaty (CTBT) and concluding a fissile material cutoff treaty, now being negotiated in Geneva. They will also stand for a strong export control regime and for beefing up the inspection powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The non-aligned, for their part, will focus on nuclear disarmament and call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and security assurances in the form of legally binding pledges from the nuclear weapon powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear arms. They will also seek to widen the fissile materials treaty to include current stockpiles.

Most important, however, will be proposals on nuclear disarmament–and the nuclear weapon states' responses to them. The more realistic the proposals are, the greater the pressure on the nuclear weapon states, which have long been let off the hook by the presumed exigencies of the Cold War and the “all or nothing” rhetoric of much of the nuclear disarmament crowd. But now, Ireland, Sweden, and New Zealand are members of the “New Agenda Coalition,” which has formed a like-minded group with non-aligned Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, and South Africa. In June 1998, the group called for more action on nuclear disarmament.

When a resolution based on the New Agenda's call was put to the vote in the U.N. General Assembly in December, it garnered 114 votes. And despite heavy arm-twisting by Britain, the United States, and France, Japan and 12 of the 16 NATO countries abstained, refusing to oppose the resolution outright. The only votes against the resolution came from four nuclear weapon states (the NATO three plus Russia), the three de facto weapon states (India, Israel, and Pakistan), Turkey, and a tranche of NATO/European Union applicant states from the former Soviet bloc.

Among other things, the New Agenda resolution called for the full implementation of the decisions adopted by the NPT parties in 1995. And it provoked a fierce debate about NATO's continuing dependence on the potential first use of nuclear weapons. With Canada prepared to vote in favor of the resolution if another nato country pledged to do likewise, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Japan came under heavy domestic pressure.

Nato's nuclear policy has been challenged by NPT member states as well. In 1995, Mexico questioned NATO's arrangement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be stationed in Europe under nato command, with provisions for control to be transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state in time of war. At the 1997 NPT meeting, South Africa raised concerns about the “nonproliferation implications” of NATO's planned expansion. Britain objected vehemently, saying that nato arrangements were irrelevant to the treaty and denying the implication that the transfer of nuclear weapons among nato members might violate the NPT's Articles I and II.

By 1998, however, the collective statement from the Non-Aligned Movement, which includes more than 100 developing countries, addressed the issue head on. The group opposed “nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.” Egypt, especially concerned about alleged transfers of nuclear know-how to Israel, also criticized those who argued that the NPT would apply only in times of peace. Egypt proposed that the Review Conference in 2000 should unambiguously state that Articles I and II allow for no exceptions and that the NPT is binding on its signatories at all times.

NATO is undergoing a review of its strategic concept, last updated in 1991. The New Agenda resolution and highlevel appeals from former military and diplomatic luminaries such as Gen. Lee Butler and Amb. Thomas Graham have stimulated arguments in several European countries about nato's nuclear-sharing and first-use policies. These debates are likely to come to a head when heads of state adopt a new posture at the alliance's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington in April.

The Non-Aligned Movement and some members of the New Agenda Coalition will no doubt question NATO's nuclear sharing and first-use policy at the NPT's preparatory committee meeting, although the nato states may be able to steer clear of a debate in that forum. But if nato confirms its reliance on nuclear deterrence, nuclear sharing, and ambiguity regarding first use, it could lead to a major confrontation at the 2000 Review Conference.

The issue likely to be hardest fought in the Review Conference is nuclear disarmament. Plainly put, a growing number of non-nuclear countries want more action and more participation in achieving the NPT's stated goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Of course they welcome any and all reductions undertaken unilaterally or through the start process, but as long as the United States or other nuclear powers continue to issue statements emphasizing the fundamental importance to their security of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons, they reinforce the perception that they are engaged in post-Cold War nuclear rationalization, not disarmament.

Resistance to rethinking a nuclear NATO–and a weakened Russia's growing attachment to its nuclear weapons–are destroying the view that nuclear weapons were primarily a product of the Cold War. Instead, they signal an assumption that the desire for nuclear superiority will remain preeminent for the foreseeable future. But that is not what the non-nuclear countries had in mind when they signed the NPT, nor is it what they agreed to when they made it permanent.

India's explosive demand for rights similar to those of the first five nuclear weapon states has compounded the non-nuclear countries' worries. They now fear that the nuclear weapon states intend to hang on to their weapons and retool their nuclear doctrines to counter biological and chemical weapons–and nonproliferation will be doomed. As a result, many NPT parties have intensified their demands for systematic steps leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The non-aligned continue to press their long-standing demand for a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. But the nuclear weapon states were more troubled in 1998 by the practical proposals being put forward by moderate countries, such as South Africa, and allies such as Canada. These two played a pivotal role in achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT, and they want the treaty to work. They and many others regard the intransigence of the United States and other members of the nuclear club, as displayed in 1998, as threatening the stability and fabric of the nonproliferation regime. The nuclear weapon states pay lip service to Article VI, but they have not yet grasped that nuclear disarmament is a fundamental tenet of the consensus for nonproliferation.

South Africa's proposal for addressing nuclear disarmament stood out in 1998 because it was practical and geared to the realities of the NPT process. The decisions taken in 1995 included a program of action on nuclear disarmament consisting of three commitments: to the CTBT, to a ban on the production of fissile materials, and to making “systematic and progressive efforts” to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The first two parts of the program were under way in 1998, if not fully in the bag. South Africa therefore focused on the third part, and argued for “a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps” of disarmament. The depth of the nuclear weapon states' refusal to accept the logic of their NPT obligations was clear from the outrage and closed ranks they exhibited when faced with modest proposals for focusing on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the treaty.

Canada's proposal that PrepCom reports should reflect important contemporary issues, such as the CTBT's entry into force, was similarly stonewalled.

Both proposals, which were popular, may well be reintroduced in 1999, perhaps with modifications. The nuclear weapon states seem to want the enhanced review to become a four-year text-drafting process, but that will not do. If they do not respond more positively to practical proposals for addressing nuclear disarmament, the third PrepCom will fail, with potentially disastrous consequences.

At this year's preparatory conference, the Non-Aligned Movement will again back Egypt and the Arab League in calling for Israel to accede to the treaty and for full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which advocated regional negotiations on a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. However, there are hopeful signs that Egypt and the United States are discussing in advance of the PrepCom how the Middle East question can be addressed in the NPT context without either ignoring Israel's nuclear capabilities or overloading the treaty with regional agendas. If the talks are successful, the Middle East issue will not be a major obstacle, although of course it will be raised and discussed.

But the hidden conflict underlying all the debates concerns the purpose and role of the enhanced review process itself. Some regarded it merely as a gambit–a device used to achieve the treaty's permanence in 1995. Unless the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states agree on their treaty obligations, all debate about the review process will continue to be conducted in conflicting language, without coherence or honest intention. In that context, no amount of earnest statements on the CTBT, fissile materials, security assurances, or even export controls will take the nonproliferation regime onto more secure ground.

The nuclear weapon states may complacently believe that the non-nuclear countries will not rock the boat, no matter how frustrated they become, because they do not want to see India and Pakistan, let alone Iraq or North Korea, lead the way to unbridled nuclear proliferation.

But such complacency is misplaced. Those pushing hardest for a genuine process to oversee nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are the regime's staunchest advocates. Their desperation stems from a growing fear that the short-sighted policies and complacency of the nuclear weapon states themselves are undermining the basis of the NPT consensus. They fear that 2000 will be a more serious watershed than 1995.