Abstract
Throwing more money at Defense will only postpone a solution to the problems at the Pentagon.
In his recent book, Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace, William Greider, national editor of Rolling Stone, builds a strong argument that the American military needs to embrace fundamental change in order to adjust to the post-Cold War era.
Greider describes a military-industrial complex that continues to promote exceedingly expensive weapons that are no longer needed to cope with current threats to U.S. national security. To pay for these weapons, Greider points out, the military has chosen to scrimp on training, routine maintenance, and soldiers' upkeep.
“The armed services, trying to sustain their old structure and acquire new weaponry and reform war-making for the future, are compelled to steadily degrade and devour their own capabilities.”
While analyzing the problems the military faces today, Greider acknowledges the obstacles inhibiting the politicians, the brass, and the public from coming to grips with the need to demobilize forces. The White House is unwilling to cancel major weapons systems; contractors promote new weapons; politicians work to protect jobs and refuse to close unneeded bases.
“So that's one superpower lunch …”
These barriers became all the more apparent when President Bill Clinton announced on January 2 that he would raise the fiscal year 2000 military budget by $12 billion (compared to the total agreed to two years ago as part of the balanced budget agreement), and by $110 billion over the next six years.
While the details of the new spending had not been released as of this writing, it appears that about a third of the funding is “new,” Ewith two-thirds to be derived from savings obtained by cutting other programs and lower-than-anticipated costs for fuel and other supplies.
Greider's warnings about the military-industrial complex's desperate maneuvering to avoid post-Cold War reality was reflected in both the president's announcement and the release of the federal budget on February 1 (with some $280 billion slated for Defense). But an infusion of more cash–and Congress's promises to raise the bidding further–will not come close to solving the Pentagon's problems.
As Greider points out, between 1989 and 1997, the cost of building a single combat plane increased by more than 50 percent–from $39 million to $64.5 million. And the Pentagon has three new aircraft programs on the drawing board: the F-22, at a total cost of $64 billion; the F-18E/F, at $46 billion; and the Joint Strike Fighter, which could top $200 billion.
An anonymous congressional “trip report” circulated by noted Pentagon maverick Chuck Spinney points out that the F-22 will be the most expensive fighter ever built. The memo, circulated in mid-January, also says that the newest version of the F-18 will cost nearly twice as much as its predecessor, but will have the same or lesser capabilities. The anonymous staffer concludes that even while the inventory of aircraft and pilots shrinks and ages, the United States is committing itself to inadequately tested aircraft and paying too much for too few new planes. There are no performance improvements, he writes, that justify the cost increases.
Even with an infusion of new money, Greider says, “The central dilemma facing the American military-industrial complex is that it can't pay for all its present forces, much less for futuristic dreams.” The president's offer of more money is like giving a couple of cigarettes to a smoker trying to kick a life-long habit. Clinton may have successfully robbed Republicans of an issue for the election campaign in 2000–the charge that “Democrats are weak on national security”–but he will leave the next president with hard choices.
There is an irony in the president's capitulation to the Pentagon. Greider says the military has eroded its own defense capacity by trying to pay for programs and forces it can no longer afford. And it is the Pentagon's own neglect of basic maintenance and training that enables its patrons in Congress and industry to charge that the military is “going hollow”–less prepared to fight.
By leaching funds from necessities to pay for luxuries, the Pentagon has generated today's so-called “readiness crisis”–the mantra of politicians who now demand more money for the military. And neither members of Congress nor the public are likely to listen to arguments that if more funds are needed for spare parts, training, or troop pay, they should be found by cutting back unnecessary Cold Warstyle weapons.
The public is not calling for increased defense spending. A poll conducted for Ben Cohen's Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities by Republican and Democratic pollsters found that 45 percent of the public favors reducing defense spending by 15 percent. Support for this cut rises to a 59 percent majority if voters are told that the savings will be invested in education, health care, and other domestic priorities. The public agrees that waste and mismanagement are rampant in the Pentagon (as in all government) and that U.S. allies can afford to pay for much more of their own defense.
Nonetheless, the initial reaction from the most vocal Pentagon hawks to the president's announcement was that the Pentagon needed even more money. In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing a few days after the president's announcement, New Hampshire Republican Robert Smith said, “I don't understand what all the crowing is about … I see a tremendous shortfall.” Other senators clambered over each other to promise even more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that they were grateful for the money, but conceded that it covered only two-thirds of the wish list they presented to Congress last fall.
Smith and other politicians' cravings to pump more money into the Pentagon may still fail against calls for money for other priorities: Democrats interested in social programs, Republicans promoting a major tax cut, and budget ceilings that inhibit free spending. However, end-of-session negotiations, bolstered by increasing budget surpluses, may still mean a hefty Pentagon increase.
Whatever the final amount voted this year, the Pentagon will continue to price itself out of business with its continuing addiction to big-ticket hardware.