Abstract
“National missile defense.” That's a nicely descriptive phrase, much more down-to-earth than Ronald Reagan's “Strategic Defense Initiative”(SDI), a name so pretentious that it begged parody, as in “Star Wars.” Politicians love the simplicity of national missile defense. They even capitalize it. After all, who among us is not in favor of defending the United States? And yet, why do I have the nagging feeling whenever I hear the term that we are being conned?
Questions. Even if we accept the notion that North Korea, Iraq, and Iran pose a future icbm threat to the United States, why is the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization developing a kinetic hit-to-kill system that is virtually certain–according to many experts, including Dick Garwin (page 36)–not to work under real-world conditions? If we are serious about the North Korean, Iraqi, Iranian “threat,” why not develop a surer way of shooting down their missiles–a “boost-phase” system in which fast-burn interceptors based near the borders of these states would chase down and destroy attacking missiles within minutes of launch?
And if North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are the threats, why is America's most sophisticated national missile defense-capable radar being installed in Vardø, Norway, some 300 miles above the Arctic Circle? Norwegian reporter Inge Sellevåg and Massachusetts of Technology physicist Ted Postol explore that oddity, beginning on page 26. Postol is certain that the radar–called have STARE–is a component of a national missile defense system aimed at Russian missiles, not scaled-up North Korean, Iraqi, and Iranian Scuds.
Postol agrees with Garwin that the system currently planned by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will not work as advertised, principally because it is nearly impossible for kinetic kill vehicles to sort through decoys and hit incoming warheads in space at faster-than-a-speeding-bullet closing speeds. But once the basic system is in place, it could be expanded and upgraded into an overtly anti-Russian system. For one thing, the hit-to-kill vehicles could be replaced with nuclear warheads. That would produce a formidable system. But even it could be overcome, particularly if the Russians abandoned the strategic arms reduction process and built more missiles and warheads.
Haven't we been here before? For decades, one of the most ardent opponents of any missile defense system was Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists. In the mid-1980s, he lobbied Russian scientists and officials to get them to think about sdi in a different way. Instead of building more offense to overcome sdi, as many Russian hardliners suggested, why not begin cutting back on the offense? That would undercut political support for sdi in the United States. The idea made sense. In the 1990s, the United States and Russia greatly reduced the number of deployed strategic weapons, and enthusiasm for sdi waned. Today, Russia is pressing the United States to agree to even deeper reductions, from about 6,000 warheads permitted by start i to 1,500. The United States has demurred, arguing that it still needs 2,000 to 2,500 warheads to maintain deterrence.
Despite that disagreement, the 10-year trend has been in the right direction. But if President Clinton decides this summer to deploy what looks like an embryonic anti-Russian national missile defense system, all bets are off regarding future reductions. In Russia, the hardliners will be back in business.
Back in the States, send in the bunko squad.