Abstract
Late in the evening of January 18, the Pentagon launched a modified Minute-man II missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. A few minutes later, an experimental ground-based interceptor was fired from the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands. Their paths never crossed–at least, not at the same instant.
Left to the technicians, this experiment would have been just one in a series of 19 test launches. But in the highly charged political environment surrounding the issue of national missile defense, the failure had heightened significance. Missile defense advocates had hyped the first test of an interceptor missile last October as a success that proved the proposed system would work. Opponents gloated that January's miss proved just the opposite.
These competing interpretations are focused on influencing President Bill Clinton's self-imposed deadline of late summer for deciding whether to deploy a national missile defense. The schedule has everything to do with the 2000 political campaign and almost nothing to do with technological progress. It may be the president's most critical decision this year.
The issue of missile defense has been political since the 1960s, when Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon launched a program that eventually resulted in the deployment in 1975 of the Safeguard anti-missile system in North Dakota. That system was abandoned almost as soon as it became operational because it did not work. President Ronald Reagan resurrected missile defense in the 1980s with his “astrodome defense” designed to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” In part, Reagan launched the program that was quickly dubbed “Star Wars” as a political counterweight to the nuclear freeze movement.
For several years, the Clinton administration has resisted the renewed Republican call for missile defense deployment enshrined in Newt Gingrich's “Contract With America.” However, in January 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen responded to political pressures–and his own preferences–by raising the missile defense budget and announcing a timetable that included a deployment decision before Clinton left office.
In March 1999, Congress added to the political momentum for deployment by endorsing legislation introduced by Mississippi Republican Sen. Thad Cochran, which mandates national missile defense deployment “as soon as technologically feasible.” Although it included zero funding for deployment, the legislation stepped up the pressure on the president.
January's embarrassing test failure will be followed by a third intercept test in April or May. Only the first three of 19 planned tests will have been conducted before the president is scheduled to make his decision. In addition, the Pentagon is using prototype interceptors and rocket boosters because the final versions will not be ready for testing until 2003–which makes these early tests less relevant to the deployment decision.
It will be politically difficult to announce a “go” on national missile defense if the next test fails.
The next step in the process is the Pentagon's “Deployment Readiness Review,” scheduled for June. Defense's recommendation will be forwarded directly to the president and other important actors. The national security adviser, the vice president, the secretary of state, and political advisers will also weigh in.
But the final decision will be Bill Clinton's, and it will be made in the middle of white-hot presidential and congressional campaigns. The administration has said the decision will be based on four criteria: the threat, the cost, the impact on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and whether the system works. The silent but crucial fifth factor is politics–whether Clinton perceives that a decision against deployment will damage Vice President Al Gore's election prospects.
There are other deadlines affecting the decision. Principal among them is the Pentagon's controversial claim that it has to begin preparing the first site by the spring of 2001 if it is to have a workable system up and running by 2005. Furthermore, in the absence of a U.S. Russian agreement modifying the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (abm) Treaty, the United States is required by that treaty to give six months notice of intent to abandon the pact.
The abm Treaty is the agreement Republicans love to hate. A U.S. anti-missile deployment would violate its prohibition on a defense of all 50 states and a second stipulation that the one missile defense installation permitted by the treaty be located in North Dakota. Other treaty provisions would be breached by upgraded radars and a new satellite network.
If national missile defense moves forward, the first 100 missiles are expected to be deployed in Alaska by 2005. After 2005, that may be expanded to 125 interceptors based in Alaska with another 125 based in North Dakota, plus further upgraded early-warning radars, X-band radars, and a satellite constellation to discriminate warheads from decoys.
There are many wild cards in the equation, including the pace of negotiations with Russia. For months, a Russian-American agreement on a modified abm Tr eaty appeared unlikely. Russian leaders were showing no interest in a deal involving defenses and further nuclear reductions, at least not until after the Russian presidential election scheduled in June. With Clinton's decision anticipated a month or two later, there was little time for compromise.
That situation changed dramatically on the last day of 1999, when Boris Yeltsin resigned as president of Russia. Yeltsin's designated heir, Acting President Vladimir Putin, became the immediate frontrunner in an election moved up three months to March. Putin is stronger physically, intellectually, and politically than his predecessor. He will also have three more months for bargaining.
Another wild card is the next intercept test. After January's test failure, even more attention will be focused on the upcoming test, which could be delayed until May. If the mission fails, it will be politically difficult for the Pentagon and the president to announce a “go” decision.
Further, there will be newer, higher cost estimates. In 1995, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the Republican missile defense plan at $30-60 billion, cutting the political legs from under the proposal. In June 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO), using Pentagon numbers, estimated that program life-cycle costs associated with the latest national missile defense proposals range from $18.4 billion for a deployment at Grand Forks, North Dakota, by fiscal year 2003, to $28.3 billion for a deployment by fiscal year 2006. None of the estimates included costs incurred before 1998, nor did they include the costs of the administration's plan for an expanded system. The administration's low-ball estimate of $12.5 billion to be spent over the next five years may pale in comparison to new CBO and the GAO projections.
New developments in North Korea, Iran, or Iraq could affect the dynamics of the decision. A panel headed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned in July 1998 about an increasing threat of a nuclear weapons attack from these “rogue states.” If North Korea were to conduct a long-range missile test before July, a “yes” decision would be more likely.
Another unknown is the foreign reaction to national missile defense, and its influence on the decision to deploy. Unless the United States and Russia agree on an ABM Treaty modification, Russia's reaction will be negative. Russia might well cancel its plans to reduce its nuclear arsenal and refuse to consider additional reductions under START III. China has also hinted that it will react by speeding up its deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons systems. Even U.S. allies in Europe, who generally support U.S. foreign policy and security positions, are increasingly concerned that the pending American decision will start a new arms race and separate European security from that of the United States. French President Jacques Chirac particularly criticized national missile defense in an interview in the December 17, 1999 New York Times, commenting:
“If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there's a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. The more improvements that are made to the shield, the more improvements are made to the sword.”
Most observers predict that Clinton will pay more attention to domestic politics and less to international reaction, and opt for deployment. Should he elect to defer deployment, however, several developments could provide political cover, including the January test failure.
An independent team of missile defense experts appointed by the Pentagon and headed by former air force chief of staff Gen. Larry Welch issued a report in November 1999 suggesting that a deployment decision in 2000 may be premature.
When Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush was asked in a December 21 interview in the Washington Post if he would criticize Clinton for delaying the decision, Bush responded: “No. I might even praise him.”
Other Republicans, ever distrustful of the president, have begun thinking that they would rather have the next administration, which they expect to be headed by Bush, negotiate with the Russians on changes in the abm Treaty. A January 8, 2000 Congressional Quarterly article quoted Gordon Smith of Oregon, chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations European Affairs Subcommittee: “I don't think we need to be in a hurry. I don't think this administration ought to push this issue. I think this administration might give away too much; it's better taken up by a new Congress.” Cong. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, also fearful of Clinton giving away too much to the Russians, offered similar sentiments: “They [administration officials] have no credibility with the Russians and no credibility with the Congress on this issue.”
After the January test failure, Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska added his voice to the calls for delay. The January 20 New York Times quoted Hagel as arguing: “We should put this decision off until next year…. I think a new president and his team should be in place to make the call on this with a new Congress.” While delay is not a universal Republican position, the split in their ranks should dampen a partisan attack on a Clinton decision to defer.
In contrast, most Democrats have been silent on the issue. In a futile attempt to make the vote on the Cochran missile defense measure meaningless, all but three supported it. Consequently, they are reluctant to go out on a limb against national missile defense for fear the president will saw it off. Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is one of the few to speak out. In a December 13, 1999 address in New York, he remarked that “it is folly to base our strategic posture on the idea that we can develop effective defenses against all the diverse threats we face today.”
Barring the play of one or more of the wild cards, the battle for Bill Clinton's heart and mind will continue until he delivers his decision on national missile defense. He could decide “Yes” or “No,” or even “Yes, but.” Any outcome is possible.