Abstract
A U.S.-Russian uranium agreement, useful in itself, might also unstick the fissban talks.
The United States and Russia have already made considerable progress in reducing stockpiles of fissile material–both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)–through a series of bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions. But to continue to reduce the security threat posed by these materials, it is critical to monitor their elimination and make certain that they are not replaced through clandestine new production. And despite the progress that has been made, a significant loophole remains. There is no current provision to insure that neither country replenishes its stockpile of weapons-usable uranium.
What is needed is a bilateral HEU nonproduction transparency regime. Such a regime would not only be an important building block for the U.S. Russian nuclear security relationship, it could also serve as an important step toward a global fissile-material production cutoff treaty.
Both Russia and the United States have stopped producing plutonium for weapons, and they conduct inspections to confirm that non-operating plutonium production reactors remain shut down. In 1997, the two countries signed off on the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, which allows the United States to monitor the status of plutonium produced by Russias three operational military reactors, ensuring that newly produced plutonium is placed in storage and not transferred to weapons programs. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is expected to monitor the disposition of the 34 tons of weapon plutonium that each country has declared to be excess.
Both countries also have stopped producing weapons-usable uranium and are blending down their excess stocks. As part of the 1993 uranium deal, the United States agreed to purchase uranium that had been removed from Russian warheads and downblended–from some 90 percent to less than 5 percent uranium 235–making it suitable for use in fuel for nuclear power reactors. The two countries established a set of transparency measures to ensure that this material was indeed derived from weapons uranium. As the United States begins to downblend its excess weapons uranium, the IAEA will monitor that process.
The United States would clearly benefit from an HEU nonproduction transparency regime, which would help guarantee that Russia does not replace the uranium sold under the 1993 agreement. The regime would take on even greater importance if the two countries agreed to eliminate additional stocks, a move recently proposed by a joint U.S. Russian expert group on nuclear materials disposition established after the Bush-Putin summit in May 2002. According to the groups proposal, further reductions in Russias stocks would be made by U.S. purchases for a strategic uranium reserve consisting of downblended material from Russian sources.
Russia, on the other hand, does not have the same incentive–it is clear that it would take some time for the United States to ramp up to produce large quantities of highly enriched uranium. However, Russia would likely be persuaded to cooperate in exchange for a U.S. commitment to expand the 1993 purchase agreement, as well as in exchange for technical cooperation in developing fuel-cycle and reactor technologies.
Essentially all U.S. enriched uranium was produced at three gaseous diffusion plants, and only one–Paducah–is still operating. The Paducah plant, which has never produced highly enriched uranium, is licensed to enrich uranium to 5 percent uranium 235 for reactor fuel. The country also has a small number of now-closed experimental and pilot centrifuge facilities, in addition to a small ca-lutron facility at Oak Ridge that produces non-uranium isotopes. It is possible that new commercial centrifuge facilities will be brought on line around 2010.
The core of Russias enrichment complex is located in the cities of Novouralsk, Seversk, Ze-lenogorsk, and Angarsk, all of which have large gaseous centrifuge plants. Russia also has about a half dozen small centrifuge and calutron facilities that are tied to research institutes.
Under the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which has been the subject of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for some time, all U.S. and Russian enrichment facilities would be monitored by the IAEA. But until the cutoff (fissban) treaty is completed, a bilateral transparency regime could serve as an interim measure to enable the countries to monitor facilities and detect any large-scale production of highly enriched uranium. A successful bilateral regime might also help generate momentum for FMCT negotiations.
Achieving a nonproduction transparency regime will be challenging. Russias enrichment complex–already a secretive industry–has recently experienced heightened levels of secrecy, in large part because of the need to safeguard commercial information and sensitive technologies. But inspections can be designed to prevent information from being leaked or stolen.
The regime would also have to contend with the initial asymmetry of inspections. Because its enrichment infrastructure is much larger, and because of its reliance on difficult-to-safeguard centrifuge technology, Russia would be subjected to significantly greater and more intrusive inspections. Inspections at operating centrifuge facilities would also require additional funding and could impact production operations.
Despite these hurdles, I believe a nonproduction transparency regime is feasible. The required monitoring technologies and procedures already exist and have been operationally tested by the IAEA and under the 1993 HEU agreement. Although Russia might be reluctant initially, technical assistance from the United States on fissile material disposition, spent fuel storage, and the development of other nuclear technology applications could give the country the motivation to cooperate.