The NPT: Can This Treaty Be Saved?

The 800-pound gorilla

In the past, global arms control regimes benefited from the balance of power, with one or the other of the superpowers providing a security umbrella at the regional level (for instance, the United States guaranteed Japan's security, and the Soviet Union provided protection to North Korea). These arrangements induced a great deal of caution in times of crises because of the ever-present fear that regional conflicts might escalate to global conflict. That stabilizing structure is gone.

Today there is no balance of power, just a single “hyperpower.” The United States is economically and militarily predominant, spending nearly as much on its military might as the rest of the world combined, and it is unclear how it will interact with the rest of the world in this new environment. Two sharply divided and competing philosophies of arms control–the more traditional philosophy of cooperative security, and the U.S. counterproliferation strategy–are now subject to intense debate.

OPEN IN VIEWER

January 11, 2003: With giant posters hung on wires above the crowd in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square, more than a million people gather to celebrate North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The strategy of cooperative security has long guided the development of global weapons-control regimes. It entails a legal approach, with binding multilateral agreements and verification mechanisms. It assigns stability and predictability in international affairs as a primary goal of the sovereign state. At the same time, it understands that states and non-state actors may seek weapons for reasons of prestige and status. The cooperative security school of thought acknowledges that real or perceived grievances exist, and that they drive some to pursue illicit weaponry.

Cooperative security strategists are convinced, though, that all nation-states will find greater relative security through mutual commitments that limit their military capabilities, and that competitors and potential enemies, as well as friends and allies, should participate in the regime. Advocates of cooperative security seek universal acceptance of norms and constraints on behavior that are mutually advantageous, mutually verifiable, and as a last resort, enforceable. The strategy of cooperative security sees security as a collective good and believes that, in an era of globalization, achieving a unilateral, zero-sum gain over an opponent is neither a positive nor a feasible long-term goal.

In contrast, counterproliferation strategy is built on selective multilateralism, in which the United States and its friends and allies may employ a flexible mix of supply-side export controls, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, global military superiority, and the preventive use of military force. Relations are largely defined in terms of formal or informal alliances and security understandings with friends, who receive preferential aid, trade relations, technology sharing, and, in some cases, sales or gifts of military goods. Security is seen as a zero-sum game. Nation-states are either with the United States or against it.

The Bush administration's September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) follows this conceptual framework, positing a global order based on the indefinite extension of U.S. military and economic preeminence. According to this document, the United States does not intend to manage its relations with rising regional powers through bilateral arms control accords or universal global disarmament and nonproliferation regimes. Instead, it will seek improved nuclear capabilities for the United States and its allies and denial of all weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional, to those outside the preferred circle of “friendly” states.

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has moved to link the “war on terrorism” and homeland security with the counterproliferation approach. Both the January 29, 2002 State of the Union address and the Bush 2002 NSS emphasize a linkage between counterproliferation and counterterrorist military actions. “Rogue” states like Iran and North Korea are seen as enabling, guiding, or equipping transnational terror networks.

Can the United States achieve greater security through agreement with multiple political viewpoints and ideologies, or, as the strongest global actor, can it achieve greater security by enforcing its own values and policy preferences? Under the evolving counterproliferation strategy, lesser actors could help implement a new order through “coalitions of the willing,” but definitions of threats, goals, and values would not be open to compromise or dispute. The United States would define what constitutes unacceptable behavior, which would include the possession of “unallowable” weapons.

In marked contrast, under the cooperative strategy, international security actions would not only be carried out with the help of others, but also defined by others in cooperation with the United States. This means that what one considers a “threat”–what is considered an illicit or illegitimate challenge to the prevailing order–would have to be agreed among diverse actors.

At the crossroads

To what extent does the United States intend to use its hyperpower status to dictate policy and act unilaterally, with minimal regard for the concerns of others? Or to what extent will it strengthen the global rule of law, work to build multilateral consensus, and accept guidance from others in the use of its power?

The implications of this choice are staggering. An imperial United States will invite retribution in large and small ways. On the other hand, a reluctant United States may fail to use its strength and influence to create a safer and better world. The nature of its new relationships is still being worked out, as illustrated by the recent debate on intervention in Iraq.

Candidate George W. Bush observed in the second presidential debate in 2000, “It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us.” Yet, true to the various policy statements made by the Bush administration in speeches and strategy documents, the war in Iraq in spring 2003 showcased the U.S. willingness to use its preeminent strength to carry out preventive military attacks to defeat nascent challenges at the regional level–with or without the help of others.

The way forward

The following conclusions and recommendations emerged at the Stanley Foundation's two-day meeting in February.

The treaties. It is too early to label the treaty regimes as failures, as some in the U.S. administration have done. The treaties' full inspection and verification capabilities have not been tried on a widespread basis. The strictest and most effective provisions of global treaty regimes have yet to be tested. There is a still a strong role for both the treaties themselves and for their related international organizations, like the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the nuclear area, model protocols, like the 93+2 program formulated in the 1990s (in response to Iraq's proliferation activities), should receive new emphasis–something that is now being tested as a tool that could serve as a partial solution to the Iranian situation.

On the positive side for the Chemical Weapons Convention, the four parties that declared their chemical weapons–India, Russia, the United States, and another publicly unnamed country–have made great strides in the destruction of both weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons facilities. By the end of 2001, all but two signatories had fulfilled their treaty obligation to declare their holdings of chemical weapons and related facilities. But the OPCW needs more money for intrusive verification and monitoring activities that are already part of the regime–only 68 percent of required inspections were carried out in 2001–and a greater effort is needed to test and augment the organization's ability to help regulate dual-use technologies. Additional attention and resources must be part of members' domestic legislation and enforcement capabilities; the OPCW cannot do its job unless member states adopt appropriate enforcement and implementation steps.

Saddam who? One surprise of the discussions was the emphasis on North Korea and Iran rather than Iraq. Experts and officials believe the NPT could become a “hollow shell” if the situation in North Korea is not effectively addressed, or if Iran succeeds in building a nuclear weapons capability (uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability) while abiding by IAEA safeguards.

The North Korean nuclear crisis is the first true example of treaty “breakout,” while developments in Iran could represent the first example of a state successfully building a working nuclear arsenal by using loopholes in the treaty that allow nuclear technology trade. Both cases were seen as more serious than the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, because neither of those countries had been a treaty member. But North Korea was, and Iran still is, a member of the NPT.

Breaking down the taboo. There have been psychological, moral, and legal taboos against using nuclear weapons as a rational instrument of statecraft since 1945, when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked. But attendees were concerned that it was now probable that the longstanding taboo would be broken during future hostilities.

India and Pakistan face each other in an increasingly coercive bilateral nuclear relationship. They have gone to the brink during recent crises, and India has been targeted by terrorist groups believed to be affiliated with Pakistani government agencies. Meanwhile, the United States is considering the use of nuclear weapons as “anti-agent” or “bunker-buster” weapons, even against non-nuclear states.

The reasoning behind the norm against both possession and use of nuclear weapons is growing less clear with the passage of time. As one participant asked, “If the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted the initial ‘vaccination’ against the future use of nuclear weapons, what might a ‘booster shot’ look like?”

The “Atoms for Peace” problem. The Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s and 1960s is enshrined in the current NPT text. According to its philosophy, states are guaranteed the technology to build nuclear power plants in return for promising not to apply “dual-use” nuclear products to military purposes.

But this plan, created in a different era under different assumptions, needs revisiting. Many of the participants in the roundtable believe there is no longer any rationale for encouraging the use of nuclear power plants that involve enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium, because these processes are central to constructing a nuclear weapon. This is the problem presented by Iran. The facilities it is building, ostensibly for civil nuclear power, can also form the foundation for a weapons program.

Yet other types of nuclear power exist, and in future years there will be other high-tech nuclear alternatives. Somehow, member states must be convinced to amend this provision of the treaty or find a way to work around it.

Five against the world. The NPT requires the five recognized nuclear powers to make a good-faith effort to move toward nuclear disarmament. But U.S. analysts attending the roundtable tended to argue that while nonproliferation goals needed reemphasis, current and future disarmament initiatives should be indefinitely shelved. Other analysts and officials countered that any pragmatic strategy must incorporate the viewpoints and threat perceptions of all states in the international system, not just the wishes of the five.

The current U.S. administration may have rejected the goal of nuclear disarmament, but the reality of international politics is that the developing world will not let this issue fade into the background.

One group of analysts believed that arms control and disarmament (which constrain the actions of the nuclear powers) ceased to be something that resonated in U.S. politics sometime in the late 1990s. They argued that nonproliferation norms must stand on their own and be strictly enforced, regardless of the pace of disarmament. One participant said the concept of nuclear disarmament was now at a “complete disconnect with U.S. domestic political realities.” Participants cited the Moscow Treaty, negotiated by the Bush administration in 2002, as an example of the shift toward “vague, unverifiable arms control measures.”

These analysts called for a “new pragmatism.” For now, the only realistic way forward for the five recognized nuclear powers is through small, incremental nuclear reductions that indicate their general support for their Article VI disarmament commitments within the NPT regime. Meanwhile, nonproliferation goals must continue to be met–even in the absence of committed disarmament steps by the nuclear powers.

Other participants strongly disagreed. They emphasized the increasing sense of insecurity felt by developing countries in the evolving post-September 11 framework. In this group's view, nonproliferation goals cannot be separated, politically or conceptually, from the goal of general nuclear disarmament. Western rhetoric and policy actions focus on rogue states and cheaters, but ignore the nuclear powers' view of their position as a permanent privilege. This attitude, many felt, was as threatening and destabilizing to the NPT as the behavior of the countries that remained outside it, and they were concerned by the nuclear powers' “surprising complacency” on the issue.

In these other participants' view, the nuclear powers' unwillingness to pledge to preclude nuclear threats and attacks against non-nuclear states has led to greater insecurity. The greatest threat, in their view, is not the proliferation of weapons technology, but the fact that the United States has elevated nuclear weapons to a doctrinal role in war-fighting situations–a serious double standard that acts as a disincentive to other states to remain non-nuclear.

Brute force. As a group, all the discussion participants rejected the idea that counterproliferation could be a security strategy in and of itself, and saw no reason why it need be a direct competitor of cooperative nonproliferation norms. They believe it is unrealistic and utopian to embrace either extreme–counterproliferation and preemptive action, or purely cooperative multilateralism–at the global level. A “full tool kit” that could be applied to a variety of very different political and military situations would include bilateral pressure and even military options.

Ratcheting back. In the past 15 years, “denuclearization” has tended to occur as a result of regime change–either through force, as intended by the United States in Iraq, or through purely domestic political transformations, as in the cases of voluntary nuclear disarmament during the 1990s. The examples of Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, and several former Soviet states seemed to show that the most verifiable and reliable nuclear renunciations in the post-Cold War world have come about as a result of political liberalization of once-authoritarian regimes.

This raises questions about the most effective and realistic approach to take toward “hard cases” such as North Korea and Iran. Should the international community rely on diplomatic and economic engagement of both countries, as well as the verification capabilities of global regimes, to ensure that neither country is pursuing weaponry? Or should the international community isolate the offender politically, economically, and militarily, with the ultimate aim of regime change and political liberalization?

The answer to this question may lie in the primary driver of a nascent weapon program: Is the program driven wholly by the whims of a particular regime, or is it instead driven by long-term regional insecurities and security vulnerabilities? The examples of India and Israel show that even healthy democracies may pursue an advanced nuclear and missile arsenal outside the bounds of the NPT framework. Regime change and democratization is not a miracle cure.

Asking why. If proliferation is to be stopped, we need to understand both demand and supply. Why do nations and terrorists want these weapons? So far, the developed nations have focused on restricting supply; they have not addressed increasing demand. There is a tendency to look at supply-side nonproliferation policies in isolation rather than asking what sort of world would preclude the need for WMD, and whether such a world could be created.

Policy debates often assume that states seek strategic weapons primarily for aggressive purposes, as conveyed by the U.S. use of the term “rogue state.” If that were true, then it would follow that economic sanctions and military strikes would stabilize volatile regions because they would be aimed at powers that unjustly seek regional dominance.

However, a fair and objective definition of demand should also include the current nuclear powers' determination to retain their arsenals. In truth, a mix of economic, strategic, and social incentives favor nuclear weapons acquisition and retention.

States seek WMD to use them (or threaten to use them), viewing them as useful war-fighting tools. Or they may seek WMD to defend against or deter a conventional or nuclear attack. Or to achieve prestige and great power status. Or for economic reasons, considering WMD either as a “cash crop” for sale to others, or as something that can be traded for economic aid and financial concessions.

Participants believe that among these incentives, deterrence is both the strongest and most consistent factor driving states down the WMD path. Many of proliferation's “usual suspects” have pursued WMD and missile programs for avowedly defensive reasons: territorial integrity, sovereignty, deterrence, and defense against threats of aggression. This suggests that the international community should recognize legitimate grievances and satisfy bona fide security concerns in ways that reduce the motivation to acquire WMD. Threatened states will not be convinced to give up their pursuit of these weapons unless and until the international community can prove that their security situation will become safer and more predictable if they do so.

Participants also suggested that states need to do more to help alleviate the economic and security problems of regions in conflict. As a first step, more credible negative security assurances could be offered to non-nuclear states–a deal in which the nuclear “haves” would promise the “have-nots” that nuclear weapons will never be used against them in a crisis or war, a promise that could be enforced through a new treaty (although this idea directly contradicts the strategy statements of the Bush administration, which emphasize the use of conventional and nuclear threats to “dissuade” proliferating nations from acquiring WMD).

Greater stability might be created through improved regional and collective security arrangements, or through confidence-building measures, foreign aid programs, and conflict mediation in instances of protracted enmity, such as the Kashmir dispute in South Asia or the various disputes in the Middle East.

Supply-side controls. Despite the hard realities of demand-side dynamics, it would be fatalistic to completely ignore the supply side of the policy equation.

First, there are no truly indigenous ballistic missile programs; all of them, including U.S. and Soviet efforts, were based on the work of former German scientists after World War II. Ballistic missile programs in developing countries have been simple derivatives of U.S. and Soviet technology gleaned through direct military trade and the indirect filtration of dual-use technologies in the global economy. Second, all nuclear programs derive from the Manhattan Project and information gleaned through espionage and declassification. This suggests that supply-side controls may still reduce proliferation risks.

Controls are critical when it comes to terrorist groups, which are not susceptible to demand-side approaches. Their concern is not security; they wish to induce rampant insecurity in others. Guarding against terrorism requires greater nuclear material security and safeguards, which in turn requires that more funds be devoted to this task. One initial step would be to increase the political and monetary support for organizations like the IAEA, which has already proposed improved measures for securing nuclear materials stockpiles.

Participants also suggested strengthening and reinvigorating supply-side approaches through the creation of a centralized international agency that would address rapid technological change and act as an intelligence clearinghouse on suspect front companies for terrorists or proliferating states. Treaty organizations such as the OPCW or IAEA might also use “challenge inspections” in cases of sensitive bilateral trade deals, utilizing their organizational capital and technical expertise as part of the licensing process between supplier and receiving state/end user.

Integrated approaches? Looking ahead, what philosophy or strategy will best achieve nonproliferation goals and objectives? Participants agreed that in the long run, only a hybrid approach that mixes preventive steps with cooperative verification and enforcement actions will stem the tide of proliferation. Stopping the spread of WMD and reducing existing stockpiles will only become a reality if the rule of law is strengthened and as many state and non-state actors as possible are enlisted in the cause. The effort will require a mix of bilateral and multilateral actions, including military enforcement actions when required. To be seen as legitimate by all players in the international community, a hybrid approach would have to be led by the United States in concert with both technology haves and have-nots, and the security concerns of the have-not states would need to be seriously addressed.