Abstract
The Iranian timetable
In “When Could Iran Get the Bomb?” (July/August 2006 Bulletin), David Albright provides a well reasoned and researched analysis of the path by which Iran could conceivably travel to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon by 2009. Additionally, it would be useful to understand why the CIA, which possesses more information with which to judge, continues to offer a more cautious assessment of 5-10 years. Given the unknowns, both estimates could fall within the margin of error.
Albright states his assumptions regarding the amount of HEU necessary for an implosion weapon, the centrifuge efficiency (as measured by separative work units), the wastage rate, and the quality of the feed material. By making slightly more standard assumptions, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that if Iran threw caution to the wind and embarked on a crash weapons program it could possibly have a Bomb in roughly the same time period (late 2009-2010). But the most important variables affecting the timeline–Iran's ability to produce and install quality centrifuges and the extent and duration of the start-up difficulties it is reportedly encountering–remain unclear.
For the moment, the most critical timeline is Iran's ability to master the enrichment technology, which would allow it to replicate centrifuge cascades in unreported facilities. One hopes the International Atomic Energy Agency will shed more light on these factors. That said, the inspectors' reduced access–including to centrifuge component production workshops–increases the uncertainty and, ultimately, policy makers' margin of error, forcing them to make worst-case assumptions.
Mark Fitzpatrick
Senior fellow for non-proliferation
International Institute for Strategic Studies
London, England
David Albright rightfully decries those who overstate Iran's nuclear progress. He's a cool head who lends competence to the issue. His technical analysis mirrors the U.S. intelligence community's broad conclusion–namely, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon sometime between five to ten years from now. Therefore, Albright writes, there's time for “aggressive diplomatic options.”
Regrettably, Albright shores up the Western position that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities as a precondition to serious negotiations. It's a stance the Iranians adamantly oppose; no negotiator throws away his trump card before the game starts. In February, the International Crisis Group advocated a “limited enrichment option” that would allow Iran to operate a few hundred centrifuges under strict international supervision. (A number of American scientists–including Richard Garwin, Wolfgang Panofsky, Marvin Miller, and Frank von Hippel–made a similar proposal in 2005.)
The Clock
A violent escalation
Nationalist violence against ethnic groups in Russia, which Joshua Yaffa detailed in his July/August 2006 Bulletin dispatch from Moscow (“Russia: Sparring Partners”), rose to unprecedented levels in late August. According to news reports, three Russian college students and a fourth man conspired to detonate a homemade explosive in Moscow's Cherkizovsky Market, an indoor and outdoor bazaar where many Central and Southeast Asian immigrants sell goods (see above), killing 10 Uzbek and Tajik nationals and wounding many others, including native Russians. Their reasoning, per the Russian authorities: “There were too many people of Asian background there, toward whom they experienced bad feelings.”
Despite the growing influence of nationalist political parties and hate groups in the country, the four perpetrators appeared to be working independently. “We are seeing the emergence of so-called netsurfing nationalists who do not join any groups but get pumped up on the internet and then strike out in the real world,” a member of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights told the Moscow Times.
The trend worries Yaffa: “It suggests xenophobia is becoming more diffuse and that the support of a large organization isn't necessary to inflict devastating damage.”
Technically, Albright may be correct by demanding an immediate suspension of enrichment activity and pointing out that even the operation of a small cascade can provide crucial nuclear know-how. Nonetheless, his broader technological and political perspective is wrong. Centrifuges are modular, lightweight, and easy to reassemble; hence, a total interdiction is impossible. Rather than pursuing rigid diplomacy, which risks an interruption in international controls (e.g., North Korea since 2002), I opt for the lesser evil. The international community should tolerate as many as 164 centrifuges at the Natanz pilot facility (a number the Iranians find acceptable), if it means international inspectors are free to roam the country in search of parallel programs.
Sadly, to date, the West's insistence on full enrichment suspension has severely limited the ability to compromise. When Iran declared itself ready to substantially curb the scope of its enrichment program and abandon heavy water development in March 2005, the Europeans ignored the proposal, foolishly hoping the June 2005 Iranian election would yield an accommodating president. A year later, the Bush administration vigorously prevented the Russians and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from brokering a “limited enrichment” arrangement.
The time has now come to negotiate without preconditions and to acknowledge the unfortunate emergence of political realities.
Bruno Pellaud
Former IAEA deputy director general in charge of safeguards
Icogne, Switzerland
“When Could Iran Get the Bomb?” reminded me of the Soviet Union's path to the Bomb. In 1945, many decision makers and scientists believed the Soviets were five years away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. To judge from their shocked reaction when the Soviets tested their first Bomb in August 1949–only a year ahead of the 1945 estimate–many of those decision makers had gotten the idea that the Soviet nuclear weapon would always be “five years from now.”
Too many people in the diplomatic community and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seem to be traveling the same road of denial and self-delusion U.S. policy makers took after World War II. How long did it take North Korea to manufacture the Bomb after it broke its IAEA seals?
Vance P. Frickey
Denver, Colorado
Playing for keeps
I read “Games Get Serious” (July/August 2006 Bulletin) with great interest. To see Food Force cited as a success story was a tremendous source of pride for those of us at the World Food Programme (WFP).
“WFP launched Food Force in April 2005 because we believe that computer games serve as an effective way to reach young people. Still, the game has proved far more popular than we ever imagined. In 15 months, more than 4 million people have downloaded the game from www.food-force.com. Despite its humble and low-budget origins, industry experts recognize Food Force as a serious-games pioneer. Three major gaming companies donated their time and resources to produce Japanese, Chinese, and French translations of the game. Donations from governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies have made nine other language versions possible.
Buoyed by this success, we would like to develop a second game that deals with hunger and development work for adults. (Food Force was aimed at kids between the ages of 8 and 13.) The fact that scientists and policy makers view computer games as a useful tool makes us hopeful that we're on the right track to spread the message about global hunger and the WFP's mission to end it.
David Rejeski's proposal for a Corporation for Public Gaming represents a further sign of the video game industry's maturation process. As one of a growing number of U.N. agencies using this medium as an advocacy tool, WFP would welcome the creation of such a body to help better nurture and support the development of more positive games.
Sillne Buhr
Food Force project manager
WFP
Rome, Italy
I found “Games Get Serious” quite illuminating. That said, I would like to add that the application of gaming concepts and game-driven technology is also fostering some exciting developments in health care–both in clinical practice and scientific research. The growing popularity of digital games has added new momentum to creating immersive and interactive “virtual reality” simulation experiences for a wide range of human health needs, particularly in mental health and rehabilitation. (Learn more at www.gamesforhealth.org.)
For example, game-based simulations have been used to build graduated exposure therapy scenarios for persons suffering from combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At our lab, we use the art assets from the Xbox game Full Spectrum Warrior in clinical trials when treating the PTSD of vets returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. It works with simpler phobias as well, as others have modified existing games to treat those with a fear of flying, heights, spiders, etc. Game-based simulations are also being used to distract patients from painful medical procedures and to motivate physical therapy activity following a stroke or traumatic brain injury.
Ship Rizzo
Research scientist
Institute for Creative Technologies
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California
While “Games Get Serious” covered a diverse range of games, we'd like to further detail how the field is productively splintering. For those concerned with social issues–from poverty to the environment–a separate serious games space called “games for change” exists. Several of our most successful endeavors were profiled in “Games Get Serious,” including Food Force, Pax Warrior, and A Force More Powerful.
As codirectors of the nonprofit behind games for change, we believe such a movement can better advance the educational impact of video games. Nearly all games focus on educational outcomes, yet from an efficiency standpoint, the conversation becomes incoherent when the results are drawn from divergent fields such as homeland security, adolescent literacy, and social change.
At our third annual conference in June, success stories began to cohere around traditional social change outcomes–outreach, shifting perspectives, etc. In terms of outreach, the MTV-sponsored game on the genocide in Darfur reached 700,000 students in seven weeks; regarding shifting perspectives, the game Peace-Maker offered players the ability to role-play both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These leaders anchor a benchmark for cogent debate and collective progress in each educational category.
Across social issues, our membership often struggles with the growing “activation gap” between citizens' passion (they care) and a lack of political participation (they don't act enough). The hope is that video games, a more participatory media than any yet created, can help create a more civically participatory public. More evaluation studies are needed, but games are here to stay, as the early signs of their educational impact are driving an increasingly coherent field.
Benjamin Stokes
Suzanne Seggerman
Codirectors
Games for Change
New York City
Burma, far from forgotten
In “Plagued By Inaction” (July/August 2006 Bulletin), Andrew Marshall writes that the international community is standing idly by as thousands of Burmese tragically die from AIDS, citing the fact that Burma receives less humanitarian aid than almost every other underdeveloped country as evidence.
With the proper context, this isn't exactly true. In 2004, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria awarded $98.4 million in program grants to Burma. It did so recognizing the severity of the country's HIV/AIDS crisis. In August 2005, the fund terminated the grant agreements, but it made clear that the decision was due to the Burmese government's restrictions on access to project implementation areas. Likewise, Doctors Without Borders withdrew from the country in March because of similar government-imposed travel restrictions on its staff–especially to certain villages. Therefore, many donors conclude that, however great the need, they simply cannot operate in Burma.
What's on your mind?
The Bulletin wants to hear from you. Letters should not exceed 250 words and may be edited for clarity and length. Be sure to include your phone number and mailing and e-mail addresses.
Send your comments to:
Letters to the Editor
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
6042 South Kimbark Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
fax: 773/702-0725
While a range of donors such as the Three Diseases Fund, developed jointly by Britain, Norway, and Sweden, attempt to engage in efforts to counter the funding losses incurred by the Global Fund's exit, harsher restrictions implemented by the junta earlier this year further tighten government control of aid activities, staffing, and site visits. The United Nations has made clear that this type of behavior could effectively end any kind of humanitarian aid to Burma.
So yes, aid is lacking. But when considering the problem's root cause, it's clear the international community is not standing idly by while the Burmese people suffer.
Alice Khin Saw Win
Faculty of Medicine
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Canada
The Israeli rationale
Avner Cohen and William Burr's “Israel Crosses the Threshold” (May/June 2006 Bulletin) provides important insight into the U.S. government's understanding of and response to Israel's Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) exceptionality during the late 1960s. However, Cohen and Burr largely neglect Israel's half of this dialogue–as well as the wider context, including the ongoing terror attacks.
They argue that the U.S. government had the power to force Israel to ratify the NPT and prevent it from developing a strategic deterrent. But the evidence clearly shows that in Israel's unique strategic environment, an “option of last resort” was (and remains) irreplaceable. Israel's deep sense of insecurity–formed by the Holocaust and the costly 1948 Arab-Israeli war–was reinforced during the 1967 Six-Day War's buildup, which inspired a fear of annihilation. To their credit, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized Israel would not rely on an amorphous international framework like the NPT for its survival. In the early sixties, Washington traveled a similar road when President John F Kennedy pressed Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to open nuclear facilities at Dimona for international inspection. But Ben-Gurion wouldn't budge on this issue. Nixon and Kissinger were probably familiar with this history.
By the time of the Nixon-Golda Meir meeting, many U.S. policy makers concluded that Israel possessed a deterrent capability. At this stage, NPT ratification and opening Israel's facilities to inspection was unlikely. (As the documents Cohen and Burr reveal in their article show, State Department officials who called for withholding aircraft to force Israel's hand failed to recognize that this only reinforced Israel's emphasis on an independent deterrent.) But unlike Iran, Iraq, and Libya, Israel didn't “flout the NPT,” as the authors misleadingly claim. Israel carefully weighed the treaty's risks and benefits and never signed on. Thus, the Nixon-Meir agreement confirmed the status quo and reinforced the “don't ask, don't test” framework that seemed to be the best available option to both nations.
Indeed, the memos that provide the foundation for the author's analysis demonstrate the degree to which deliberate ambiguity succeeded in bringing Israeli deterrence requirements and American nonproliferation objectives together. The 1969 agreement was a major diplomatic accomplishment that provided stability in a volatile region. If it becomes outdated, it will result from Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the NPT's collapse, as new global arms control measures aren't realistic replacements for strategic deterrence in a Middle East where Iranian leaders threaten Israel's existence.
Gerald M. Steinberg
Director, Program on Conflict Management
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, Israel
It's interesting to note, however, that what Steinberg sees as so evident and compelling today was not as clear-cut in 1969. When Nixon and Kissinger struck the “don't ask, don't tell” deal with Israeli Prime Minister Meir in September 1969, they kept it secret, recognizing it as a potentially controversial matter. At the time, very few top officials knew of the deal. What Steinberg also seems to ignore is that prior to Meir's September 1969 visit, Israeli decision makers felt great anxiety about the future of their nuclear program. Indeed, when Prime Minister Levi Eshkol died in February 1969, he had no idea what position Israel would present to the United States regarding the NPT.