Abstract
International capabilities must be supported and improved to respond to alleged uses of biological agents.
THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOgies to fight disease and hunger, and to create new carbon-neutral fuel sources, has enormous potential to improve quality of life and mitigate climate change. Some biotechnologies, however, could also potentially be used to create biological weapons designed to incapacitate or kill people or spread livestock and crop diseases. Today, the world lacks effective verification and enforcement mechanisms against the production of biological weapons, which are particularly difficult to detect in part because the relevant materials and manufacturing equipment often have peaceful and medicinal uses. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) includes specific measures for verifying compliance with the chemical weapons ban. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), though it bans countries from acquiring or retaining biological weapons, does not contain comparable verification measures.
This gap highlights the need to strengthen and streamline the detection and investigation of biological attacks once they have occurred. At the request of any U.N. member state, the U.N. secretary-general has the authority to rapidly deploy a team of experts to an attack site and conduct an investigation of the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons, as well as chemical ones, thereby addressing violations of international norms. In the past year, U.N. member states, U.N. bodies, and other international organizations, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), have provided specific technical advice necessary to refine and strengthen the secretary-general's role. WHO experts cannot participate directly in a U.N. field investigation of alleged biological weapons use. However, the WHO's experience in responding to outbreaks over several years has played an important role in updating the investigation procedures. 1
Many countries over the past decade have expressed increased concerns about biological weapons threats. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Organization for American States, and other regional organizations have made it clear that nonproliferation and countering biological weapons threats are key priorities. 4 A 2008 report by the U.S. bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism focused on nuclear and biological weapons as particularly significant challenges and further pointed out that “terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.” 5 The 2009 U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, while acknowledging this danger, called for expanding the international dialogue on biological threats and stated, in part: “The ongoing revolution in the life sciences is already a global endeavor…. Efforts to restrict or control the enabling materials and knowledge, while helpful in specific contexts, must be carefully defined and targeted.” 6
The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war or armed conflict. 7 In addition, two multilateral treaties, the 1972 BWC and the 1993 CWC, prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and other acquisition of these weapons. 8 The CWC includes an explicit ban on the use of chemical weapons, while the BWC implicitly bans the use of biological weapons through its prohibitions on acquisition and possession. The CWC also contains an elaborate verification regime with detailed provisions for mandatory declarations and on-site inspections of chemical weapons sites and relevant chemical industry facilities, and a process for investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons.
However, the BWC lacks such structures. In 1995, state parties to the BWC started negotiations on a compliance protocol including on-site inspections to bolster the convention, but the talks collapsed in 2001 when the United States withdrew its support. The failure of the BWC protocol negotiation has heightened the importance of the secretary-general's mechanism related to the investigation of alleged biological weapons use.
today, the world lacks effective verification and enforcement mechanisms against the production of biological weapons, which are particularly difficult to detect in part because the relevant materials and manufacturing equipment often have peaceful and medicinal uses.
Today, any member state can trigger the launch of an investigation of alleged use by making a request to the secretary-general. In response, the secretary-general may decide to dispatch a fact-finding team to the scene of the alleged attack, collect relevant evidence in a scientific manner (including environmental and biomedical samples, medical examination of victims, and eyewitness interviews), and report its objective findings to all U.N. member states. The importance of the secretary-general's role was acknowledged in the final document of the 2006 BWC Sixth Review Conference. The 2006 U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy encouraged the secretary-general to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures—something that had not been comprehensively done since 1989. 12 The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) coordinated the activities to strengthen the secretary-general's capabilities, emphasizing the need for strengthening the biological area. Since then, UNODA has assisted member states in training experts, built a network of supporting international organizations, and developed additional training materials. These efforts by UNODA have resulted in a significantly expanded roster of experts and laboratories. The current roster comprises 237 biological and chemical experts and 42 laboratories, all nominated by 41 U.N. member states. 13 The updated information allows for rapid and targeted selection of appropriate experts and laboratories.
Last year the Swedish government hosted the first training course, which was supported by UNODA, for experts from the roster. Through classes, workshops, and field training, participants gained detailed knowledge on procedural matters, including interviewing witnesses, victims, and medical personnel in hospitals; collecting information from medical records; conducting biological sampling and analysis; and documenting their findings and writing reports. In addition, representatives from the WHO, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and Interpol explained their procedures for carrying out field investigations.
The training course culminated in a four-day practical exercise that involved a realistic scenario: an alleged use of biological weapons during a military conflict that resulted in a tularemia (rabbit fever) outbreak. The participants, divided into two teams, were expected to assess information received on the alleged use and the resulting disease outbreak, prepare mission plans, obtain clarifications and additional information, prepare plans for activities at hospitals and sites of alleged use, compile and evaluate facts, and report findings. Experts from 14 U.N. member states completed the training course.
Past allegations of chemical or biological weapons use have been associated with armed conflicts between nations. NOW that threat also comes from terrorists. Fact-finding requires the highest level of integrity and credibility.
The intentional dispersal of biological agents might be detected initially as an outbreak of infectious disease. In such a case, the WHO might already be in the country contributing to a public health response before an allegation of weapons use even arises. The WHO operates under the legal and operational framework of the 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations for activities regarding prevention and control of the international spread of infectious diseases. 15 Among other things, the WHO develops capacities for outbreak detection and response in its 193 member states. Furthermore, specialized networks such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), coordinated by the WHO, are very active in responding to public health emergencies worldwide. Since 2000, the WHO and GOARN have responded to more than 50 events worldwide with more than 400 experts providing field support to 40 countries. 16
The experience gathered from the WHO's work could be of relevance in a fact-finding mission of the secretary-general. A work plan between the WHO and UNODA for developing closer technical collaboration was prepared in January 2009 and includes contribution to the review process of the secretary-general's investigation manuals and procedures and development of a process for sharing information (such as baseline public health data). The WHO has expressed its intention to provide technical support to the secretary-general if he initiates an investigation. The WHO has also instructed its Global Alert and Response Department to develop mechanisms aimed at providing relevant support—for example, by sharing necessary equipment, field experience, and lessons learned—to an investigation. The proposed approach would ensure that during an investigation, the WHO would focus solely on its public health mandate and public health interventions, while avoiding politically more sensitive determinations concerning biological weapons use. A formal agreement between the WHO and UNODA is under consideration.
Footnotes
World Health Report 2007: A Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the
21st Century (Geneva: WHO, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2007/en/; “Global Public Health
Response to Natural Occurrence, Accidental Release or Deliberate Use of
Biological and Chemical Agents or Radionuclear Material that Affect
Health,” 55th World Health Assembly, WHA.55.16, May 18, 2002,
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA55/ewha5516.pdf; and
WHO, “Health Aspects of Biological, Chemical and Radionuclear
Threats,” available at 
.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1(I) of January 24, 1946, seeking proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
In 1992 at a meeting held at the level of heads of state and government, the U.N. Security Council confirmed that development and proliferation of WMD is a threat to international peace and security; see “Note by the President of the Security Council,” (S/23500, January 31,1992). The threat posed by proliferation of WMD was reaffirmed by the U.N. Security Council in 1995, in “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/1995/9, February 22, 1995.
At the 16th Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in July 2009, the “Work Plan for Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes” was adopted; in June 2009 the European Commission adopted a policy package on “Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union”; and in March 2009 the Fifth Plenary Session of the Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee against Terrorism took place.
Bob Graham et al., World At Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage, 2008).
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva, June 17, 1925.
The BWC entered into force in 1975; the CWC entered into force in 1997.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/37/98 D, December 13, 1982.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/37 C, November 30, 1987.
Annex I of “Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/44/561, October 4, 1989; U.N. General Assembly, “Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,” A/RES/45/57 C, December 4, 1990, adopted without a vote.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/288, “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” September 8, 2006.
As of January 2010.
The Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/55/283, September 24, 2001, and the OPCW Conference of the States Parties in decision C-VI/DEC.5, May 17, 2001.