A Bargain Half Fulfilled

Abstract

Public charter schools (PCS) are thought to succeed because they have greater autonomy and are held more accountable than traditional public schools (TPS). Though teachers are central to this expectation, there is little evidence about whether teachers in PCS enjoy more autonomy and are held more accountable than teachers in TPS. Also, it is unclear what the franchising of the PCS sector—the growth of schools run by educational management organizations (EMOs)—means for teacher autonomy and accountability. Using nationally representative survey data, this article compares teachers’ perceptions of autonomy and accountability in PCS and TPS and in EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS. It shows that teachers in PCS reported greater autonomy than teachers in TPS; similarly, teachers in non-EMO-run schools indicated greater autonomy than teachers in EMO-run schools. However, there were no differences in perceptions of accountability across these different school types.

Keywords

accountability autonomy educational management organizations public charter schools teachers

Public charter schools (PCS) are theorized to succeed more than traditional public schools (TPS) because of a bargain struck between schools and charter-granting entities: PCS are given greater autonomy from the standard rules and regulations, and in return, they are held more accountable (Miron & Nelson, 2002). Early theorists expected that this dynamic would operate on two levels (Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990; Millot, 1996; Nathan, 1996). At the school level, PCS would have the latitude to experiment with new approaches to education. If they performed well, they could maintain their charters; if they did not, they could lose them. These theorists also expected heightened autonomy and accountability at the teacher level: Compared to teachers in TPS, teachers in PCS would have greater freedom to diverge from curricula and rules while at the same time having their jobs more closely linked with student success (Nathan, 1996).

Although there have been many changes to the U.S. public education system since these early theorists were published and the PCS sector has grown and evolved, these intermediate goals—enhanced autonomy and accountability—remain central to arguments in favor of PCS (Kirp, 2013). Despite this, we have little robust, up-to-date information about whether teachers in PCS actually enjoy greater autonomy or are held more accountable than teachers in TPS. As such, this article’s first goal is to study whether hypothesized differences in PCS-TPS teacher autonomy and accountability actually exist. Second, the article looks inside the PCS sector to explore why some teachers enjoy greater autonomy and are held more accountable than others. In particular, the article considers how one of the major changes to the PCS sector in recent years—the growth of schools operated by educational management organizations (EMOs)—explains differences in teacher autonomy and accountability.

To compare teachers in these different settings, the article uses nationally representative teacher survey data collected by the U.S. Department of Education. The findings suggest that the PCS bargain insofar as teachers’ perceptions are concerned remains half fulfilled. Teachers in PCS reported greater autonomy than teachers in TPS; nevertheless, they did not feel more or less accountable than teachers in TPS. Also, though teachers in EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS had similar perceptions of accountability, teachers in EMO-run schools reported having less autonomy. In fact, the analysis shows that teachers in EMO-run PCS were statistically indistinguishable in terms of autonomy from teachers in TPS. The article concludes by considering how these findings inform theory and the debate over PCS.

Public Charter Schools and Teacher Autonomy and Accountability

Since the early years of U.S. public education, there have been reoccurring concerns about parochialism, decline, and crisis (Ravitch, 2013). Perhaps starting with the publication of A Nation at Risk (Gardner 1983)—a federal report that questioned the quality of the U.S. public education system—these concerns became more mainstream (Miron & Nelson, 2002; Powers, 2009). Arriving in the first term of the Reagan presidency, a time in which privatization and deregulation were prominent objectives, critics began portraying TPS as monopolies—inattentive and unaccountable to the needs of parents and children and, due to a lack of competition and market forces, failing in their mission of providing a quality education (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Miron & Nelson, 2002).

In response, reformers advocated for a variety of educational reforms, including the establishment of PCS: publicly funded, privately operated schools (Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996). The charter concept offered schools something of a bargain: In exchange for greater autonomy, they would be held more accountable for student learning (Crawford, 2001; Finnigan, 2007; Garn & Cobb, 2001; Hill, Lake, & Celio, 2002; Miron & Nelson, 2002; Renzulli, Parrott, & Beattie, 2011). Whether these twin objectives could be simultaneously achieved was (and is) subject to debate: The mechanisms that ensure school accountability may necessarily reduce autonomy (Opfer, 2001). Nevertheless, early theorists did not see it in this way: They expected PCS to be more autonomous and more accountable than TPS.

In addition to making schools more autonomous and accountable, early charter theorists expected that the PCS bargain would permeate into the schools themselves where teachers would feel the effects of loosened regulation and enhanced accountability (Crawford, 2001; Kolderie, 1990). For example, Budde (1988) argued that “teachers should be given more autonomy; decisions about curriculum and other school matters should be made closer to the classroom” (p. 20). At the same time, he noted, the system of teacher evaluation had to change such that teachers would be “made more accountable for the results (or lack of results) achieved by their students. Incompetent teachers should be fired. The more able teachers should work a longer professional year and be paid substantially higher salaries” (Budde, 1988, p. 13).

Along the same lines, Shanker (1988) suggested that PCS would give teachers “the latitude to abandon things that don’t work and to create a structure that more closely reflects what we know about how students engage and learn”; nonetheless, he also noted that “this in no way means going back to the 1960s and giving every teacher and student a license to ‘do their own thing’ without supervision or accountability” (p. 97). Nathan (1996) spelled out the same quid pro quo in his book:

This country’s public schools employ many talented, committed educators. Unfortunately, these excellent teachers are often frustrated by a system that does not value their skills. They are disappointed by an administrative bureaucracy that sometimes stifles their creativity and by parents who object to proposed reforms and do not want their children to participate. They discover that it is difficult to remove mediocre teachers from public schools. As the frustrations mount, energetic, enthusiastic teachers become bitter, burned-out teachers. . . . The charter school movement gives real power not only to parents and children to choose the kind of school that makes sense for them but also to teachers to use their skills, talents, and energy. Along with this opportunity comes responsibility—the responsibility to demonstrate improved student achievement as measured by standardized tests and other assessments. (pp. xv–xvi)

Though the PCS sector has changed in myriad ways since these early theorists wrote, enhanced teacher autonomy and accountability remain central to the case for PCS. For example, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2015) notes that “Charter schools allow teachers the freedom to be more innovative” while simultaneously “rewarding high-quality teachers with higher pay.”

Comparisons of Teachers in Public Charter Schools and Traditional Public Schools

Despite their centrality to the claims of early and current PCS proponents, it is unclear whether teachers in PCS actually have more autonomy or are held more accountable relative to teachers in TPS. In large part, this is because there have been few studies that use a national framework to compare the experiences of teachers in these different settings. Rather, most PCS-TPS comparative research focuses on teacher credentials—as measured by education, certification levels, and number of teaching years (Brewer & Ahn, 2010; Burian-Fitzgerald, Luekens, & Strizek, 2004; Miron & Nelson, 2002)—or turnover (Gross & DeArmond, 2010; Renzulli et al., 2011; Stuit & Smith, 2012).¹

However, there have been a few studies that have looked inside these different types of schools to ask if the PCS bargain is being realized. Crawford (2001) compared TPS and PCS teacher autonomy in a sample of 37 primary schools in Michigan and Colorado. In his combined analysis—which included around 400 teachers—he found no differences in the amount of autonomy between teachers in TPS and PCS. Powers (2009) used nationally representative data to show that teachers in PCS reported having more control over selecting instructional material and content, techniques, and discipline relative to teachers in TPS; she found no differences in control over grading and homework. In terms of accountability, she found that teachers in PCS were less likely than teachers in TPS to indicate that they would be recognized for doing a good job; there were no differences between teachers in PCS and TPS in terms of having their job security tied to student test scores.

Though useful, these analyses rely on data that are now somewhat dated. Crawford (2001) used data from the 1997–1998 school year, and Powers (2009) used the Department of Education’s Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) data from the 1999–2000 school year. At the time of these analyses, the charter movement was relatively small: There were 0.3 million students in around 1,500 PCS in the 1999–2000 school year; by the 2011–2012 school year, an estimated 2.1 million children were educated in approximately 5,700 PCS (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). In addition to growing in size, the nature of the sector has evolved: In the early years of the movement, many PCS were converted TPS or standalone, independent PCS; in the years since then, there has been an increase in non-converted PCS and PCS operated by EMOs (Betts, Tang, & Zau, 2010; Miron & Gulosino, 2013).

Additionally, both studies use means tests to analyze differences between teachers in PCS and TPS. This approach is useful for providing a first look at the data; however, because they cannot control for teacher- and school-level factors that may also affect teachers’ perceptions, they do not provide as rigorous a view as possible. This article contributes by examining more recent data (from the 2011–2012 school year) and using a multivariate analysis to explore teachers’ perceptions of autonomy and accountability. Although these data are not perfect—as discussed in the following, teachers are not randomly assigned to schools so this article cannot prove that schools are affecting teachers in particular ways—they provide an updated, robust portrait comparing teachers in PCS and TPS. Before examining these data, it is important to first consider whether at the level of theory there is reason to think that the publicness of a school might affect teachers’ experiences and perceptions.

Publicness and Public Charter Schools

As with the broader privatization movement, arguments in support of PCS are rooted in expectations about the nature and performance of public organizations. Specifically, these arguments expect that publicness is associated with inept leadership and bureaucratic entanglement (Burian-Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Risen, 2008). However, differences between public and private organizations that seem clear at first glance are often murkier upon closer inspection (Bozeman, 2004; Murray, 1975; Simon, 1997). As such, prior to asking why we might expect differences between teachers in PCS and TPS, it is important to define publicness and locate these schools accordingly.

For many years, scholars have noted that there are blurred lines between state and market and public and private (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Sanger, 2003; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011). As a result, organizational theorists suggest that it is best to conceive of publicness as a continuum (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011): Organizations that are predominantly owned, funded, and controlled by public authorities are understood as public while those that are predominantly owned, funded, and controlled by private authorities are understood as private (Perry & Rainey, 1988). Organizations with a mixture of public and private ownership, funding, and control are somewhere between these poles.

Using this framework, both TPS and PCS have high levels of publicness. In terms of funding, though there is a widespread perception that PCS receive a large portion of their operational budgets from foundations and private donations, both types of schools rely predominantly on public revenues (Batdorff et al., 2014). Similarly, there are few differences in ownership: Both are opened or authorized by public entities like states, school districts, or charter-granting agencies. The key difference, then, is in how the schools are controlled or operated. Though both types of schools are subject to federal and state law, PCS tend to have more leeway from state and district rules and regulations than TPS (Miron & Nelson, 2002). As a result, many of the decisions about PCS operations—from curriculum to grades offered to decisions about personnel—are made by privately selected school leaders or boards of directors. As such, PCS are not analogous to private or parochial schools, which are funded, owned, and operated privately. Nevertheless, due mainly to differences in control and operations, they are less public than TPS.

So conceived, why might teachers in PCS have different levels of autonomy and accountability than teachers in TPS? Public organizations are more constrained by political authority—they must answer to elected officials from varied political institutions and pay close attention to public opinion (Bozeman, 2004). Across a range of disciplines and theories, these characteristics are thought to make public organizations harder to change, more focused on processes than outcomes, and less efficient (Goodsell, 2004). Because private or quasi-public organizations are less constrained by political authority, they are theorized to be more nimble and efficient (Donahue, 1989; Salamon, 1995). At the front lines of an organization, where operative employees interact with the public and do the work that permits the organization to function (Lipsky, 1980; Simon, 1997), these differences in publicness may manifest in two ways: management and “red tape.”

Most management theories are premised on a simple expectation: The choices that managers make as they interact with their environments and employees have the capacity to affect how their organizations operate (see e.g., Meier, O’Toole, Boyne, & Walker, 2007); in this way, managers “matter.” Though all managers are thought to have the potential to affect how their employees (and hence organizations) perform, public managers are generally understood as less powerful (Bozeman, 2004; Meier & O’Toole, 2011; Rainey & Chun, 2005). This is because relative to managers in private or quasi-public organizations, they are more likely to be given ambiguous objectives (Davis & Stazyk, 2015) and to have to respond to multiple principals (Meier & O’Toole, 2011); also, due to the inflexibility created by civil service rules and high levels of union membership (Davis, 2011), public managers have a narrower range of actions available to them than private or quasi-public managers. As a result of these factors, public managers are theorized to have a more difficult time, among other things, setting goals and maintaining employee accountability. In the aggregate, this results in public managers being less able to successfully manage their organizations.

Additionally, because they are constrained by political forces, like public opinion and elected officials across levels and institutions of government, public organizations are thought to be governed by more rules and regulations than their private counterparts. In many cases, this thickened regulatory environment leads to red tape—“rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 12). Though public organizations may not be the stereotypical, rule-saturated organizations of public imagination (Goodsell, 2004) and public managers may not be more likely to favor rules than private managers (Bozeman & Rainey, 1998), Feeney and Bozeman (2009) observe that: “One of the most enduring findings in red tape research . . . is one that conforms nicely to commonsense expectations—government agencies tend to have higher levels of red tape” (p. 713).

Returning to the case at hand, PCS theorists draw from these real and perceived differences between public and private organizations to suggest that there will be significant differences in how PCS and TPS operate (Burian-Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Gawlik, 2008; Miron & Nelson, 2002). Most relevant for this article, PCS are theorized to be “better managed” because PCS principals have more power than TPS principals to shape the central mission and goals of the school (Crew & Anderson, 2003, p. 193). In addition, principals in TPS may have a more difficult time making personnel decisions, like rewarding or punishing employees for their performance, relative to principals in PCS. In fact, there is some empirical research to support this latter expectation: Principals in PCS report having more influence over hiring and evaluating teachers than principals in TPS (Gawlik, 2008). As such, teachers in TPS may be less likely to feel accountable—in positive or negative ways—for their work. Although weak management might be expected to give teachers in TPS greater autonomy, they would also be more likely to work in schools with high levels of red tape (Burian-Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Hill et al., 2002); as a result, they may perceive that they have less control over their work relative to teachers in PCS.

This discussion shows that there are theoretical reasons to expect that the PCS bargain, envisioned by early school reform proponents, might be realized at the teacher level. It also shows the mechanisms that are theorized to drive these differences: management and red tape. Drawing from this discussion, the article tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Teachers in PCS perceive that their schools have less “red tape” than teachers in TPS.

Hypothesis 2: Teachers in PCS perceive that their schools are more competently managed than teachers in TPS.

Hypothesis 3: Teachers in PCS perceive that they have more autonomy than teachers in TPS.

Hypothesis 4: Teachers in PCS perceive that they are more accountable for their performance than teachers in TPS.

Public Charter School Franchising: The Rise of Educational Management Organizations

The prior section suggests that there are theoretical reasons to think that the PCS bargain, envisioned by early theorists and proponents, might be evident in a comparison of teachers in PCS and TPS. However, much has changed in the PCS sector over the intervening years. In particular, in the early days of the movement, there was a remarkable amount of philosophical and pedagogical diversity among PCS (Nathan, 1996). Since then, there has been a concerted effort to identify and replicate successful PCS models (Scott & DiMartino, 2010), which may have constricted curricular innovation (Lubienski, 2004). The effort to bring particular models up to scale has resulted in an increase in the number of franchised schools—schools run by nonprofit or for-profit EMOs (Miron & Gulosino, 2013).² Thus, this section considers what this development might mean for teacher autonomy and accountability in PCS.

Embracing a logic of deregulation and decentralization, PCS were initially envisioned as independent, standalone institutions with which state and local stakeholders could experiment and innovate (Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996). As alluded to previously, this idea was predicated on the notion that the rules and regulations imposed by centrally controlled bureaucracies were impeding school and teacher autonomy and accountability. Though early theorists viewed these regulations as problematic, they envisioned a similar danger if PCS moved toward a “corporate model” in which “teachers [were] hired simply to carry out a play someone else has designed”; in these cases, “teacher insight, creativity, and talent may be lost because teachers will have little motivation to use these qualities” (Nathan, 1996, p. 8). Despite these concerns, over time, there has been a rise in the number of students educated in EMO-run PCS: In the 2001–2002 school year, approximately 90,000 students attended EMO-run schools; by the 2011–2012 school year, this figure had increased to an estimated 900,000 students—half of all students in PCS (Miron & Gulosino, 2013).

The rise of EMOs has generated concern that PCS will become rigidly regulated and have less independence (Finnigan, 2007). Put differently, observers have raised concerns that this development may prevent the realization of the PCS bargain—enhanced autonomy for augmented accountability—and make PCS indistinguishable from TPS. Thus, this section draws from organizational theory to ask what the growth of franchises might mean for the experiences and perceptions of teachers in PCS.

Franchising is a common form of organization in many business sectors. In essence, a franchise is a set of organizations that provides a relatively standardized set of goods or services as per an agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee (Stanworth & Curran, 1999). The relationship between the two—and the extent to which the franchisee exercises autonomy—is often understood using agency theory (Pizanti & Lerner, 2003); in essence, the theory envisions a game in which a principal (the franchisor) tries to control an agent (the franchisee). Perhaps the dominant way of achieving compliance is formalization—the creation and promulgation of rules, procedures, and enforcement mechanisms. In the context of franchising, much of this is achieved via the contract linking franchisor and franchisee. As with many elements of formalization, these contracts solve some problems and create others (Pizanti & Lerner, 2003). In particular, they may prevent agents from appropriately responding to situations (Cox & Mason, 2007).

In the typical application of agency theory to franchising, there is little concern given to operative employees. Nonetheless, due to their importance in shaping how their organizations function (Lipsky, 1980; Simon, 1997), it is worth asking how this framework might shape frontline workers’ experiences. To do so, agency theory is extended so that the franchisee is the principal and the operative employee is the agent. As previously described, the principal is expected to use formalization to standardize the types of behavior that he or she favors from the agent. In effect, this means that the franchisee will set up rules and routines for the operative employee to follow as well as consequent rewards and punishments. However, the franchisee does not have free reign in this respect: Formalization must operate within the bounds of the contract with the franchisor. Put differently, the franchisee has a confined range of responses relative to an owner working outside a franchising agreement.

To return to the case at hand, this discussion suggests that franchising could have an effect on the experiences and perceptions of teachers working in EMO-run PCS. In fact, many of the theorized effects of franchising are similar to the theorized effects of publicness. Namely, teachers in EMO-run schools would seem likely to encounter higher levels of red tape relative to teachers in non-EMO-run schools and correspondingly, less autonomy. At the same time, because they work in organizations that are centrally (rather than locally) controlled, teachers in EMO-operated schools may work for school administrators who have less control; as such, teachers in EMO-run schools may be less likely to believe that they will be held to account for their performance relative to teachers in non-EMO-operated schools. Drawing from this discussion, the article tests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: Teachers in EMO-run PCS perceive that their schools have more red tape than teachers in non-EMO-run PCS.

Hypothesis 6: Teachers in EMO-run PCS perceive that their schools are less competently managed than teachers in non-EMO-run PCS.

Hypothesis 7: Teachers in EMO-run PCS perceive that they have less autonomy than teachers in non-EMO-run PCS.

Hypothesis 8: Teachers in EMO-run PCS perceive that they are less accountable for their performance than teachers in non-EMO-run PCS.

Data and Method

To test these hypotheses, this article examines survey data collected during the 2011–2012 school year as part of the U.S. Department of Education’s (DOE) Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS). SASS is a nationally representative survey of public school districts, schools, and personnel; schools were selected in each state, and then multiple teachers were randomly selected from within each school. To create the variables used in this article’s analysis, data were drawn from the SASS school and teacher surveys.

Dependent Variables

The article has four outcomes of interest: teachers’ perceptions of red tape, management, autonomy, and accountability. Red tape is defined as “rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 12). Because red tape is a multidimensional concept (Pandey & Scott, 2002), it would be useful to measure it with a host of interrelated questions. Unfortunately, the SASS questionnaire only includes one question that asks teachers about these issues: “Routine duties and paperwork interfere with my job of teaching” (respondents were asked whether they agreed with this statement on a 4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree).³ This question is helpful as it measures a crucial element of red tape: whether administrative duties interfere with teachers accomplishing their primary goal. However, because it does not measure the entirety of the concept, the variable examined here is labeled paperwork.

Management is defined as the approaches used by organization leaders to maintain and advance their organizations using planning, motivation, and communication (Rainey, 2003). In this article, management is an index variable that was created from four items on the SASS teacher questionnaire: “The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is supportive and encouraging,” “My principal enforces school rules for student conduct and backs me up when I need it,” “The principal knows what kind of school he or she wants and has communicated it to the staff,” and “I like the way things are run at this school.” As with the other questions, respondents were asked whether they agreed with these statements on a 4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The resulting index variable, management, had a high scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78); it was averaged to retain a 4-point scale.

Teacher autonomy refers to teachers’ ability to independently make classroom decisions about teaching and learning (Renzulli et al., 2011). In this article, autonomy is an index variable that was created from six items from the SASS teacher questionnaire; respondents were asked: “How much actual control do you have IN YOUR CLASSROOM at this school over the following areas of your planning and teaching?” and given six items to respond to: “1) Selecting textbooks and other instructional materials; 2) Selecting content, topics, and skills to be taught; 3) Selecting teaching techniques; 4) Evaluating and grading students; 5) Disciplining students; 6) Determining the amount of homework to be assigned.” For each item, respondents chose one of four ordered responses: no control, minor control, moderate control, and a great deal of control. The resulting index variable, autonomy, had a high scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77); it was averaged to retain a 4-point scale.

Like red tape, accountability is a multidimensional concept including bureaucratic, performance, and market elements (Garn & Cobb, 2001). Due to its centrality in the PCS debate, this article focuses on performance accountability: the relationship between student achievement and school-wide personnel decisions. Specifically, it examines teachers’ perceptions of the extent to which they will be rewarded or punished for outcomes related to their work. Although an index variable that measured both aspects of accountability would be ideal, there was little correlation between items that measured teachers’ perceptions of reward and punishment accountability. Thus, accountability is measured with two separate variables from the SASS teacher questionnaire. Staff recognition was created based on respondent agreement with the following item: “In this school, staff members are recognized for a job well done.” Job security was created based on respondent agreement with the following item: “I worry about the security of my job because of the performance of my students or my school on state and/or local tests.” Both questions had four ordered responses from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Table 1 presents the survey questions and corresponding variable names for all of the dependent variables used in the article.

Table 1

Survey Questions and Variable Names

Variable Name	Variable Type	Survey Question(s)
Paperwork	Single item	Routine duties and paperwork interfere with my job of teaching.
Management	Index	The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is supportive and encouraging. My principal enforces school rules for student conduct and backs me up when I need it. The principal knows what kind of school he or she wants and has communicated it to the staff. I like the way things are run at this school.
Autonomy	Index	How much actual control do you have IN YOUR CLASSROOM at this school over the following areas of your planning and teaching?: a) Selecting textbooks and other instructional materials. b) Selecting content, topics, and skills to be taught. c) Selecting teaching techniques. d) Evaluating and grading students. e) Disciplining students. f) Determining the amount of homework to be assigned.
Staff recognition	Single item	In this school, staff members are recognized for a job well done.
Job security	Single item	I worry about the security of my job because of the performance of my students or my school on state and/or local tests.

Independent Variables

The information for this article’s independent variables was gathered from the SASS school questionnaire in which school officials answered questions about the school’s characteristics. On the questionnaire, officials were asked: “Is this school a public CHARTER school?” The officials’ responses were used to make the categorical variable PCS. If officials responded that it was a PCS, they were prompted with the following question: “Which of the following best describes the governance structure of this public charter school? 1) An independent or stand-alone charter school; 2) Part of a non-profit charter management organization or network of schools that are managed by central agency; 3) Part of a for-profit charter management organization or network of schools that are managed by a central agency; 4) Part of a traditional public school district; 5) Other.” The categorical variable EMO-run PCS was created such that schools in Categories 2 or 3 were coded 1 and schools in Categories 1, 4, and 5 were coded 0” Using SASS identification variables, these independent variables were merged with the data from the SASS teacher questionnaire.

Control Variables

To examine the hypotheses, the analysis controlled for two sets of variables. At the teacher level, it controlled for years of experience, age, racial and ethnic group, gender, union membership, certification status, achievement of a master’s degree, and main teaching subject area. All teacher-level control variables were created based on teachers’ responses to the SASS teacher questionnaire. At the school level, the TPS-PCS analysis controlled for the state in which the school was located, whether the school was located in an urban or rural setting, the number of students enrolled, the racial and ethnic makeup of students, the percentage of students who had an individualized education plan (IEP), the percentage of students who were categorized as limited English proficiency (LEP), the percentage of the students who participated in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), and the grades taught in the school (divided into elementary, K–5; middle, 6–8; and high, 9–12); the PCS analysis controlled for all of these variables but included controls for whether the school was converted from a TPS or was originally established as a PCS; whether the school was chartered by a district, state, university, or agency; and the number of years the PCS has been in existence. All school-level control variables were created based on responses to the SASS school survey.

Analytic Methods

To analyze the aforementioned hypotheses, this article begins by presenting the findings from a bivariate analysis that used adjusted Wald tests to compare the means of these different variables for the respective PCS-TPS and EMO-run/non-EMO-run comparisons. These means tests used survey weights, created by the DOE to account for SASS’s complex sampling strategy, to ensure that the findings are representative of teachers across the nation. However, because these schools—as well as the teachers in them—are likely to differ in important ways, means tests cannot be used to definitively evaluate this article’s hypotheses.

As such, the article then moves to a multivariate analysis that also used the SASS survey weights. For the PCS-TPS analysis, the article used the following model:

y = α + β_{1} X_{1} + β_{2} X_{2} + ε,

where α is the intercept, X₁ refers to a set of school-related variables (PCS, urban, rural, enrollment, percentage of students White, percentage of students Black, percentage of students Asian, percentage of students Hispanic, percentage of students IEP, percentage of students LEP, percentage of students NSLP, elementary school, middle school, high school, and state), X₂ refers to a set of teacher-related variables (years teaching, birth year, Hispanic, White, Black, Asian, gender, union member, certification status, master’s degree, and main teaching area: general education, art, English, English as a second language, foreign language, health, physical education, math, natural science, and social science), and ε is the error term.

The same model is used for the PCS analysis except for the following differences to the set of school-related variables: (1) Instead of PCS, it includes EMO-run PCS; (2) it includes a variable measuring whether the school was originally a PCS (vs. a converted TPS); (3) it includes variables measuring whether the school was chartered by a district, state, university, or agency; and (4) it includes a variable measuring the number of years that the school has been in operation. Following the PCS sector examination, the analysis closes with a comparison of teachers in TPS and EMO-run PCS.

Since all of the article’s dependent variables are ordered survey responses, the multivariate analysis relies on ordered logistic (logit) regression (Fullerton, 2009; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004; Long, 1997). The article’s figures report odds ratios that indicate the probability of a one-unit change in a dependent variable based on a one-unit change in an independent variable (keeping all other model variables constant). Though ordered logit is the preferred tool for this analysis, some scholars have raised concerns that logistic regression techniques reduce estimate precision relative to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Mood, 2010; Robinson & Jewell, 1991). As such, two supplementary analyses were undertaken for the models reported in this article: (a) OLS with standard errors clustered by school and (b) OLS with DOE survey weights. Although there were some differences across these analyses, by and large, the findings mirrored those reported in the following.

The aforementioned method will enhance our understanding of differences across these various school types. However, it has two important limitations. First, because it analyzes observational as opposed to experimental data, it cannot prove that school types caused any discovered differences among teachers. Second, although the variables described previously were carefully constructed, they are not the only way to measure the concepts studied in this article. These limitations—and how they affect interpretations of the article’s findings—are further elaborated in the article’s Discussion section.

Results

Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in this analysis (summary statistics for the control variables are located in Appendix Table 1 in the online journal); it also shows the results of bivariate adjusted Wald means tests for the PCS-TPS and EMO-run/non-EMO-run comparisons: Asterisks in the PCS and EMO columns denote a statistically significant difference (at the p < .05 level) from the TPS and Non-EMO columns, respectively. The number of observations is rounded to the nearest 10 as per DOE regulations.

Table 2

Summary Statistics

	All (N = 28,230)		TPS (N = 26,570)		PCS (N = 1,660)		Non-EMO (N = 1,200)		EMO (N = 460)
	M	SE	M	SE	M	SE	M	SE	M	SE
Dependent variables
Paperwork	2.88	0.01	2.88	0.01	2.68*	0.04	2.65	0.05	2.73	0.08
Management	3.17	0.01	3.17	0.01	3.14	0.04	3.17	0.04	3.07	0.06
Autonomy	3.24	0.01	3.24	0.01	3.25	0.03	3.30	0.04	3.15*	0.06
Staff recognition	2.98	0.01	2.98	0.01	3.01	0.04	3.03	0.04	2.95	0.07
Job security	2.30	0.01	2.29	0.01	2.39	0.05	2.37	0.06	2.43	0.09
Independent variables
PCS	0.03	0.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
EMO-run PCS	—	—	—	—	0.32	0.04	—	—	—	—

Note. TPS = traditional public schools; PCS = public charter schools; EMO = schools operated by educational management organizations.

p < .05.

In the all respondents column of Table 2 we see that the mean paperwork response was 2.88, just below agree. Also, there is initial support for Hypothesis 1: Teachers in TPS reported a higher average paperwork score (2.88) relative to teachers in PCS (2.68). Second, the all respondents column suggests that teachers generally agreed that the administration of their schools was competent: The average management score was 3.17. Nevertheless, we see no initial support for Hypothesis 2: According to the bivariate analysis, teachers in PCS did not have more positive perceptions of management than teachers in TPS.

Third, in alignment with other recent work (Boser & Hanna, 2014), the findings indicate that teachers generally reported high levels of control: The average autonomy response, 3.24, corresponds with an answer between moderate control and a great deal of control. Though Table 2 does not report sub-autonomy index findings, in the all respondents analysis, the average scores were high for techniques (3.53), grading (3.58), discipline (3.39), and homework (3.62) but lower for the selection of texts (2.63) and content (2.67). It is also important to note little initial support for Hypothesis 3: In a bivariate test, the PCS autonomy mean was indistinct from the TPS autonomy mean.

Fourth, the all respondents score for staff recognition (2.98) was higher than the average job security score (2.30). In other words, teachers were generally more likely to agree that they would be positively recognized for doing a good job than they were to agree that their job would be in jeopardy if students did not score well on tests. The bivariate analysis revealed no initial support for Hypothesis 4: Teachers in PCS were not more likely than teachers in TPS to agree that they would be recognized for performing well nor were they more likely to agree that their job security depended on their students’ performance.

Though not formal hypotheses, it is also useful to note that the findings from the summary statistics of the control variables (in Appendix Table 1 in the online journal) correspond with those made in prior studies (Brewer & Ahn, 2010; Burian-Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Miron & Nelson, 2002). Namely, we see that teachers in PCS were younger, had less experience, were less likely to be members of a teachers’ union, and were less likely to be certified or have a master’s degree. We also see that teachers in PCS were less likely to be White, more likely to be Black, and more likely to work in urban schools with higher concentrations of Black and Hispanic students.

On the right side of Table 2 we see that, as expected (Hypothesis 7), teachers in EMO-run PCS reported less autonomy (3.15) than teachers in non-EMO-run PCS (3.30). Nevertheless, in a bivariate context, there was no support for the other three EMO-related expectations (Hypotheses 5, 6, and 8): Teachers in EMO-run schools did not report different perceptions of paperwork, management, staff recognition, or job security. Appendix Table 1 in the online journal reveals that there were other differences between these schools: EMO-run schools had a smaller percentage of White and Asian students, a larger percentage of students who qualified for free or reduced lunch, and had been in operation for fewer years. Also, teachers in EMO-run schools were younger, less experienced, less likely to be union members, and less likely to have a teaching certificate.

These summary statistics are useful for describing the data and providing a first impression of differences between teachers in PCS and TPS and EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS; however, one of the rationales for this article is that prior comparisons have not presented multivariate findings of autonomy and accountability controlling for individual- and school-level differences. Thus, the following two figures display the odds ratios derived from multivariate logit estimates (for full results see Appendix Tables 2 and 3 in the online journal). Figure 1 displays the differences between teachers in PCS and TPS: An odds ratio above 1 with an asterisk implies that teachers in PCS were more likely to hold particular views relative to teachers in TPS; an odds ratio below 1 with an asterisk suggests that teachers in PCS were less likely to hold particular views relative to teachers in TPS. An odds ratio without an asterisk indicates that there was no statistically significant difference between teachers in PCS and TPS.

Figure 1.

Comparing teachers in public charter schools and traditional public schools.

The left side of Figure 1 reveals support for Hypothesis 1: There was a statistically significant difference in paperwork between teachers in PCS and TPS. As expected, teachers in PCS were less likely to agree that school duties and paperwork interfered with their teaching. The figure also reveals support for Hypothesis 3: Teachers in PCS were more likely to agree that they had control over classroom decisions. Because autonomy is an index variable, it is also useful to look at the variable’s constituent parts. An autonomy sub-index analysis (which used the same model as in Appendix Table 2 in the online journal but is not reported due to space limitations) revealed that teachers in PCS were more likely to indicate that they had the autonomy to choose texts and course content. However, there were no differences in perceived autonomy over technique, grading, and discipline, and teachers in PCS were less likely to indicate that they had control over homework. Though there is evidence of differences in paperwork and autonomy, there is no support for the expectations regarding management (Hypothesis 2) and staff recognition or job security (Hypothesis 4).

Proponents of PCS sometimes portray unions as having a negative effect on student academic achievement—in an effort to protect members, they argue, unions bargain for contracts that make it difficult to reward excellent teachers and fire poor performers (Risen, 2008). Though union membership is conceived of as a control variable in this article, it is interesting to consider some of the findings from Appendix Table 2 in the online journal that speak to the role that union membership may play in shaping teachers’ perceptions. In fact, union members were more likely to report higher levels of paperwork and less likely to perceive competent management. Nevertheless, there were no differences between union and non-union members in terms of autonomy, and the findings in regards to staff recognition and job security were mixed: As PCS proponents would expect, union members were less likely to agree that they would be rewarded for doing their jobs well; nonetheless, union members were more likely to agree that their job security was tied to their students’ academic performance.

Figure 2 reveals results from the analysis that explored differences between teachers at EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS. An odds ratio above 1 with an asterisk implies that teachers in EMO-run PCS were more likely to hold particular views relative to teachers in non-EMO-run PCS; an odds ratio below 1 with an asterisk suggests that teachers in EMO-run PCS were less likely to hold particular views relative to teachers in non-EMO-run PCS. An odds ratio without an asterisk indicates that there was no statistically significant difference between teachers in EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS.

Figure 2.

Comparing teachers in EMO-run and non-EMO-run public charter schools.

This figure shows support for the paperwork hypothesis (Hypothesis 5): Teachers at EMO-run schools were more likely to agree that paperwork interfered with their teaching. The figure also shows significant differences in autonomy: As expected (Hypothesis 7), teachers in EMO-run schools were less likely to agree that they had control over their teaching. As with the PCS-TPS comparison, it is useful to mention the results from an unreported analysis that explored different facets of autonomy (but used the same model as the one shown in Appendix Table 3 in the online journal). This analysis showed that teachers in EMO-run PCS were less likely to report control over content, technique, grading, and homework. There were no differences in terms of control of texts or discipline. Also, Figure 2 shows that there were no statistically significant differences in management, staff recognition, or job security between teachers in EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS.

Though it is not a central purpose of this article, it is also useful to discuss the association that other PCS characteristics had with teachers’ perceptions. Appendix Table 3 in the online journal shows that a school’s status as an original charter versus being a converted TPS had no relationship with any of the article’s outcomes. Similarly, there was no evidence that the number of years that the school had been in existence was associated with teachers’ perceptions.⁴ However, there is some evidence that the entity responsible for chartering the school may have had some effect: Teachers in schools chartered by a district reported lower levels of paperwork and were less likely to indicate that their job security was tied to student test scores. Also, teachers in schools chartered by a state reported higher levels of staff recognition and management.

The findings thus far suggest that teachers in PCS have somewhat different perceptions from teachers in TPS and that teachers in non-EMO-run PCS have somewhat different perceptions than teachers in EMO-run PCS. How, then, do these two subsets of teachers within the PCS sector compare with teachers in TPS? To answer this question, two supplementary analyses were undertaken: One compared teachers in TPS and EMO-run PCS, and the other compared teachers in TPS and non-EMO-run PCS.⁵ These analyses used the same statistical model as used in Appendix Table 2 in the online journal. This analysis showed that teachers in non-EMO-run PCS reported significantly less paperwork and greater autonomy than teachers in TPS; there were no differences in management or either accountability question. In contrast, the comparison between teachers in EMO-run PCS and TPS revealed no differences in any of the five examined outcomes (paperwork, management, autonomy, staff recognition, and job security).

Discussion

For many years, scholars have been asking what in particular is public about PCS (Miron & Nelson, 2002). This article envisions publicness as a continuum and argues that types of schools can be placed on the continuum according to how they are owned, controlled, and funded. In terms of ownership and funding, PCS are not dissimilar from TPS; however, they are controlled by private entities that within the bounds of federal and state law have control over important decisions about how schools are operated. As such, PCS are a “hybrid that mixes elements traditionally associated with private schools (choice, autonomy, and flexibility) with elements traditionally associated with public or government-run schools (universal access and public funding)” (Miron & Nelson, 2002, p. 194). Do teachers in these hybrids have different experiences than teachers in TPS? In particular, are they, as early theorists expected, liberated from the strictures of the public education system while at the same time held more accountable than teachers in TPS (Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996)?

The aforementioned findings show that teachers in PCS were less likely to experience one aspect of red tape (Hypothesis 1) and more likely to feel autonomous (Hypothesis 3) relative to teachers in TPS; also, within the PCS sector, teachers in non-EMO-run schools were less likely to experience paperwork (Hypothesis 5) and more likely to feel autonomous (Hypothesis 7) relative to teachers in EMO-run schools. Nevertheless, there was no support for the expectations that teachers in PCS would perceive their schools as more competently managed (Hypothesis 2) or that they would be more likely to believe that they would be held accountable (Hypothesis 4) than teachers in TPS; similarly, there was no evidence that teachers in EMO-run schools perceived their schools as less competently managed (Hypothesis 6) or felt less accountable (Hypothesis 8) than teachers in non-EMO-run schools. A supplementary analysis showed that the differences between teachers in PCS and TPS were driven by teachers in non-EMO-run PCS; teachers in EMO-run PCS were statistically indistinguishable from teachers in TPS.

Prior to discussing the implications of these findings, it is important to mention two caveats. First, this article highlights two organizational reasons (publicness and franchising) why a school’s characteristics might affect teachers’ experiences. One reading of this article’s findings is that they confirm and challenge these organizational expectations. However, because teachers choose which schools to apply to and schools make determinations about which teachers they accept, an alternate explanation is that these differences result from teacher self-selection. Put differently, teachers are not randomly assigned to PCS and TPS—as with all labor market choices, prospective employers and employees consider the candidate’s person-organization fit prior to entering into a contract (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). The idea of fit is particularly important in PCS: Part of the initial rationale for these schools was that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to public education kept students and teachers from school environments that suited their specific needs (Nathan, 1996). As such, we cannot be sure that differences in teacher survey responses are attributable to organizational differences rather than self-selection.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that self-selection and organizational influence are not mutually exclusive explanations: Employee socialization and behavior are thought to be driven by forces from inside and outside the organization (Cooper-Thomas & Anderson, 2006; Oberfield, 2014). As such, although self-selection is expected to affect teachers’ experiences (and survey responses), so are organizational factors like management and culture. Thus, though there are good theoretical reasons to think that organizational influences affect employee experiences—in this case and across the labor market—self-selection may have played a role here too. As such, it would be overselling the article’s findings to claim that they show that school type (or organizational variation) directly caused the reported findings. Rather, one interpretation is that they provide correlative evidence—in support and in contradiction—of the organizational theories outlined in the first half of the article.

A second caveat about interpreting these results stems from the way in which the article’s concepts were measured. Although the variable measures are defensible, they are not the only way to study these concepts. For instance, readers will recall that though there are general differences in autonomy in Figures 1 and 2, there were also important sub-index differences. Thus, the article’s findings may depend on the specific ways in which these concepts were measured. Similarly, it is important to note that this article focused on subjective rather than objective measures of teacher autonomy and accountability. Though such an inquiry is defensible and indeed necessary—if teachers in PCS do not perceive that they have more autonomy and will be held accountable, it is not clear why they would behave differently from teachers in TPS—it will be important for future researchers to compare this article’s findings with those from research that operationalizes these outcomes differently.

As a result of these limitations, it would be inappropriate to infer too liberally from this article’s results. Nonetheless, because there are relatively few PCS-TPS or EMO-run/non-EMO-run PCS teacher comparisons and because this article relies on recent, representative data from across the United States, it is useful to consider some of the potential implications of its findings.

First, the article suggests that the PCS bargain—at least at the teacher level—has only been half fulfilled. As expected, teachers in PCS reported having greater autonomy relative to teachers in TPS. Returning to the discussion of publicness, perhaps because they are less subject to political control, PCS have less red tape and grant teachers more leeway. Nevertheless, PCS leaders do not appear to be linking enhanced autonomy with greater accountability. This finding may reduce concerns that PCS are the objects of “panoptic surveillance” (Opfer, 2001, p. 202), which impedes teachers in responding flexibly to students and situations. At the same time, it may increase concerns that there is relatively little oversight of PCS (Hassel & Vergari, 1999). From this perspective, the PCS experiment would be analogous to experiences with privatization and deregulation in other contexts: It leads to decentralized control but less accountability (Stanger, 2009). However, this interpretation would be incompatible with the findings here in an important way: The article does not show that teachers in PCS were less likely to be held accountable than teachers in TPS. Rather, it suggests that teachers in PCS reported greater autonomy but were not more or less likely to believe that they would be held accountable.

What accounts for this non-finding with regards to accountability? One explanation is that the theory regarding how publicness affects management and accountability does not apply to this case. For instance, perhaps legislative developments erased accountability distinctions between PCS and TPS if they did in fact previously exist. Over the past 15 years, policymakers have used state and federal law to remake the public school system so that it emphasizes performance-based accountability (Garn & Cobb, 2001; McDonnell, 2008; Ravitch, 2013). For example, the Obama administration’s Race to the Top and Teacher Incentive Fund encouraged states to rewrite their laws to emphasize teacher accountability. Even earlier, and more famously, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) aimed to make all public schools and teachers more accountable: In discussing NCLB’s priorities, President Bush argued that schools work best when teachers are held “accountable for producing results” (Heinrich, 2010, p. i60). Many questions have been raised about the extent to which this legislation has been successfully implemented (discussed further in the following). However, perhaps NCLB and these other programs succeeded in erasing differences in teacher accountability between PCS and TPS, if they did in fact previously exist.

Alternatively, perhaps the difference in publicness between PCS and TPS is too minimal to create major differences in how schools are managed. From this perspective, because PCS are owned and funded publicly, PCS principals and boards may have to be more responsive to elected officials and public opinion than typically thought. This would limit their latitude in steering their schools as they see fit. Perhaps as a result, teachers in PCS and TPS would have largely similar experiences with management and accountability.

Second, the article’s findings have implications for the direction of the PCS sector. In particular, if the sector increasingly becomes populated with EMO-run schools, some of the teacher autonomy differences between PCS and TPS may disappear. It is not clear whether this is a positive or negative development for student achievement. In fact, if particular models—like the “No Excuses” approach used in some urban PCS (Angrist, Pathak, & Walters, 2011)—are associated with student gains, an argument can be made that they should be expanded even at a cost to teacher autonomy. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a move in this direction runs contrary to arguments that PCS promote teacher autonomy and innovation.

Third, the findings here have implications for concerns about EMO accountability: Some recent reports have suggested that charter governing boards have difficulty overseeing and maintaining the accountability of EMO-run PCS (Dixon, 2014). Although this may be true in some respects and instances, this article shows that teachers in EMO-run and non-EMO-run PCS had indistinguishable expectations about reward and punishment accountability.

Finally, the findings here have implications for our theoretical understandings of publicness and franchising. As noted, public organizations are typically thought to be less competently managed and have more red tape (Goodsell, 2004). Aligned with prior empirical research (Feeney & Bozeman, 2009), this analysis reinforces the conventional view about red tape. However, it reveals no evidence that public managers are rated as less competent than quasi-public managers nor does it show that public employees felt less accountable than quasi-public employees. In a similar way, it offers a mixed view of franchising: It may reduce operative employee autonomy with enhanced red tape while at the same time having little impact on management or accountability. Thus, taken in sum, this article highlights the importance of empirically evaluating the conventional wisdom about how an organization’s characteristics and structures affect frontline employees and its overall performance.

Conclusion

Public charter schools, from their earliest days through today, have been envisioned as offering schools and teachers a simple bargain: In exchange for enhanced autonomy, they would be held more accountable (Budde, 1988; Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996). Despite this, there have been relatively few robust national examinations that compare teacher autonomy and accountability in PCS and traditional public schools. This article contributes in three ways. First, it draws from theory to show how a school’s publicness might affect teacher autonomy and accountability. Second, in response to the growth of franchising in the PCS sector, it uses theory to demonstrate why teachers in a franchised PCS might have different experiences than teachers in a non-franchised PCS. Third, the article uses a recent, nationally representative data set to examine these expectations.

Drawing from the findings discussed in the prior section, this article concludes with three recommendations. First, the evidence here supports criticisms about red tape in TPS (Burian-Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Hill et al., 2002). Though some duties and paperwork are undoubtedly necessary for maintaining accountability, there is little evidence here that it has the desired effect: Teachers in TPS did not feel more accountable than those in PCS (who reported less red tape). However, it may have played a role in making teachers in TPS feel like they have less control over their work. As such, school administrators need to find ways to cut unnecessary rules and procedures that take teachers away from their main objective: educating students.

Second, across all kinds of schools examined here, teachers indicated relatively high levels of autonomy and low levels of accountability. In particular, there was little evidence that teachers perceived that their job security was linked to their students’ performances on tests. Whether one believes that this link should exist or not, test-based accountability was central to NCLB and other recent education reforms. As such, this article contributes further evidence suggesting that the implementation of NCLB has not gone as planned (Manna, 2010; Taylor, O’Day, & Le Floch, 2010). It also highlights an important question for future research: Given public concern about “teaching to the test” (Boser & Hanna, 2014), what explains why teachers feel insulated from student test performance? Also, more generally, what explains variation in teachers’ perceptions of the link between student test performance and job security? The typical explanation, that unions insulate teachers, received no support here; in fact, Appendix Table 2 in the online journal shows that union members were more likely to feel that their jobs hinged on student test scores. Thus, further research is needed to explore what factors shape teachers’ perceptions of this type of performance accountability.

Finally, over the past 10 years, EMOs have emerged to constitute a large proportion of the PCS sector. Though we have some evidence about the implications of this development (Angrist et al., 2011; Bulkley, 2004; Goodman, 2013), we know little about its generalized effect on teachers. This article suggests that EMO-run schools have the potential to make the PCS sector more like TPS in two respects: increased red tape and diminished teacher autonomy. Whether this is a positive or negative development for students remains an open question. Nonetheless, this consolidation appears to alter one of the initial and enduring rationales for PCS: flexibility and innovation. If this trend continues, it will be important for PCS advocates and theorists to revise their arguments and expectations about how these schools differ from TPS and why these differences might affect student learning.

Footnotes

Notes

Zachary W. Oberfield is an assistant professor of political science at Haverford College, 370 W. Lancaster Avenue, Haverford, PA 19041, e-mail: zoberfie@haverford.edu . He studies schools, organizational socialization, and street-level bureaucracy. His book, Becoming Bureaucrats: Socialization at the Front Lines of Government Service, examines the development of police officers and welfare caseworkers during the first two years of their careers.

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