How Can Educators Confront Science Denial?

Abstract

An unwillingness to consider empirical evidence that contradicts one’s desired conclusion, or science denial, is an enormous barrier to producing an informed citizenry. This essay explores literature on conceptual change and motivation to put forth fresh ideas on how curricula can foster science acceptance, or the willingness to engage in critical evaluation of evidence even when it holds potential to contradict one’s preferred conclusion. Drawing from motivated reasoning and self-determination theories, this essay builds a theoretical model of how negative emotions, thwarting of basic psychological needs, and the backfire effect interact to undermine critical evaluation of evidence, leading to science denial. The model guides the proposal of several design principles for creating instruction that is likely to foster science acceptance, and puts forth the evidence-laden narrative as an exemplar. This essay calls for instructional methods that facilitate motivation toward accuracy goals by fulfilling basic psychological needs as students engage in accuracy-oriented reasoning while evaluating evidence. The conclusion suggests further lines of research that might improve our understanding of science denial and how it can be confronted in the classroom.

Keywords

conceptual change motivation science education survey research

One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We’re no longer interested in finding out the truth. The bamboozle has captured us.

- Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark

Science denial is “the systematic rejection of empirical evidence to avoid undesirable facts or conclusions” (Liu, 2012, p. 129). The scientific community is gravely concerned with a gradual migration of science denial from the periphery toward the center of our society (Liu, 2012). Science denial is a form of pseudoscience (Hansson, 2017), is a threat to our democracy, and is an enormous barrier to educating a science-informed citizenry. In this essay, I define the converse of science denial, science acceptance, as the willingness to engage in critical evidence evaluation, despite its potential to contradict one’s preferred conclusion. Critique is fundamental to all scientific practice; in order to engage in any practice that would allow for engagement in scientific methods, analysis, data interpretation, and construction of evidence-based arguments, one must critique all possibilities (Ford, 2015). Thus, this definition of scientific acceptance reflects the importance of critique and the dynamic nature of science; scientific acceptance should not be confused with indiscriminate acceptance of scientific facts, based on authoritative claims.

This essay will explore literature on conceptual change, the backfire effect, scientific argumentation, and motivation to elucidate how scientific acceptance, as defined above, can be fostered by science instruction. While not sufficient for addressing science denial, the conceptual change literature provides insights into how individual theory change occurs, and what instructional features and contexts are likely to promote theory change. The backfire effect is then defined and explained in order to understand why conventional science instruction, which presents science-denying students with increasingly convincing evidence-based arguments, is largely unsuccessful at fostering science acceptance. Studies examining scientific argumentation in classrooms are reviewed to foretell the importance of students’ goals during collaborative discussions. In order to understand how a learner’s preferences influence evidence evaluation, the theory of motivated reasoning is explored. Together, the motivated reasoning and scientific argumentation perspectives explain the importance of learners’ goals during evidence evaluation, and how such goals influence a learner’s willingness to consider an unfavored conclusion. Finally, self-determination theory provides insight into how instruction can foster goal orientations that are likely to lead to scientific acceptance. The literature on conceptual change, the backfire effect, scientific argumentation, motivated reasoning, and self-determination theory are synthesized to demonstrate why motivating accuracy-oriented reasoning should be a primary instructional goal, and how it can be fostered in the science classroom (Figure 1). This essay concludes by putting forth a theoretical model of how science denial is allowed to occur, as well as how curricula can foster science acceptance (Figure 2).

Figure 1.

Conceptual synthesis highlighting the contributions of the conceptual change, scientific argumentation, backfire effect, and motivation literatures to demonstrate the need to motivate accuracy-oriented reasoning during evaluation of scientific evidence, if science instruction is to foster science acceptance.

Figure 2.

Theoretical model of how negative emotions and thwarting of basic psychological needs undermine critical evaluation of evidence, leading to negative feedback on critical evaluation of evidence (i.e., the backfire effect) during science denial, while conversely, during science acceptance, positive emotions and basic psychological need support foster self-determination regarding critical evaluation of evidence.

Conceptual Change

Conceptual change approaches to instruction are successful in fostering scientific understanding when a learner’s misunderstanding is due to the natural phenomenon being misconceived. Instruction that is likely to foster conceptual change elicits dissatisfaction, or cognitive dissonance, with existing knowledge. This occurs when there is a perceived mismatch between previously constructed knowledge and a novel experience (Chi, 2008; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). Ideally, this contradiction leads to the learner’s reconstruction of knowledge structures to account for the novel experience, and the resulting structures more closely resemble scientific knowledge (Chi, 2008; 2013; Posner et al., 1982).

Realistically, however, the knowledge-in-pieces (KiP) perspective (diSessa, 2018) indicates this process of modifying knowledge so that it resembles the scientific community’s consensus knowledge occurs incrementally over time (years), such that subtle fluctuations among existing knowledge structures synthesize gradually to yield conceptual understanding. KiP also recognizes that conceptual knowledge is not composed of stable knowledge structures that exist free of context (Hammer 1996). Rather, context activates specific foundational cognitive structures, or phenomenological primitives (p-prims), so when a teacher observes a learner express what one might surmise is a misconception, the conception might be a result of the specific p-prims activated and knowledge constructed in that moment in the given context, rather than a stable concept stored in memory (Hammer, 1996). Furthermore, the knowledge that instructors might deem relevant in two different contexts might not be activated in students, leading to the appearance of students possessing stable, misconceived concepts stored in memory but, in fact, the issue may be due to differential activation of p-prims (Hammer, 1996). The implications of KiP are that instruction should activate the p-prims activated by the context in which educators intend the knowledge to be used; for example, if a nutrition professor wants students to be using their developing understanding of what constitutes healthy food when choosing items in the dormitory cafeteria, the instructor should construct the instructional context to mimic or include the dormitory cafeteria as much as possible. Also, conceptual development is a long-term process; concepts can become stable, context-free structures that are stored in memory, but instruction that facilitates this engages students in sustained and numerous interactions with the new knowledge.

Knowledge structures occur at different scales (Duit, Treagust, & Widodo, 2008), and broad, stable knowledge structures stored in memory are theories. Theories are cohesive mental models that explain causal relationships among several related phenomena (Hemmerich, Van Voorhis, & Wiley 2016). Theories are resistant to change, even when one is confronted with anomalous evidence (Chinn & Brewer, 1998; 2000). Chinn and Brewer (1998, 2000) provide a taxonomy of seven possible responses to anomalous evidence, only two of which give rise to theory change. Theory change toward more accurate theories happens gradually, as predicted by KiP (diSessa, 2018), beginning with decreased confidence in one’s accepted theory (Hemmerich, et al., 2016).

Several factors contribute to whether a learner undergoes theory change. Theory change is more likely when a learner is confronted with multiple lines of convergent evidence, and when the learner is provided an alternative theory that explains the anomalous evidence (Hemmerich, et al., 2016). Each of these experiences, such as when a learner acknowledges evidence that cannot be explained by their current theory, or when a learner sees the logic in the scientific explanation, incrementally modifies the learner’s theory. Additionally, the learner must judge the alternative theory as plausible, or potentially truthful, when evaluating evidence and explanations (Lombardi, Nussbaum, & Sinatra, 2016). While this finding may imply that a learner’s theory is cognitively replaced by the alternative (i.e., scientific) explanation, rather, a learner’s cognitive structures serve as the foundation for the construction of scientific knowledge (Hammer, 1996).

Teaching implications arising from these findings are numerous. First, students must be given opportunity to use the scientific theory in a variety of contexts, many of which resemble or include contexts that are native to the learner, over extended time (Hammer, 1996; diSessa, 2018). Furthermore, it is not sufficient to cast doubt on a learner’s theory; the scientific/alternative theory must be made available to the learner, must be comprehensible, and must be plausible from the learner’s perspective (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; 2001; Lombardi et al., 2016). Engaging students in critical evaluation of novel explanations through plausibility appraisals has been demonstrated to foster conceptual change regarding climate change (Lombardi, Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2013), a topic often subject to science denial. Model-evidence link (MEL) diagrams, which scaffold students’ weighting of relative evidence in support of alternative explanatory models, are a useful instructional tool in facilitating this critical evaluation of novel explanations (Chinn & Buckland, 2012; Lombardi et al., 2013). Critical evaluation using MEL diagrams has the potential to foster epistemic conceptual change, or “change in the cognitive processes and beliefs involved in making judgements about knowledge and knowing” (Lombardi et al., 2016, p. 43; Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). Potentially, epistemic conceptual change toward perceiving scientific knowledge as constructed via critical evaluation of arguments and evidence, rather than perceiving scientific knowledge as either absolute or subjective, could foster a scientific habit of mind (Lombardi et al., 2016), which could plausibly prevent succumbing to science denial regarding contemporary issues that arise in the future.

While the conceptual change literature is useful in fostering conceptual change about scientific phenomena, it is not solely sufficient in dealing with the science denial that educators encounter in their classrooms. When science denial occurs, natural phenomena are not merely being misconceived; often, learners can fully comprehend a natural phenomenon but still find its explanation to be implausible (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). In the case of science denial, empirical evidence is rejected due to its undesirable conclusions, even if the scientific explanations are comprehended. Therefore, conceptual change approaches alone are not likely to be effective when trying to foster understanding of controversial topics that are subject to science denial, because they do not address why students are unwilling to engage in critical evaluation of evidence. Echoing calls to infuse the conceptual change approach with other perspectives that attend to motivational and affective factors (e.g., Sinatra, 2005; Treagust & Duit, 2009), I argue that because the topics subject to science denial are emotionally laden, a whole-hearted approach to overcoming science denial through instruction must attend to these factors.

The Backfire Effect

Evolution, climate change, vaccinations, and GMOs are scientific topics that potentially threaten one’s faith, sense of normalcy, confidence in parenting decisions, and sense of food safety. While understanding the scientific facets of topics subject to science denial is important, “science denial is less about science and more about deep fears and core personal identity” (Rosenau, 2012, p. 567; Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hoger, 2014). Emotion plays a role in both evidence evaluation (Garcia-Marques & Loureiro, 2016) and decision-making (Charpentier, De Neve, Li, Roiser, & Sharot, 2016). Thus, attending to identity and emotion is necessary for instructors attempting to foster science acceptance.

The backfire effect occurs when unscientific claims, such as that climate change is not caused by human activities, become more entrenched when confronted with counter-evidence (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Two forms of the backfire effect are relevant to the science denial educators encounter in the classroom. The familiarity backfire effect occurs when hearing misinformation during an explanation about its inaccuracy leads listeners to remember the misinformation but not that it is inaccurate (Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017). Although Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky (2017) recently demonstrated that this effect can be minimized when retractions of misinformation enhance salience of the inaccuracy, it is still advisable to lead with scientifically accurate information to increase its familiarity, rather than the inaccurate information.

A potentially more potent backfire occurs due to counter-evidence threatening one’s identity or worldview (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Hence, science instruction, which involves engaging students in evaluating evidence that may conflict with their worldview, may worsen science denial. A hypothetical example demonstrates how this might occur: Imagine a student who identifies as a conservative, has grown up in a religious community that questions geologic time and its implications, and is generally familiar with conservative stances on a variety of socio-scientific issues. Such a student is more likely to identify with, relate to, and trust fellow conservatives, many of whom may be family and loved ones with whom he or she has formed tight bonds, rather than his or her geology professor. This is because these influential others feel a part of the student’s identity because they played seminal roles in establishing that identity over his or her life, leading up to a moment when this student is confronted with geologic evidence, in their college geology course, supporting human-induced climate change. Before the student even has a chance to see the scientific evidence, he or she may conclude that it is invalid, simply because the student is aware of the views on climate change that are shared among those the student trusts. Due to the geology professor being an assumed representative of the opposing side, data and arguments put forth by the professor contradicting claims made by trusted loved ones leads to the student unconsciously feeling as though the professor is condemning those trusted individuals and, to the degree that the student feels those individuals have played important roles in their identity development, is attacking the student’s identity. Regardless of whether the attack is real, implicitly feeling attacked leads the student toward defensiveness, an unwillingness to genuinely hear the perceived opposition’s justifications for claims, and a steadfast adherence to his or her identity, which is partially composed of science-denying beliefs.

The backfire effect puts science educators in a precarious position: Do we avoid referencing evidence when teaching science to prevent further entrenchment of science denial, or do we nevertheless reference evidence during our instruction, which is likely to polarize our student body regarding controversial topics? Findings from studies on the backfire effect provide two important implications for instruction. First, resistance to evaluating counter-evidence can be reduced when coupled with affirmation of one’s values (Cohen, Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, & McGoey, 2007; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) and when the counter-evidence is framed in a way that does not threaten the opposing worldview (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010).

Scientific Argumentation

With the widespread adoption of the Next Generation Science Standards, which calls for students’ engagement in argument-from-evidence (NGSS Lead States, 2013), investigations of scientific argumentation among students have been fruitful, leading to several insights into the problem of science denial. First, when engaging in classroom scientific argumentation, different students may hold different interpretations, and consequently goals, of the argumentation activity (Berland & Reiser, 2011), which in turn influence the conceptual understanding that emerges from the argumentation. Students may hold as a goal of an argumentation activity to persuade others or to make sense of the problem or data at hand; often, students view these concurrent goals of argumentation as opposed to one another (Berland & Reiser, 2011). When a student whose goal is to persuade others of his claim makes inaccurate claims during argumentation, the teacher’s legitimization of the inaccurate claim allows for such a student to shift the argumentation goal toward sense-making and participating in consensus-building (Berland & Lee, 2012). This is not to say that instructors should accept and reinforce inaccurate claims. Rather, comments that allow students to save face legitimize the student’s contribution to the discussion, even when they may have made an inaccurate claim. Examples of such instructor responses might include: “I see why you would conclude that,” or “I know you are not alone in thinking that. Thank you for bringing this up so we can address this common misconception.” Such responses demonstrate that even inaccurate statements can contribute to shared sense-making.

Conceptual growth is more likely when the goals are to make sense of data and build consensus, but consensus-building alone does not suffice for supporting conceptual development. Asterhan and Schwartz (2009) found that students engaging in dialectical argumentation, consisting of challenges, rebuttals, oppositions, and concessions, experienced greater conceptual growth than students participating in consensual argumentation, consisting of supports, agreements, and elaborations. Similarly, Schwartz, Neuman, and Biezuner (2000) found that students learned more when their argumentation involved disagreements, challenges, concessions, and hypothesis-testing. Students’ goals during any given argumentation activity can also be influenced by teachers’ goals and the goals conveyed in broader classroom practices (Berland, 2011).

The scientific argumentation literature highlights in the influence of goals (i.e., to persuade others of one’s preferred conclusion vs. to make sense of the problem at hand) and willingness to engage in socio-cognitive aspects of argumentation (i.e., dialectical vs. consensual argumentation). The key to productive argumentation seems to be that students simultaneously seek both consensus and accurate sense-making. Striking a balance between these potentially opposing goals necessitates social and communication skills that allow for dissention, friendly disagreement, and preservation of competence when a dialoguer is found to be incorrect. A point of departure, however, is that studies that examine the role of scientific argumentation as a facilitator of learning generally do not seek to describe how broader personal theories changes as a result of engagement in argumentation. Nonetheless, the scientific argumentation literature highlights the importance of goals when collaboratively engaging in scientific practices, such as argumentation and critical evaluation of evidence (Figure 1).

Motivation

As one might infer from the scientific argumentation literature, people do not generally begin evidence evaluation from a neutral position. Instead, individuals exhibit motivated reasoning; “evaluation of scientific evidence may be biased by whether people want to believe its conclusions” (Kunda, 1990, p. 490). Kunda (1990) theorized that not everyone has a desire to be accurate in their conclusions, at least on certain topics. Directional goals motivate people to come to a desired conclusion, despite contradictory evidence (Kunda, 1990). On the other hand, accuracy goals motivate people to be accurate in their conclusions and thus evaluate information more carefully and use more complex critical thinking strategies (Kunda, 1990). Kahne and Bowyer (2017) present compelling evidence for directional goals among young people when evaluating the accuracy of claims; 58% of a national sample agreed with a grossly inaccurate statement when it aligned with their ideology. Political knowledge magnifies directional goals, while exposure to media literacy initiatives fosters accuracy goals (Kahne & Bowyer, 2017).

What are additional ways that we can foster accuracy goals in students, particularly surrounding controversial topics that are subject to science denial? Accuracy goals are fostered by increasing the stakes of making the wrong judgement while simultaneously allowing time for careful reasoning (Kunda, 1990). However, I find this implication insufficient for addressing science denial in the classroom. The consequences of being inaccurate regarding climate change, for example, are deemed implausible by many (Lombardi et al., 2013). Therefore, authentically increasing the stakes, or highlighting the high stakes of not being accurate regarding issues such as climate change, are not likely to foster accuracy goals, because science deniers do not believe those consequences will happen. Thus, I turn to an alternative theory of motivation, self-determination theory, which may provide more insight into how accuracy goals can be fostered in the science classroom.

The advantage of applying the lens of self-determination theory (SDT) to fostering accuracy goals in the science classroom is that SDT attends to the social and cultural factors that foster or undermine motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). SDT posits three innate psychological needs: competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which determine the regulatory processes that direct goal pursuits (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Competence refers to an individual’s perceived efficacy in pursuit of a goal (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). The need for relatedness refers to an individual’s need to interact with and be connected to others (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004); relatedness can also be conceived as a sense of belonging. Autonomy refers to an individual’s perceived ability to act in accordance with their true self or act of their own volition (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). Goal pursuits differ to the extent that they are self-determined, which is to say the degree to which they are perceived to arise from the self or have an internal locus of causality (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those that are performed for mere pleasure or satisfaction and are entirely self-determined. Even when behaviors are not inherently enjoyable, individuals may fully internalize extrinsic motivators, such as the values shared by a culture, so that resulting behaviors arise from an internal locus of causality (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Full internalization results in full integration of those values into one’s sense of self, such that the values are fully accepted as one’s own and the behaviors arising from those values constitute self-expression (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Internalization of a culture’s values is dependent upon the degree to which the three basic psychological needs are fulfilled by the social milieu afforded by that culture (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The teaching implications of this are significant: If science educators want to motivate accuracy goals, we need to cultivate its value in the social milieu of our classrooms, and support students’ autonomy, competence, and relatedness as they engage in accuracy-oriented reasoning, such as when students are critically evaluating empirical evidence. Thus, I argue that educators will be relatively unable to effectively address science denial in our classrooms until we identify specific instructional methods that facilitate motivation toward accuracy goals by fulfilling basic psychological needs as students engage in accuracy-oriented reasoning while evaluating evidence.

The SDT literature provides us general instructional contexts and teaching behaviors that support the three basic psychological needs, which can serve as starting points for motivating accuracy goals. Autonomy-supporting practices include assuming the students’ perspectives on issues, providing explanatory rationales, using noncontrolling language, and avoiding guilt or shame (Reeve & Halusic, 2009). Competence is supported when students receive messages that acknowledge the difficulty of a task but also express instructor confidence in the student’s ability to learn how to perform well (Sheldon & Filak, 2008). Relatedness is supported when instructors acknowledge unique contributions from individual students and express interest in students’ experiences and perspectives (Sheldon & Filak, 2008). While early SDT research focused on only supporting autonomy in educational contexts, more recent work has demonstrated the importance of supporting all three needs. For example, Radel, Pelletier, & Sarrazin (2012) found that students may actively engage in behaviors that restore their sense of autonomy when it has been diminished, but only if their perceived competence is high.

Fulfillment of needs is related to emotions; for example, competence and relatedness are negatively associated with anger and sadness and positively associated with joy (Tong, Bishop, Engkelman, Diong, & Wh, 2009). Also, competence is negatively associated with fear (Tong, et al., 2009). Topics subject to science denial are laden with negative emotions such as fear and anger (Sinatra, Broughton, & Lombardi, 2015; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2013), so viewing science denial through the lens of SDT allows for new perspectives on the backfire effect. Specifically, I hypothesize that being confronted with counter-evidence that threatens one’s identity elicits emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness, which, in turn, thwart fulfillment of basic psychological needs related to critically evaluating that evidence. This leads to further repulsion from critical evaluation of evidence, which manifests as the backfire effect. This causal sequence summarizes my theoretical model of how emotion, need-thwarting, and the backfire effect interact to give rise to motivation to avoid critical evaluation of evidence and thus science denial (Figure 2). Conversely, when confronted with evidence that matches one’s personal theory, identity is reinforced, leading to positive emotions and need fulfillment while evaluating that evidence (Figure 2). Thus, there is a positive feedback loop leading to evidence evaluation in the case of science acceptance, which is homologous to the backfire effect (i.e., a negative feedback) observed in cases of science denial (Figure 2).

Instructional Implications

I argue that if educators are going to successfully confront the science denial that has creeped from the periphery toward our mainstream society, we need to create and test instructional tools, methods, and approaches that draw from this theoretical model. Such instruction would share the following design principles for fostering science acceptance:

Instruction engages students in critical evaluation of evidence, which involves assessing plausibility of at least two claims given real evidence.

During instruction, students can relate to or emotionally identify with someone engaging in critical evaluation of evidence.

Instruction is structured to support students’ three basic psychological needs during critical evaluation of evidence, such as:

a. deliberate assignment of student teams so they are likely to mutually support students’ senses of belonging

b. instructional materials that reflect students’ perspectives, both science denying and science accepting, and experiences without judgement or shame

c. ample scaffolding for difficult cognitive tasks that enable students to feel capable

Instruction establishes a social milieu that values accuracy during sense-making.

Instruction is rooted in contexts that overlap with the lives of students.

I put forth the evidence-laden narrative (ELN) as one instructional tool that enacts these design principles and holds potential to reinforce science denying students’ identity and support basic psychological needs while engaging in critical evaluation of evidence.

An ELN is a personal narrative that tells a story of overcoming science denial. An ELN begins by the ELN’s character explicitly stating their values that are relevant to the science denial context; in every ELN, one such value reflects accuracy goals in the science denial context. For example, an ELN addressing vaccination may state “Susana feels it is extremely important for her to understand the risks and benefits of vaccination to be accurate, given the potential for vaccinations to affect her child’s health; she wants her child to grow up healthy and disease-free.” The ELN then proceeds into a personal story of overcoming science denial on the topic by engaging in evidence evaluation. Applying Hemmerich et al.’s (2016) finding that convergent evidence is more likely to facilitate theory change, ELNs convey several lines of convergent evidence supporting the scientific consensus related to the science denial context. The narrative guides the reader through the character’s progress toward science acceptance, given different pieces of evidence that were evaluated and the emotions experienced when evaluating the evidence. As the character engages in evidence-evaluation, so too do students, collaboratively evaluating the same evidence alongside the character. The ELN then concludes with the character making a science-informed decision that reflects the scientific consensus on the topic. Throughout the narrative, students are prompted to engage with the narrative through questioning that addresses both affective and conceptual goals. For example, when the ELN character explicitly states his or her values, students are prompted to consider whether they share these values with the character. Doing so provides opportunity for students to affirm their own values, which has been demonstrated to reduce the backfire effect (Cohen et al., 2007; Nyhan & Reifler, 2011). The goal of this aspect of the ELN is to affirm students’ identities and allow them to approach the science denial topic without feeling threatened. By providing opportunity to students to engage in evidence evaluation alongside the character and then detailing how the character evaluated each piece of evidence, the character serves as a relatable role model regarding evidence evaluation, despite the evidence countering one’s preferred conclusion. Furthermore, by detailing how the character feels while evaluating evidence, students who identify with the character feel their emotions are validated as well. I argue ELNs have the potential to support students’ basic psychological needs while analyzing evidence because they potentially affirm identity and emotions surrounding science denied topics, while also demonstrating how one progresses toward science acceptance. I expect that ELNs have the potential to facilitate overcoming science denial, because science deniers are more likely to be convinced by counter-evidence when evidence comes from someone with whom they identify. Indeed, Bhuva and Medina (2017) observed that science denial regarding vaccination was overcome when previously passionate anti-vaccination parents were convinced to vaccinate their children after reading about other parents’ experiences of having believed in anti-vaccination and then converting to pro-vaccination. It is worth investigating whether a similar outcome can be facilitated for students through use of ELNs.

ELNs have the potential to support basic psychological need fulfillment while engaging in evidence evaluation, but they can also potentially distract a student from the empirical evidence being presented in the narrative. Model-evidence link (MEL) diagrams are activities that structure students’ critical evaluation of evidence for and against competing causal explanations for natural phenomena (Lombardi, Brandt, Bickel, & Burg, 2016). It is also worth considering whether MEL diagrams are a useful scaffold for analyzing ELNs, such that the combination of the two tools fosters students’ basic psychological need fulfillment and science acceptance more than the use of either tool alone.

Despite the potential for fostering science acceptance held by the ELN and other instructional approaches following the above design principles, it is also possible to imagine barriers that would make such efforts unproductive. Given that at least some understandings may be dynamic in situ knowledge constructions resulting from contextually dependent p-prim activation (diSessa, 2018), it is plausible that students who engage in ELNs demonstrate shifts toward science acceptance as predicted by the present framework, but then return to a science denial perspective when in other contexts. The potency of this phenomenon may be amplified by the didactic contract, or students’ and teachers’ interpretations of the set of one another’s responsibilities, beliefs, methods, and behaviors in the classroom (Brousseau, 2002). Students have been engaging in didactic contracts at the classroom, institutional, and societal levels throughout their education, so it is commonplace for students to separate their classroom understandings and behaviors from that of other contexts. Furthermore, students might interpret an ELN and other instructional activities meant to foster science acceptance as simply another science activity that calls upon them to participate in ways appropriate to the science classroom, per the didactic contract. In short, students may say, do, and think in ways that are specific only to the school context. Thus, instructors must root instructional attempts to foster science acceptance in contexts that exist in students’ lives outside of school as well as sustain such instruction over time to give students a chance to build the conceptual bridges between in- and out-of-school contexts.

A Pilot Study

In a pilot study, I have begun to test aspects of this theoretical model (Figure 1) for how instruction can foster science acceptance. I recruited 116 postsecondary students enrolled in an introductory biology course to engage with an abbreviated ELN administered via an online questionnaire. The goal of the pilot study was to answer the questions: 1) what was the observed improvement in participants’ agreement with the scientific consensus during completion of an abbreviated ELN? 2) what is the degree to which increase in agreement differed between participants who were directionally oriented versus participants who were accuracy oriented? 3) what is the degree to which increase in agreement differed between participants who strongly identified with the ELN’s character versus participants who weakly identified with the ELN’s character? 4) what is the degree to which increase in agreement differed between participants who experienced negative emotions during evidence evaluation versus participants who experienced positive emotions during evidence evaluation?

To measure science acceptance regarding vaccinations, participants were asked the extent to which they agreed with the claim “The increase in the number of vaccinations that are given to children nowadays is unhealthy and has led to an increase in health problems.” Participants answered on a 0–10 scale, with 0 referring to “I totally disagree with this claim,” 5 referring to “I am unsure where I stand on this issue,” and 10 referring to “I agree 100% with this claim.” This item was reverse-scored and shifted to a -5 to +5 scale, allowing for a measure of science acceptance/denial, with positive values referring to acceptance and negative values referring to denial.

To measure reasoning orientation, participants were next asked “When evaluating evidence regarding socio-scientific issues such as vaccinations, climate change, and GMOs, how important is it to you for your final conclusions to be correct?” and “When evaluating evidence regarding socio-scientific issues such as vaccinations, climate change, and GMOs, how important is it to you that your initial intuition ends up being correct?” Emphasis was added to attune participants to the difference between the items. The first item was asked in order to measure participants’ goal orientation toward accuracy reasoning, while the second item was to measure participants’ goal orientation toward directional reasoning. Both questions were answered on a 0–10 scale, with 1 referring to “not at all important,” 5 referring to “somewhat important,” and 10 referring to “extremely important.” The directional item score was subtracted from the accuracy score to yield a single goal orientation score (-10 to +10), with negative values referring to goal orientation toward directional reasoning and positive values referring to goal orientation favoring accuracy.

Three items were used to measure the extent to which participants identified with the ELN’s character, Kendra. All three of the following items were answered on a 0–10 scale, with 0 referring to no identification with the character and 10 referring to total identification with the character: “Kendra feels it is really important to be accurate in her evaluation of information about vaccination, because whichever decision she makes will affect the health of her child. To what extent do you share this value of being accurate in your conclusions about vaccinations with Kendra?” “If you were in Kendra’s shoes, how concerned would you be about accurately evaluating all the available information about vaccinations?” “To what extent do you identify or relate to Kendra?” Internal reliability analysis indicated acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.665), and all three items were positively correlated with each other with a correlation coefficient of at least 0.25. Therefore, scores on these items were averaged to yield a character-identification score. Participants who strongly identified with Kendra were identified as those who had a character-identification score equal to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean. Participants who weakly identified with Kendra were identified as those who had a character-identification score less than the mean.

After participants responded to the items above measuring their agreement with the scientific consensus, reasoning orientation, and identification with the ELN’s character, the abbreviated ELN described the story of Kendra, a graduate student who has just learned she is pregnant. Kendra is on a quest to evaluate information to determine if she should vaccinate her child. The ELN presented to participants two data tables from primary literature as pieces of information that Kendra was evaluating; data used in the ELN were published by Roush, Murphy, and Vaccine-Preventable Disease Working Group (2007) and the Immunization Action Coalition (2018). After evaluating each data table, participants were prompted to select the claim that was supported by the presented data and to indicate emotions experienced during evidence evaluation. Participants ranked on a 0–10 scale the degree to which evaluating the evidence made them feel the following emotions: confused, capable, angry, vindicated, at ease, thwarted, frustrated, incompetent, confident, and calm. Items asking about negative emotions demonstrated high internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.916), as did items asking about positive emotions (Cronbach’s α = 0.873). Thus, the mean negative emotion score was subtracted from the mean positive emotion score to yield a single emotion score (-10 to +10), with negative values referring to negative emotions experienced during evidence evaluation and positive values referring to positive emotions experienced during evidence evaluation.

Due to non-normal distribution the pre- and post-ELN agreement with the scientific consensus, Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests were performed. Comparing pre- and post-ELN agreement with the scientific consensus across all participants (N = 116), engagement in even an abbreviated ELN administered online, which took on average 10.3 min to complete, fostered improvement in agreement in the scientific consensus (Z = -3.90, p < .001). Participants who were accuracy-oriented (N = 85) experienced a significant improvement (Z = -2.87, p = .004), despite their initial degree of agreement with the scientific consensus being high (M = 2.72 + 2.56 SD on the -5 to +5 scale). Participants who were directionally oriented (N = 19), significantly improved in their agreement with the scientific consensus (Z = -2.25, p = .024), despite agreeing with the scientific consensus less than accuracy-oriented participants prior to the ELN (M = 1.25 + 3.81 SD). Participants who strongly identified with the ELN’s character (N = 20) experienced a significant improvement in the degree of agreement with the scientific consensus (Z = -2.52, p = .012), as did those who weakly identified with the ELN’s character (N = 57; Z = -2.19, p = .029). Participants who experienced negative emotions during evidence evaluation (N = 21) did not experience improvement in the degree of agreement with the scientific consensus (Z = -1.04, p = .298), whereas participants who experienced positive emotions during evidence evaluation (N = 49) demonstrated significant improvement (Z = -3.14, p = .002).

These findings demonstrate the importance of reasoning orientation, identity, and emotions when evaluating evidence about a controversial issue but, like all good pilot studies, more questions are raised than answers provided. There are several limitations to this pilot study that should be addressed in further research. First, larger sample sizes would enable more powerful statistical analyses to evaluate the multiplicative effects of several factors on students’ science denial/acceptance. Second, science denial/acceptance and reasoning orientation were each measured in this pilot study with a single item. In the case of science denial/acceptance, this item fails to evaluate the degree to which someone is experiencing science denial or simple ignorance. Thus, it is plausible that the improvements observed regarding agreement with the scientific consensus are simply due to participants becoming aware of information they were not privy to before the study. Thus, future studies need to carefully parse science denial of evidence from ignorance of evidence. A better measure of science denial/acceptance should measure not only agreement with the scientific consensus but also a participant’s preferred claim and willingness to diverge from his or her preference if supplied with convincing evidence. Similarly, orientation toward directional reasoning or accuracy was measured with a single item, but if this construct is to be investigated further, we are in need of an instrument that really explores the specifics of these goal orientations. Validated instruments related to science denial/acceptance are emerging (e.g., Bentley, Petcovic & Cassidy, 2016), but there is often a focus on agreement with scientific consensus, rather than engagement in motivated reasoning.

Also related to measurement, this pilot study attempted to capture the degree to which participants related to the ELN character through three items that demonstrated marginally internal validity. A brief but improved measurement of the degree to which students relate to someone (e.g., ELN character, science professor, etc.) would enable better tests of this working hypothesis that the degree to which a learner identifies with the source of the information influences willingness to reason toward accuracy.

This pilot study also provides little insight into the efficacy of ELNs implemented in an actual classroom, because this abbreviated ELN was implemented via an online survey. These findings call for an unreserved dive into the nature of instructional features as they come to fruition in authentic classrooms.

Research Directions

My proposal of a theoretical model of how science instruction can motivate science acceptance births numerous potential research questions. For example:

When engaging students in critical evaluation of evidence, what instructional features and contexts support students’ feelings of autonomy, competence, and relatedness?

What instructional features and teacher actions convey accuracy as a value? What classroom practices cultivate accuracy as a shared value, and what, if anything, supports students’ adopting accuracy as a personal value?

What instructional materials facilitate students’ identification with individuals who value accuracy?

Which emotions are critical to supporting or undermining critical evaluation of evidence?

What instructional features and teacher actions support those critical emotions during evidence evaluation?

Generally, further inquiry should head in the direction of creating instructional tools that not only expand our collective understanding of motivation toward critical evaluation of evidence, but also refine instructional materials that facilitate science acceptance. Design research is particularly useful “when formulating and testing initial designs in domains where the current research base is thin” (Cobb & Gravemeijer, 2008, p. 71). Given the relatively recent migration of science denial from society’s periphery toward the mainstream (Liu, 2012), few resources are available to science educators for addressing science denial in their classrooms, making design research an appropriate methodology. Because the social milieu of the classroom is likely to support or undermine basic psychological needs, research could also examine how classroom norms influence motivation to engage in critical evaluation of evidence. It is plausible that engagement in critical evaluation of evidence influences students’ notions of what constitutes a valid scientific argument, and vice versa; students’ initial ideas about valid arguments would likely influence engagement in critical evaluation of evidence. Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate how repeated engagement in critical evaluation of evidence facilitates the sophistication of classroom norms, which, in turn, influence the basic psychological need fulfillment, quality of scientific arguments students devise, and students’ ability to evaluate their peers’ arguments during classroom discourse.

Conclusion

Science educators are now encountering science denial in their classrooms more than ever before (Liu, 2012). Although motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) has been somewhat successful in explaining the nature of science denial, the theory provides little guidance in how science instruction can motivate accuracy goals, which is the desire to arrive at an accurate conclusion through evidence evaluation. Conceptual change approaches adequately facilitate theory change regarding emotionally benign topics, but when science-denying students meet evidence that threatens their identity, a backfire effect occurs, causing entrenchment of science-denying beliefs (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Application of self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) to the problem of science denial can potentially transform this area of inquiry by reframing the motivational component to science denial in a way that acknowledges the cultural and social influences on motivation. SDT identifies basic psychological needs, their relations to motivation, and instructional conditions that support such needs, which can be tested experimentally. This essay suggests the science education community explore an enormous area of inquiry—the application of SDT to fostering science acceptance.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Karina I. Soto-Darner and Kara E. Baldwin for their assistance in creating a graphic organizer to facilitate understanding of the literature review. I also thank Rachel A. Sparks for allowing me to recruit participants for the pilot study from her course and locating the data presented in the abbreviated ELN in the primary literature.

ORCID iD

Rebekka Darner

Author

Rebekka Darner, PhD, is the director of the Center for Mathematics, Science, and Technology and an associate professor of biology education at Illinois State University, Campus Box 5960, Normal, Illinois 61790-5960; rldarne@ilstu.edu . Her research seeks to identify instructional methods that effectively foster quantitative and scientific literacy among non-scientists.

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