Abstract
Introduction
Similar to most countries in the world today, English in Israel plays a major role, both as a global and a local language in multiple domains such as business, academia, media, and education, as well as in daily interactions. English is the language of texts that students are required to read in academia in most disciplines; it is a language frequently “peppered” in Hebrew oral interactions, especially by youth in urban spaces; it is a language widely used in the cyber space and the one used in global corporations and high-technological companies; it is also a language heard in most films and television programs accompanied by translations but no dubbing. Finally, it is a language that all students are required to learn from a very early age of elementary school and through the end of secondary school; in addition, a high level of English proficiency is required for admission into higher education institutions. English is the language that is widely displayed in public spaces, at times along with Hebrew and more rarely with Arabic; English is to be found also as a single language in names of shops, advertisements, names of buildings, commercials, announcements, and instructions. According to a study by Ben Rafael, Shohamy, Amara, and Trumper-Hecht (2006) that documented the languages displayed in public spaces (e.g., linguistic landscape), in Israel English is displayed almost as frequently as Hebrew, the dominant and official language, in areas where Jews reside. This is in stark contrast to the absence of English in public places in towns and villages where Arabs live; in these areas, Arabic, the other official language of Israel, is the main language of communication as well as the medium of instruction in all Arab schools. Arabic in these areas is dominant in public spaces, along with Hebrew; yet English is hardly to be found. The patterns that emerge indicate that English, a nonofficial language in Israel, plays an important role mostly in Jewish areas but in Arab communities, which make up 20% of the Israeli population, Hebrew is viewed as a “global” language; English, a compulsory language for all Arab students in schools from a very early age, is only minimally represented in public spaces. Furthermore, the level of English proficiency reached by Arab students is substantially lower than that of the Jews. Arabs invest most of their “language-learning energies” in learning Hebrew and in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA); English comes last.
Thus, although English plays a central role among those born into Hebrew families, it does not have the same status, role, and priority among groups who are born into different languages such as Arabs as well as immigrants, whose first priority is to acquire Hebrew, the lingua franca within Israel. Countries are not homogenous entities, and a theme such as “the role of English in Israel” needs to be analyzed and interpreted within the diverse communities and spaces in varied sociolinguistic realities. Indeed, current views of language policy do not view policies in homogenous terms but rather as complex phenomena embedded in multiple factors and layers (Johnson, 2010) that require a deeper level of study about the interconnections among languages, communities, and spaces. Thus, a study of English in a nation such as Israel requires a focus into the multiple complexities associated with history, ideology, politics, religion, economics, education, law, and geography. English, the “foreign visitor” and the “current player” in Israeli society, is embedded in those complex factors and realities. It is within this complexity that I will address here a set of factors regarding the multiple roles of English in Israeli education and society in an attempt to understand the following issues: How did it come to be? How is English connected to other languages? How does it relate to different groups, communities, and people? How accessible is English to all? To what extent does the presence of English support and/or challenge multilingualism? In our book, The Languages of Israel (Spolsky & Shohamy, 1999), we referred to English as “everybody’s second language”; yet in this chapter I raise doubts as to whether English is in fact “everybody’s language.” If it is not, who are those who are left behind, who are those who cannot connect to English and whose access to education and employment is being denied? Does English perpetuate justice and equality? How is it manifested in the education systems? How does the dominance of English affect the linguistic diversity of minorities and immigrants? How do the ideologies, policies, and practices associated with the revival of Hebrew affect or how are they affected by the power of English and its high status.
The aim of this chapter then is to point to the complexities of the English language in Israel from a critical perspective, its global language status, and the manners in which it affects and interacts with a variety of local issues. The main focus is on how the presence of a global language, like English, affects a given sociolinguistic reality, bringing about specific consequences in terms of people’s participation, equality, justice, and rights. Addressing these questions and issues will proceed along two main themes: The first is a historical and current perspective of the phases that English went through in Israel parallel to the revival of Hebrew and its accompanying ideologies; the second is the impact of the power of English on other languages and people, especially on Arabs, who use a different community language, and on immigrants, who arrive in Israel with home languages other than Hebrew. These groups are expected to acquire both Hebrew and English in order to participate and function in the society in education and employment.
English and Hebrew: Complementary Rivalry
The relationship between English and Hebrew has been complex and dynamic and hence needs to be interpreted within the history of Israel. At the end of the 19th century, when Jews started to immigrate to the area, still under the Othman regime, Hebrew was constructed as an ideological language as a symbol of a new national collective identity. This continued during the years that the British ruled over Palestine, from 1917 to 1947, the mandate era. During most of these years, English was accepted as a language of the British government, whereas those who immigrated used the various languages of the places and communities from where they came in Europe, the United States, as well as Middle Eastern countries—German, Polish, Russian, Arabic, Turkish, and a variety of Jewish languages such as Yiddish, Ladino, Jewish Arabic, and so on. In those days, English was not viewed as a meaningful rival to the revival of Hebrew like some of the other languages of the immigrants, especially Yiddish, German, and Polish. The British implemented a trilingual official language policy with English as the government language, Hebrew as the language of the Jewish community, and Arabic for the Arab communities. Still, given that English was the language associated with the British regime that Jews wanted to overthrow in the process of reaching independence, it was viewed by some as a symbol of colonialization. It is mostly toward the end of the mandate years that the English language became more closely associated with the British rule. Indeed, one of the first acts of the Israeli Government after reaching independence was to remove English from the official list as an overt act of independence from the colonial rule, leaving Hebrew and Arabic as the two official languages. Although English in the 1950s was constructed negatively as the language of the colonializer and as a threat to the revival of Hebrew, it regained prestige, mostly in the 1960s, when it became associated with the United States and globalization; in all these years it has been continued to be taught in schools. Yet the widespread use and power of English have been perceived in those years as endangering the status, vitality, and revival of Hebrew. English today is accepted as a legitimate and essential language in schools and society but “up to a point” only. This means that there is still fear in many Hebrew language planners and ideologues that English will sweep away the great accomplishment achieved by the revival of Hebrew. A detailed description of this process is described below.
As noted, the early years of migration of Jews to Palestine took place in the Othman era at the end of the 19th century. These influxes continued more intensively during the years of the British mandate when Palestine became a British mandate in 1917 and the League of Nations approved the Balfour Declaration to grant Jews the right to a homeland. One of the major ideologies of many of the leaders of the time, although not of Hertzel, the main visionary of Zionism, was the revival of the Hebrew language and associating it with the creation of nationhood and collective national identity. The ideology then was to turn Hebrew from a written language, used mostly in prayer books, to a living language, a vernacular that will be used by all and in all domains of life—homes, education, and public spaces. The main agenda was to introduce the Hebrew language as a replacement to the many languages spoken and used by the Jewish immigrants who arrived in Palestine at the time. The Hebrew ideology was sweeping and oppressive and was targeted against both Jewish languages such as Yiddish and other territorial languages used by immigrants such as Polish, Russian, and especially German, given its high status as the language of science and literature at the time and a home language for many German Jews who arrived during the 1930s and who openly refused to give up German for the sake of Hebrew (Shohamy, 1994, 2008). Still, in 1923, Zionist activists who supported Hebrew managed to convince the British authorities to recognize Hebrew as an official language of the Jews in Palestine, resulting in the trilingual policy of English, Hebrew, and Arabic, mentioned above. Although in those years Hebrew had already become the language of instruction in school, only a relatively small number of people were proficient in the language, whereas Yiddish and other immigrant languages continued to be used at home and in public spaces (Segev, 1999). English in those days was mostly used by British officials as the language of government, but it was not viewed as a strong competition to Hebrew as the two languages were expected to live harmoniously with one another, serving complementary functions. Various documents of the time point to active campaigns promoting the use of Hebrew as the “only” language while rejecting all other languages. In some of these documents, English is mentioned as an exception, and the British are portrayed as those helping the Jews protect Hebrew from other languages, especially Yiddish (Shohamy, 2008). However, throughout most of these years English was taught in both Hebrew and Arab schools as an additional language.
Some groups, such as the Germans, resented the ideology of the sole rule of Hebrew, insisting that their newspapers should continue to appear in German; immigrants from Poland continued to send their children to Polish-speaking schools, and many others continued to use Yiddish at home, often unable or unwilling to learn Hebrew. English was not viewed in competition until the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s, when a number of activist groups marked English as the language of colonialization and called for its removal as a symbol of the British regime in the move to independence. This was especially reenforced when the British put a limit on the number of Jews who would be permitted to immigrate to Palestine so as to not change the demographic balance of the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine. During this period, the British government came to be viewed as a rival instead of an ally, which brought about violent acts by extreme Jewish groups against the British rule. In those years, the English language became viewed as “the language of the enemy.”
Below is an interview with Mr. Gabriel who was active in the Gdud Maginei Ha-Safa (“battalion for the defense of Hebrew”; quoted in Shohamy, 2008, p. 214):
Do you think it could have been done in another way?
Maybe, if there was a government, then. But this was the time when the British were here, a very hating government. They would do anything they could to hurt us. Had they not been so much against us, things could have been different. So, we had no choice but to establish organizations such as the “gdud” and to take the authority into our own hands. These groups had to be established to ensure that we can revive and maintain the beauty of the Hebrew language, and especially the use of correct speech. The British and the English language were viewed as occupiers of the language.
The partition policy by the United Nations in 1947 was followed by the war that led to the creation of the state of Israel, resulting in a change of the demographic balance so that a substantially lower number of Arabs remained in Israel and the Jews became the majority. As noted, one of the first acts of the newly formed Israeli government was to drop English as an official language, a symbolic act of “getting rid of the British.” The removal of English was also an ideological act giving prime importance and centrality to Hebrew as the sole language, especially in the context of the vast migration at the time of immigrants who did not know Hebrew and the need to create a cohesive collective national identity.
The 1950s can be viewed as times when major government policies were introduced to spread Hebrew as a homogenous language, a language of instruction in all schools, accompanied by widespread education policies for teaching the language to adults as well as the establishment of the Ulpans, intensive schools for teaching Hebrew to professional immigrants. This included inventing new Hebrew words, establishing the Hebrew Language Academy, and introducing strong policies of language purity and language correction, directed mostly to the huge flow of new immigrants arriving in Israel after the Second World War. The negative attitudes toward English continued both in private and public spaces, but English continued to play a central role in the curriculum being taught in schools in both elementary and secondary levels and in higher education. This is an important policy given the taboo imposed on all other languages of the Jews such as German or Yiddish, which were totally banned at universities until the 1960s (Harshav, 1993; Spolsky & Shohamy, 1999).
Major political changes took place in the 1960s, with the closer affinity of Israel with the United States; the vast migration of Jews from English-speaking countries, especially North America; and the status of English as a global and international language. English was no longer associated with the British colonial regime but rather with the United States, especially since English has become not only the world’s lingua franca but also the main language of communication for the Jews, substituting Yiddish, a language that almost vanished among secular Jews after the holocaust and the migration of Jews from Europe. English has become a major language in schools and universities, with substantial expansion of teaching hours in schools and the adoption of a communicative curriculum to fit the new role of English as a major international language of communication. English since then has become a highly desired language by most of the Jewish population in Israel and a requirement for university enrollment, given its role as the language of science and academia.
In spite of these developments or perhaps because of that, English has been viewed by many Hebrew language leaders as a threat to Hebrew. Voices of resistance to the growing power of English have been echoed frequently in the media and at academic conferences. There are cases when the head of the Hebrew Language Academy banned the proposed policy of the Minister of Education to use English as a medium of instruction in two content areas (crafts and gymnastics). The reason given was that such a policy will threaten Hebrew and lead to its decline. The Minister of Education gave in to the request, and no content-based instruction has been introduced in Israeli Jewish schools ever since. (No such objection was made with regard to teaching content in English for Arab schools.)
The power of English as a global language, its broad use among Jewish speakers, and especially its attraction to youth were framed as posing a major threat to the dominance of Hebrew. It is the combination of the global status of English along with Hebrew paranoia associated with national existential fear that positioned English in competition to Hebrew and its symbolism. Yet, along with that, there have been ample initiatives by parents, schools, and municipalities to develop programs to teach English at an earlier age, hoping that it would bring about higher proficiency in the language and greater mobility and status. Currently, most schools teach English from first grade, and often even earlier, defying the official education policy of later grades. Municipalities initiate programs to teach English by homeroom teachers in first grade, and some universities offer prestigious programs where English is the medium of instruction as part of internationalization of higher education and as an economic source drawing students from countries worldwide.
The resentment to such programs by Hebrew leaders and ideologues continues in this day and age and is always framed as a threat to the existence of Hebrew, that is, the fear that English might take over and eclipse the achievement of the revival of Hebrew and hence threaten collective national identity. The Hebrew Academy views its role as a source to not only introduce new words in Hebrew but also guard and protect Hebrew from English. As late as 2012, Professor Bar Asher, the head of the Hebrew Language Academy, stated that English poses a threat to Hebrew, especially in higher education. He expressed fears that it will become the medium of instruction that will rule the academic scene entirely. The battle against the use of English as a subject of academia is expressed in Paragraph 1 below, along with the response of universities’ speakers who argue that English is needed as the language of science and academic prestige, presented in Paragraph 2; both have been taken from the Israeli newspaper Haaretz (Nesher, 2012).
Opposition to English occurs also in terms of displays in the public space. In 2006, Professor Zohar Shavit, a member of the Tel Aviv council, introduced a city provision that it will be compulsory to include Hebrew in all signs around the city of Tel Aviv.
In spite of this rivalry and the opposition of Hebrew language leaders, the situation at all universities in Israel is that they practice bilingual Hebrew-English policies since almost all academic texts that students read are in English whereas classes are taught in Hebrew. In some universities, there are provisions that require that at least one subject be taught in English. Still, the rivalry between Hebrew and English continues, which has a major impact on the education policy on English, as well as on the level of proficiency achieved by Israeli students. The Ministry of Education still opposes the early start of English, so only private funding is available to teach English in earlier grades; thus, only affluent schools can afford it. There is still no content-based instruction programs such as the CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning), widely used in Europe, at any Israeli schools. Many university students have great difficulties in reading academic texts in English, and a large number of students have to study in special English courses before they are accepted to the universities as high schools do not prepare them sufficiently for dealing with high-level English academic texts. English texts are almost never used in Hebrew classes in high schools, not even in subjects such as history, science, and literature. However, high proficiency in English serves as the main criterion for admission to universities, and students need to incur great financial expenses and spend a lot of time in order to prepare for these courses before they are accepted into universities. Thus, the lack of effective content-based teaching at schools and the strict separation of Hebrew from English in academic content prevent many students from entering universities. Thus, although Hebrew and English are intermingled in many domains of life in Israel and in virtual spaces, they are kept totally apart in the education systems of elementary and high schools. The fact that schools do not provide sufficient levels of English teaching means that many wealthy families have to send their children out of Israel to acquire higher levels of English and parents initiate programs that they finance rather than rely on the public education system. The current policies have a detrimental impact on English proficiency.
The rivalry between Hebrew and English can be observed in other places as well as in attitudes to immigrants who come from English-speaking countries. In a study by Blumstein and Shohamy (2012), titled “Do Speakers of Powerful Language Need to Be Empowered?” it was shown that immigrants from English-speaking countries, in opposition to immigrants from non–English speaking countries, are discriminated against in terms of public services. Although most immigrants to Israel obtain special services, like translation services for accommodation especially for Russians, French, and Ethiopian immigrants, no such services are provided to English speakers. It was found that immigrants who are proficient in English, the powerful language that most Israelis are eager to acquire, are being “penalized” as they do not obtain such services in English. In a series of interviews, English-speaking immigrants protested against the absence of language services in public life, especially in health services. The main argument here is that proficiency in a powerful language (English) causes them to be overlooked as people, as immigrants, who are in need for services as any other immigrants: Their status as English speakers marks them as different. Most of the people in the study were senior citizen immigrants from North America, who despite their use of a powerful language, English, are not powerful enough in terms of their status as immigrants and hence do not demand language services in English such as those obtained by immigrants from other countries. English, even today, is not viewed as an immigrant language but rather as a powerful language in competition with Hebrew, resulting in discrimination against users of the language.
Yet, in spite of such strict top-down policy toward English as in competition with Hebrew, there is a strong bottom-up pressure demanding more English. The ongoing trend is for students to begin studying English in a much earlier age than the policy of the ministry permits, and store owners bypass the regulation regarding public signs by putting signs in English and include Hebrew in tiny letters, just to comply with municipal laws.
In conclusion, it is clear that the status of English in Israel is between high prestige and dominance to rejection and opposition by those who fear that English will become more dominant than Hebrew. There is the realization that English is important, global, international, and functional, but this realization is accompanied by questions and doubts as to the future of Hebrew, especially since the latter has only “recently” been revived and has become a vital national language. English in Israel is held captive by Hebrew: There is still lack of confidence about the future of Hebrew, and the price paid is the low level of English achieved by Israeli students and especially the fact that English serves as a gatekeeping device to higher education and the workplace. Bilingualism in the two languages in spite of the reality of university studies and the public spaces is still viewed as a threat to the great achievement of Hebrew revival, and any mixture and trans-languaging among the two languages is viewed negatively, although it is very common. There is wide acceptance of English as a global language and ample use of the two languages in public spaces and certainly on the Internet, but there is still the notion that English “should know its limits” and that Hebrew should always come first and certainly not as a medium of instruction. The policies demand that Hebrew should be the only language of instruction in all schools and subjects and English should never be allowed to surpass Hebrew. This does not mean that there is no resistance to these restrictions “on the ground” and that alternative policies are not created and circumvented, usually with additional costs to the learners. After all, people see great value in English for mobility and are eager to acquire it at a younger age as they view the advantages that come with knowing the language and hence seek other venues and channels to learn it. The tension originates mostly from the fear of “otherness” as a threat to the continued existence of Hebrew ideology. Multilingualism is not accepted for English; Hebrew and English are taught in schools in total separation. Hebrew is the only medium of instruction in all Israeli Jewish schools and English is still viewed as a “foreign” language, as opposed to its use “on the ground” in society.
English for Arabs and Immigrants
Whereas the first part of this chapter focused on the relationship between Hebrew and English in Israel, this section addresses the impact and inequalities resulting from the power of the English language for those who were not born into Hebrew—Arabs and immigrants. In Israel, Jewish immigrants are expected to acquire Hebrew as it is the dominant language and the only medium of instruction in all Israeli Jewish schools. As was noted above, for Arabs, who make up 20% of the Israeli population, the Arabic language is the medium of instruction in Arab schools and a vital community language; Hebrew, though, is the language of power that Arabs are expected to acquire in order to function in most places in Israeli society as it is de facto the national language in spite of the official status of both languages (Amara & Rahman, 2002). For both Arabs and Jewish immigrants, English is a third language. English is a compulsory language in both Arab and Jewish schools, and students learn it from the third grade. Yet for Arabs English is not a top priority given the dominance of Hebrew in Israel and its role as a societal mobilizer needed for academic participation as Hebrew is the sole language of instruction in all universities. Although a number of Arab higher education institutions exist, these are all in the field of education and not in other disciplines. The inequality results from the fact that whereas English is a top priority for Jews, it does not occupy the same priority for Arabs as well as for immigrants, who invest most of their language efforts in learning Hebrew. Already in the higher grades of Arab secondary schools, Hebrew has become the language used to learn mathematics and sciences, and most textbooks are in fact in Hebrew, given the realization that Hebrew is the main language of instruction at universities. Another complexity emerges from the fact that spoken Arabic is drastically different from MSA; the latter considered of higher status in the Arab community and the variety being promoted in all schools. Yet MSA is drastically different from the spoken language, so students invest a lot of time and resources in learning MSA; English then can be considered a fourth language. The inequality also results from the fact that immigrants and Arabs are expected to reach identical levels of proficiency in English as Jews, and they are in fact being compared on the same English tests at the end of High School; the scores on these tests are used as the main criteria for acceptance to all Israeli universities. The different conditions of learning English in the different communities are not taken into account, although the results of these tests have a direct impact on the outcomes of being accepted or rejected by the universities. For Arab students, the lack of high proficiency in English poses a major obstacle, and it is detrimental to their participation in higher education. It is no surprise then that the scores of the Arab students on those final tests are substantially lower than those of the Jewish students. Yet, if one examines the total linguistic repertoire of Jews versus Arabs and immigrants, the latter two groups have a broader linguistic repertoire. The overlooking of the rich linguistic repertoire can be viewed as an act of marginalization, exclusion, and injustice. It is the need to fit into hegemonic Jewish ideologies of Hebrew, a powerful ideological language in Israel, and of English, a global and powerful language, while marginalizing home languages, that contributes to the continued policy of colonialization perpetuating “otherness,” which is also accompanied by the negative consequences of limited access to higher education, limited academic success, and lack of equal opportunities and participation.
To counteract this discriminatory policy, a new trend that is currently emerging among Arabs is the enrollment of Arab students at Universities in Jordan where the language of instruction is Arabic. In a number of studies on the topic, Arar and Haj-Yehia (2010) point to the costs and benefits that motivate this trend, such as the lack of Hebrew and English proficiency. At the same time, the studies show that although these students gain a linguistic advantage, they suffer from the social and psychological difficulties of being “the others” in Jordan as well as having to pay substantially higher tuition payments than in Israeli universities. Furthermore, these studies also show that after the students return to Israel on graduation, they have great difficulties in finding employment.
This phenomenon is important to examine within the current trend toward the development of multilingual competencies. Both immigrants and Arabs develop multilingual skills as they all are far more proficient, to various degrees in multiple languages, than the majority of the Israeli Jewish population, who are proficient in two languages only—Hebrew and English. Yet, although the opportunity to learn two additional languages is much appreciated, there are serious consequences of not having high levels of proficiency in the very languages that are most valued and appreciated in the Israeli society. Most of the views that promote multilingualism somehow treat all languages as if they have identical values so that the more languages one knows the better. Yet these policies fail to delve deeper into the meaning of multilingualism, with questions such as “multilingual in what”? For Arabs in Israel, learning Hebrew as the only medium of instruction at universities is not neutral as it is associated with a linguistic phenomenon that has been imposed on them since 1948; it is a language that occupied them. This may involve deep emotions, hostility, threats for collective identity, historical events, a feeling of marginalization, as well as lack of personal and language rights. The learning of the language may introduce a complex set of emotions that touch the very essence of being a minority in Israel that is further magnified by the official status of Arabic, which is mostly on paper but has no meaningful manifestation. This may be similar to English, a language that is accompanied by a complex set of emotions (Shohamy, 2007). Whereas Israeli Jews view English as a desirable language, related to the United States, a symbol of progress, advancement, globalization, and the “West,” Arab students tend to view it as a “Jewish” lingual franca, especially given the large number of Jewish immigrants in Israel who come from English-speaking countries (e.g., about half of Israeli English teachers come from English-speaking countries, mostly from North America). Thus, English can assume different meanings for different people, in different contexts, at different points in time. In some contexts, a global language such as English is learned as an instrumental and mobilizing tool and/or one that is associated with imperialism or the West, as a cultural and linguistic occupation; loss of identity; and a mark of marginality. Multilingualism then does not come free, but different languages are associated with and related to multiple meanings, layers, and levels that are embedded in historical, political, ideological, and emotional contexts (Pavlenko, 2006).
Take, for example, the study by Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh (2009), who showed in his research that for Arabs the need to learn Hebrew and English at the University of Haifa lowered their perceptions of the status of their home and community language, Arabic. He found that for Arab students, who at the beginning of the academic year viewed their language as prestigious, valuable, and important, this perception changed after 7 months of studying at the university where Hebrew and English had strong salience whereas Arabic had no visibility and functionality on campus. Thus, at the end of the year, their perceptions drastically changed—the students admitted that since the university was dominated exclusively by Hebrew and English, this led them to undervalue their own language, Arabic, viewing the learning of Arabic in their schools previously to attending the university as useless and “a waste of time,” that is, they felt betrayed by the system. In a follow-up study (Shohamy & Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh, 2012), Arab students at that same university expressed feelings of frustrations and lack of respect given that their home languages had no representation on campus, especially in the linguistic landscape; they therefore felt that they were forced to surrender to Hebrew and English ideologies and overlook their own language.
Conclusions and Discussion
In analyzing the role of English in Israel, two main themes were brought up: One is the competition between English and Hebrew, two powerful languages between which there has been continuous rivalry over the years, and this continues in different degrees until today. Both languages are learned in schools, but language planners still fear that English is threatening the continued existence of the revival of Hebrew. It was claimed that this rivalry has a negative impact on the level of English teaching and learning in Israel, especially in higher education. English is rarely taught with Hebrew in the same space as there is total separation of the two languages in schools, unlike the more complementary role in public in Israel and in cyberspace. The second theme addressed the cost of English for Arabs and immigrants, pointing to the inequality of the comparison in English proficiency between students for whom English is a second language and those for whom it is the third or even fourth language. The results of equivalent English tests for all groups regardless of the conditions of learning have a major impact on access, participation, and rights.
These issues led to a critique of current views about the promotion of multilingualism; being multilingual for Arabs and immigrants not only does not provide any academic advantage but also penalizes them as they are not knowledgeable in the languages that the society values the most, overlooking their whole linguistic repertoire. The current movement toward multilingualism needs to delve deeply into such issues. In the case of Arab and immigrant students in Israel who are multilingual in a number of language, this is not viewed as an asset, as they are multilingual in the “wrong” languages, as multilingualism varies by the very contexts in which people function at a given point in time. Arab students do not view the multilingualism they share as an advantage as while studying at the university, they do not see any advantage in terms of mobility. In fact, in each political context there is a hierarchy of languages that are perceived as having high and/or low values, depending on a complex set of political, social, economic, and historical factors. This means that students would rather be bilingual in the languages that society values highly than be multilingual in a number of languages that do not hold meaningful values and that have limited economic currency. In the case of Arabic, the language is very powerful and prestigious in most countries in the Middle East; yet in Israel today, Arabic is marginal and stigmatized. At the same time, although Hebrew is considered prestigious in Israel today, it is not used anywhere else out of Israel as a vernacular. Hebrew and English are the most valued languages, whereas Arabic, Russian, or any other immigrant languages, apart from English, have very limited value, and proficiency in these languages is not appreciated. These languages are neither used widely in the media or as medium of instruction in any of the prestigious academic institutions in Israel, nor are they languages that Hebrew users seek to acquire as they do not provide any societal and academic benefits, at this point in time.
The main conclusion is that categorizing languages as global or national does not capture the scope, depth, and complexity of factors that are associated with language engagements. There is a need to focus more seriously on what it means to expect students to learn global languages and to examine the ramifications of specific languages in contexts such as the cost of learning other languages that may in the short and long run serve as assets and of value. As was shown above, learning Hebrew and English by Arabs in Israel is not identical to learning global and national languages in other places in Israel. The long-term effects of such policies are far-reaching. Accompanying the academic marginality, there is also a message about the marginal position of the very people whose home languages are not valued as the loss of prestige, respect, and honor. For example, these policies lead Arab students to develop low motivation for sustaining their home languages as no practical and symbolic values are associated with them especially in the bastion of higher education, which often serves as the index of the prestige of languages. In fact, in a number of Arab communities in Israel, there is a growing demand by school administrators, parents, and students to introduce Hebrew and English as early as possible, often on the account of Arabic. More recently, many school subjects are no longer taught in Arabic but rather in Hebrew and English as both are perceived to be more rewarding and leading to greater economic benefits. In mixed towns with closer contacts between Hebrew and Arabic speakers, many Arab students seek to enroll in Hebrew-speaking schools, and the proficiency in academic Arabic is rapidly declining. In a study by Goldstein-Havazki (2011), it was shown that Arabs in mixed towns such as Jaffa, even in areas where most residents are Arabs, prefer to use Hebrew and English on signs in their shops and businesses and to remove Arabic. A number of high school students who participated in the study documented the linguistic landscape in Jaffa’s public spaces and found that Arabic has given way to Hebrew and English; this led them to develop a critical awareness of the phenomenon of the loss of Arabic. As a result, they became activists in trying to bring back Arabic to Jaffa; they then held conversations with their parents demanding greater representations of Arabic in public spaces.
It is the role of language policy specialists to recommend language policies that can even out the inequalities that exist in societies, such as by creating a need for the majority students to acquire minority languages so to boost the prestige and value of these languages (Shohamy, 2006). This is especially important given research findings indicating that learning of the languages “of the others” can become tools for bridging political conflicts and ethnic tensions. In a study on the learning of Arabic by Hebrew speakers in Israel (Donitsa-Schimdt, Inbar, & Shohamy, 2004), it was demonstrated that even a short time of learning spoken Arabic by Jews could change their attitudes about Arabs, viewing them as people and not as political objects. In other words, although there may be compelling reasons to acquire global languages, it is of utmost importance not to overlook the other values of learning languages, specifically for coexistence, for bridging political conflicts, and for creating more equal and democratic societies where people feel they can participate and be included in societies so they have the right to participate in any language. Education policies cannot be limited to mobility and economic achievements but must consider a variety of other important values such as inclusion, participation, representation, respect, honor, and connections—let alone personal rights. Language is a very powerful tool that can be most useful in creating close and meaningful contacts among people. It therefore requires paying close attention to its role as bridging divides, repairing inequalities, empowering different languages, and redistributing power.
How Unique Is English in Israel?
Although this chapter focused on the role of English in Israel, one wonders about the extent to which the phenomenon described above is typical to other non-English countries in this day and age or is it unique to Israel given the revival of Hebrew. The revival of Hebrew and the competition with English may be unique to Israel in the sense that in other countries languages have not been revived in such ways; yet the idea of one common language that is ideological, dominant, and viewed as a unifying factor for diverse groups has been around since the end of the 19th century (and in some cases even before) when national homogenous languages replaced multilingualism and many language varieties in nations such as in Italy, Spain, France, China, Japan, and Germany, and this continues till today. In most countries, national single languages were perpetuated, standardized, and imposed as the only “correct” languages of instruction in schools and in society; China and other countries are promoting one single language that serves the dominant groups in societies, and certainly English is promoted in many English countries as a national language and not necessarily as a global language. The process in Israel may have been somewhat different, as a whole country made up of immigrants and other ethnolinguistic groups who lived there before was forced to acquire a new language, Hebrew, for creating a collective national identity. The situation with Arabs after 1948 was somewhat different as they were “allowed” to continue to use Arabic as the language of the community and the language of instruction in school especially in homogenous areas where the only residents were Arabs (unlike Jewish immigrants who are forced into Hebrew from the day of their arrival). Yet, as shown above, Arabs have no choice but to adopt Hebrew for functionality purpose, while Arabic vitality continues and needs to be guarded and cultivated. Thus, the fact that all universities use Hebrew as the only language of instruction and English as the language of texts is detrimental for Arabs, who often feel “forced” to drop Arabic especially as there is a growing number of Arabs who participate in higher education.
As to the competition with English, Israel is not unique, as newly standardized languages that were recognized by nation-states were poised in competition and fear with “the other” language, English. English and other national languages are still viewed as competitors in many countries such as Japan, Germany, Spain, and France. It is also not unique to Israel where English becomes a marginalizing language as immigrants and minorities are forced to acquire national languages and reach only low levels of proficiency in the language, yet are being compared with the those for whom English is a second language, leading to multiple inequalities and injustices as noted above.
As a final note, it is important to realize that one outcome from the focus on multilingualism in the past few years has been greater recognition and legitimacy on trans-languaging, that is, the use of a number of languages together and moving harmoniously from one language to the next according to needs. It is realized now that speakers of first languages do not leave their first languages behind and use these languages in the acquisition of their second and third languages (Haim, 2013). Thus, both Arabs and the immigrants living in Israel and in other places worldwide continue to rely and use their home languages as valuable resources, especially in processing content in schools. Similar studies are emerging across many multilingual contexts today especially in Africa, where students are required to use English in schools along with their first language, which used to be taboo in the past; the new trend to mix languages and to legitimize multiple languages in the same space may be helpful in reducing the fear from English in some places and empowering other languages for immigrants and minorities. Together, these can lead to multilingual policies that are more just and inclusive and use English more harmoniously.
It is the role of language policy experts to demonstrate these trends and to take activist steps in order to challenge these inequalities and marginalization as a result of English and promote the uses of first languages in more integrated ways. First, it is important to point to the phenomenon of victimization of people as a result of language globalization and the high price paid for globalization and promotion of English language as well as other powerful languages, as in the case of national languages speakers of minority languages. Then, there is a need to point to the several years it takes to acquire second languages; to the fact that people should be given opportunities to demonstrate their knowledge through a variety of means and not only through national or global languages (Levin & Shohamy, 2008; Levin, Shohamy, & Spolsky, 2003; Shohamy, 2011). Finally, to legitimate and then encourage the use of various varieties and mixture of languages, hybrids, fusions, and trans-languaging, as native-like proficiency is not possible to achieve, nor it is desired. Language participation is part of freedom of speech and can be enhanced with various forms of translation. Also it is important to note that although English is considered a global language, the real meaning of globalization is multilingualism—it is about diversities, options, and possibilities where a variety of languages are used in many shapes and forms and even within the different Englishes. English may be the beginning, but it is not the end. We need to point out that schools that serve governments and turn multilingual realities into monolingual islands in the interest of political reasons work against a just society; instead, teachers should work on developing and cultivating the knowledge with which students come to school and not marginalize it. It is important to show how languages are used as manipulative tools with the pretense of quality education, standards, and correctness; yet in fact, these approaches suppress the wealth of knowledge that gets filtered when other languages interact. True globalization is the acceptance, inclusion, and participation in local, national, and global societies in Israel and in other places where these phenomena occur.