Bryan Norton argues that my recent critique of anthropocentrism presupposes J. Baird Callicott's philosophically problematic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and that the problems that it raises for anthropocentrism in general are in fact only problems for strong anthropocentrism. I argue, first, that my own view does not presuppose Callicott's distinction, nor any claims about instrumental value, and second, that the problems it raises for anthropocentrism apply to weak and strong anthropocentrism alike.
McShaneKatie. 2007a. ‘Anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism: Why should we care?’ Environmental Values16: 169–185, doi: 10.3197/096327107780474555.
5.
McShaneKatie. 2007b. ‘Why environmental ethics shouldn't give up on intrinsic value’. Environmental Ethics29(1): 43–61.
6.
NortonBryan G.1984. ‘Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism’. Environmental Ethics6: 131–148.
7.
NortonBryan G.2008. ‘Convergence, noninstrumental value and the semantics of “love”: Comment on McShane’. Environmental Values17: 5–14, doi: 10.3197/096327108X271914.
