Abstract
The Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol (the MPIC) met twice in 2019, holding its 62nd and 63rd meetings in Bangkok, Thailand (29 June) and Rome, Italy (2 November), respectively, under the gavel of Committee President, Patrick McInerney (Australia). It reported to the outcomes of these meetings, including an overview of the draft decisions approved by the Committee, to the 31st Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (MOP-31) held from 4–8 November. 1
The following report briefly summarises the debates and outcomes (recommended decisions) of the two MPIC meetings, and notes how they were addressed by MOP-31. In brief, the two MPIC sessions considered and produced several recommendations to MOP-31 and began discussions on reconsideration of the committee’s own remit.
The Implementation Committee Process
As noted in UNEP’s Ozone website, the functions of the 10-member MPIC are to receive, consider and report on any of the following: any submission by Protocol Parties related to non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol; any “information or observations forwarded by the Secretariat in connection with the preparation of the reports on production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances”; and “any other information received and forwarded by the Secretariat concerning compliance with the provisions of the Protocol”.
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It is also specifically empowered to carry out two additional actions: to “request, where it considers necessary, through the Secretariat, further information on matters under its consideration”; and to “undertake, upon the invitation of the Party concerned, information-gathering in the territory of that Party for fulfilling its functions”.
The highly consensual phrasing of these functions and powers is in accordance with the fact that the Protocol itself established this process under the heading “Non-Compliance Procedure”, to underscore its role as an aid to countries in achieving compliance and finding “amicable solutions” to any non-compliance situations, rather than as a source of penalties or negative judgements. This approach is not altered by the one direct mandate of the MPIC:
[T]o maintain, in particular for the purposes of drawing up its recommendations, an exchange of information with the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund related to the provision of financial and technical cooperation, including the transfer of technologies to Parties operating under Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Protocol.
Substantive Discussions
The two sessions dealt with many issues in common, particularly questions on its key non-compliance issues (reporting, the Multilateral Fund for Protocol Implementation and the status of previous decisions), although both also considered new issues. Thus, MPIC-62 began consideration of the “possible future risk of non-compliance with hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) production and consumption reduction targets by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. MPIC-63 took this further, focusing on new reporting obligations for hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and possible ways of dealing with illegal production of and illegal trade in controlled substances.
Ultimately each session agreed on several recommendations to MOP-31.
Reporting
The first presentations heard in each meeting were given by the Protocol Secretariat, addressing Articles 7 (“Reporting of data”) and 9 (“Research, development, public awareness and exchange of information”) and related issues. The statistical information on reporting was perhaps not unexpected, showing that about half of the Parties had submitted their 2018 reports in time to be considered in the 62nd meeting (i.e., on time), but that more than 99 percent (all Parties except Yemen) had submitted their 2017 reports by MPIC-62. By MPIC-63, these statistics could be updated. The Secretariat reported that all 197 parties required to report data for 2017 and 2018 had done so – the first time in many years that 100 per cent reporting had been achieved before the last meeting of the year of the Committee.
Regarding control measures, in its report to MPIC-62, the Secretariat noted that there had been “no new cases in 2017 of non-compliance with the control measures for the consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances under the Protocol, and no cases of possible non-compliance had arisen for 2018 from the data reported thus far”. 3 The report to MPIC-63 did not address this issue, because the Secretariat stated that it would not report anything that had already been reported to MPIC-62.
The Secretariat reported that there had been no new submissions under Article 9 since MPIC-61. It noted that the submissions seeking 2018 exemptions (from China regarding its essential-use exemption for carbon tetrachloride (an ozone-depleting substance (ODS)); and from Argentina, Australia, Canada and China seeking critical-use exemptions for methyl bromide for 2018) were available for consideration on UNEP’s Ozone website.
In addition, the report to MPIC-62 also addressed the reporting of “exports and destinations pursuant to MOP-17 decision XVII/16, on preventing illegal trade in controlled ozone-depleting substances”, a review process that has not yet been completed, although the Secretariat noted on the basis of data obtained to date that there appeared to be “a downward trend in the quantities of imports and a slight upward trend in the percentage of reported imports with source country information”.
Other reporting (including excess production and consumption of ODSs, and process-agent uses of ODSs) applied only to a few countries – the MPIC-62 report listed three (the Czech Republic, Israel and the Russian Federation) and the MPIC-63 report added another – Germany, which had reported unintentional excess production “as a by-product”. All of these reported stockpiling excess production and taking measures to prevent unauthorised uses thereof. China, the EU, Israel and the US gave details on process-agent uses. All four had been permitted to engage in these uses, and properly reported thereon.
Also in MPIC-62, the Secretariat reported that the production of phased-out substances, mostly for feedstock uses, had risen to around 560,000 tonnes in 2017, although the overall use of feedstock as reported had not changed significantly. More than half of the total amount of phased-out substances reported were HCFCs. 4 The report to MPIC-63 noted that “all of the stockpiled production of bromochloromethane that parties had reported was intended for use as a feedstock, either within the producing party or for export, as depicted in annex XI to the data report”. 5 This report also noted that “the number of parties reporting destruction of ozone-depleting substances had risen considerably ... though the reasons for that were not apparent”.
On this agenda item, the Committee agreed to submit a relatively standard recommended decision to the MOP-31, which noted the above information and encouraged continued timely reporting by Parties. 6
By MPIC-63, 32 of the 89 countries that had agreed to become Parties to the Kigali Amendment 7 were “Article 5 countries” (developing countries listed under the Convention and subject to different requirements and deadlines) and thus required to report baseline HFC data within three months of ratification. As of the meeting, 31 had done so; however, one Article 5 country was still within the three-month time limit for submitting data.
Another summary of reporting, given under the Multilateral Fund (MF) agenda item, discussed below, discussed reporting on HCFC phase-out measures, noting that “[a] total of 107 Article 5 countries had committed themselves in their phase-out management plans to achieving compliance with the 2020 target, and 22 had compliance targets up to 2025. Twelve low-volume-consuming countries had committed themselves to completely phasing out HCFCs between 2020 and 2035”. 8
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
Both meetings heard and took note of Secretariat presentations on the Protocol’s highly successful MF, including on the decisions taken by the Executive Committee of the Fund and on activities carried out by bilateral and implementing agencies. More than US $1.3 billion had reportedly been approved for 178 in-country HCFC phase-out projects, of which, by MPIC-62, more than US $800 million had been disbursed. 9 The report in MPIC-63 emphasised the extent and importance of verification of national reporting on these matters, particularly with regard to the MF.
In particular, with regard to the phase-down of HFCs pursuant to the Kigali Amendment, the report to MPIC-62 noted that “[a] total of $19.4 million had been approved for enabling activities in 131 Article 5 countries, and $845,300 for six Article 5 countries had been included in the business plan for 2019”. 10 At MPIC-63, the report added that “the Executive Committee was developing guidelines for funding the phase-down of HFCs” and that it had “approved criteria for enabling activities for the phase-down of HFCs, which included ratification of the Kigali Amendment”. 11 MPIC-63 also learned that documents were being prepared “on the level and modalities of funding for HFC phase-down in the refrigeration servicing sector and on the implications of parallel and integrated implementation of HCFC phase-out and HFC phase-down”, and that related concerns in Argentina, India and Mexico were scheduled for consideration at the MF Executive Committee’s 84th meeting.
As there was no need for a MOP decision on these matters, the MPIC merely “took note” of these presentations.
Status of Previous Decisions and Recommendations
Both MPICs had relatively positive discussions of follow-up to previous decisions involving five countries. The Central African Republic had brought all reporting through 2017 up to date by MPIC-62, and was found to be back in compliance. By MPIC-62, Yemen had not yet submitted its 2017 report; however, it submitted that report before MPIC-63, which was able to confirm its compliance. Three countries – Kazakhstan, Libya and Ukraine – had previously committed themselves to “plans of action” to return to compliance. Here also, although none of the three had submitted the relevant data in time for MPIC-62, they did so for MPIC-63, 12 and appropriate analysis confirmed that each was in compliance with its commitments under their respective plans of action.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Risk of Non Compliance
MPIC-62 also heard a presentation relating to a recent communication from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), stating that it was at risk of non-compliance with its HCFC production and consumption reduction targets, despite the fact that the MF had, since 2012, agreed to fund projects totalling approximately US $1.2 million to assist that country in the phase-out of controlled substances. Discussions disclosed, however, that only US $335,000 of those funds had as yet been disbursed, because the institutions disbursing those funds had been guided by a UN Security Council resolution, imposing a series of economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea in the aftermath of that country’s 2006 nuclear test. 13 MPIC-62 determined that it should continue to comply with decisions of the Security Council. 14
Managing the Use of and Trade in HFCs and Other Controlled Substances
Two other substantive compliance issues addressed in MPIC-63 focused on (i) the integration of HFCs (relatively new among the substances controlled under the MP) into the Protocol’s licensing systems for the import and export of controlled substances; and (ii) the need to address illegal production of and trade in controlled substances. Both matters were raised in MPIC-62 and discussed in MPIC-63.
Licensing Import and Export of HFCs
The addition of HFCs to the MP’s list of controlled substances occasioned a need to consider how HFC control objectives would be integrated with existing MP licensing systems, 15 which had been a major focus of the MPIC while Parties were initially establishing them. MPIC-63 considered a discussion of the limited data on HFC licensing by Parties to the Kigali Amendment, adopting a decision encouraging MP “Article 5 Parties” to update their licensing systems to address HFCs.
Possible Ways of Dealing with Illegal Production of and Trade in MP Controlled Substances
Another area of concern raised under the “other matters” agenda item in MPIC-62 was a request for suggestions “on how to deal with illegal production and illegal trade, identifying possible gaps in the non-compliance procedure, challenges, tools, and ideas and suggestions for improvement”. This issue was taken up by MPIC-63, with the support of a detailed and comprehensive note by the Secretariat. Although the Committee’s first discussions did not lead to a recommended decision, the Secretariat’s note on this topic is highly interesting (particularly given the number of practical lawyers and policy-makers that are, due to the COVID-19 situation, currently not fully occupied, and possibly in need of a focus of new research and analysis).
As described to the Committee,
[The reports considered by the meeting] 16 identified possible areas that the parties might wish to consider, including issues not addressed as compliance issues (including illegal production, consumption and trade ...); reporting, monitoring, verification and implementation review; the functions and membership of the Implementation Committee; means of triggering the non-compliance procedure; decision-making and the consequences of non-compliance; and the role of the Secretariat.
The goal of these documents was to present “a brief comparative overview of arrangements under other legal regimes, including multilateral environmental agreements” – a topic of particular interest that has, as yet, received insufficient formal attention from researchers and analysts. To the extent that these matters have been addressed in legal/policy literature, it has generally been in one of two contexts – either, as here, undertaken in the context of a particular objective of a particular multilateral environmental agreement; or focusing on a single very narrow aspect of the broader compliance question.
In MPIC-63, the Secretariat’s notes were only welcomed as providing “much food for thought”. Members expressed the hope that they “could be discussed much more widely, specifically at the next meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group”, before any decision “relating to the remit of the Implementation Committee” could be decided by the MOP. The Committee’s primary actions related to these reports were to raise “other issues that could be helpful to discuss”. The meeting report identifies four such issues: the extension of monitoring to include confirmation that the controlled substances were being used for the purpose for which exemptions had been granted; reconsideration of the uses to which illegally produced or imported substances were put; determination of the value of experiences of other multilateral environmental agreements – specifically, whether they had adopted definitions of terms such as illegal production, illegal consumption and illegal trade; the relevance of a possible distinction, for the purposes of the discussion, between “Article 5 Parties” and “Parties receiving assistance from the Multilateral Fund”.
No formal recommendation was agreed with regard to this agenda item; however, the Secretariat’s Notes
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are worth further comment. They begin by summarising the current status of “arrangements under the Montreal Protocol”, providing a table noting “tools” under the Protocol itself and “tools under the Multilateral Fund (applicable to only A5 Parties)”. This section notes the following general elements of the MP’s controls on trade and their linkages to funding decisions under the MF: a ban on trade with non-Parties (Article 4)
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and ban on certain trade with Parties where a Party is unable to cease its own production (Article 4A); the requirement that Parties establish a licencing system covering imports and exports of controlled substances (Article 4B); voluntary reporting and information-sharing on issues such as proven cases of illegal trade and on the sources and destinations of imports and exports; and a protective provision which states that illegally traded quantities of ozone-depleting substances reported by a Party are not counted against its consumption if they are not placed on its domestic market (MOP decision XIV/7, para. 7).
The report goes on to note a number of relevant issues that have not been specifically identified in the Protocol as “compliance issues”, but that affect the questions of “illegal production and trade”, including undefined concepts such as “illegal production of controlled substances”, “‘illegal trade’ in controlled substances”, “illegal consumption of controlled substances” and the problems associated with “Polyols” (polyurethane prepolymers which are regarded as a “product” under the MP, and are not reported in trade reports as controlled substances that are consumed in the importing country) and the fact that there is, as yet, no agreed definition or a consistent approach to dealing with them. It also notes that, although reported, certain uses of controlled substances, including “stockpiles; quarantine and pre-shipment uses; recovered, recycled and reclaimed substance and feedstocks” are not subject to control measures.
The report also notes that, as an outgrowth of the MP’s “positive spin” on non-compliance oversight, “[r]eporting of data to the Secretariat under Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol relies on self-reporting by each Party. Apart from the Secretariat’s submission of requests for clarification, there is no provision for verification of the reported data under the Protocol”, except upon request from or with approval of the Party concerned. To some extent, the MF engages in more active verification in connection with its decisions. As such, this type of verification is only applicable to Article 5 Parties seeking assistance. Similarly, there is no direct verification of licensing systems, except where it may arise in connection with the work of the MF.
Perhaps most important, the report noted that “illegal trade” is not defined under the Montreal Protocol, which addresses only trade with non-Parties or trade that results in excess consumption, under the non-compliance procedure. Here also, the MP’s approach of viewing non-compliance issues more positively has relevance, as Parties have no direct obligation to report on “illegal trade and on national approaches taken to address it”, but are only encouraged to share such information on a voluntary basis. To the extent that procedures are required and/or that penalties are assessed, it is a matter of national law, adopted at the discretion of the country’s law-makers.
The report then summarises the MP’s implementation framework, including the roles of the relevant MP bodies (MIPC, Parties, MOP and Secretariat), as a prelude to its “comparative overview of arrangements under other legal regimes including multilateral environmental agreements”. This overview considers the compliance processes of the following instruments and bodies: Montreal Protocol (1987)
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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES, 1973)
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Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention, 1989)
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Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention, 1998)
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the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000) to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena Protocol, 2000)
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the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (2010) to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol, 2010)
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the Kyoto Protocol (1997) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol, 1997)
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the Paris Agreement (2015) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris Agreement, 2015)
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the UN Human Rights Council (2006)
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the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 1994)
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the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Minamata Convention, 2013)
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the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam Convention, 1998)
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The report does not claim to fully examine all of these processes, but to “present[] a sample of arrangements for consideration by the Implementation Committee”, in recognition of the fact that “there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach” with regard to compliance processes of international bodies and instruments with very different purposes, mandates, Parties and origins.
To readers of EPL, the most interesting part of these reports may be the 12 tables contained in Annex III to the Final Report of MPIC-63, laying out summaries of the following for each of the above-listed compliance processes: Review/compliance mechanism mandate Compliance/review body composition Compliance/review body functions Triggering the non-compliance procedure Decision-making authority Approach (facilitation/enforcement) Participation (open/closed) Reporting requirements Role of the secretariat Verification and review of reported data and information Consequences of non-compliance Types of issues considered to date by the compliance/implementation body
Although the reports do not provide specific analysis (their mandate being to present options, rather than to recommend choices), the reports suggest that the MPIC’s authority and mandate might be reconsidered in a way that could improve the MP’s already high level of effectiveness with regard to its mandate and to the issues mentioned above, which are not specifically identified as compliance issues, but which have a significant impact on compliance with the MP. It offers suggestions for areas of action including the following: altering reporting requirements (so that some key elements that are currently voluntary would become mandatory); engaging expert assistance in addressing and enforcing illegal trade provisions; and building capacity for national measures. They also suggest possible methods of increasing the breadth, mandate and effectiveness of the MP’s non-compliance process including by direct work on licensing issues, as mentioned above.
These reports generally suggest two things: first, that it may be time to see an update of the more comprehensive legal analyses of these issues; and second, that the highly effective Montreal Protocol processes, which have generally reflected a high level of constructive cooperation among all countries, may be the forum in which real change to international legal processes is forged. In light of the recent disappointments relating to the proposed Global Pact for the Environment, 31 it appears that there may be professional interest in promoting the first steps in such development, organically through an already-operational instrument and its existing processes.
Final Comment
The Montreal Protocol has long been worthy of, and received, praise for its efficacy in including (at one time) 100 percent of the countries of the world among its Members and operating in a science-based, cooperative manner that still produces binding mandates and commitments. Two results are that its Implementation Committee has been effective in aiding in implementation and its Parties are generally found to exhibit a high level of compliance, so that the MPIC’s work is not overly difficult. Another is about to be seen: the MPIC can take the lead in developing a new level of international compliance and a new approach.
Footnotes
EPL’s report of MOP-31 was published in our most recent issue. (Ripley, K. 2019. “Addressing the Challenges of Kigali Implementation”. EPL 49(6): 339–344). The current report focuses only on the MPIC and its proceedings, which the author was not able to attend. For that reason, this article is informed by the respective final reports of those meetings (“Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work of its sixty-second meeting”. UN Doc symbol UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/62/4; and “Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work of its sixty-third meeting”. UN Doc symbol UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/63/6; both available at https://ozone.unep.org/meetings?field_date_range_end_value%5Bmin%5D=1980-01-01&field_date_range_end_value%5Bmax%5D=2019-12-31&field_meeting_type_value%5BImpCom%5D=ImpCom); and on interviews of attendees and other reports of those meetings. The final report of MOP-31 (“Report of the Thirty-First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer”. UN Doc Symbol UNEP/OzL.Pro.31/9) addresses the MPIC reports at Parts XVI (“Compliance and data reporting issues: the work and recommended decisions of the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol”) and XVII (“Risk of non-compliance with hydrochlorofluorocarbon reduction targets for 2019 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”). That report is available at https://ozone.unep.org/meetings?field_date_range_end_value%5Bmin%5D=1980-01-01&field_date_range_end_value%5Bmax%5D=2019-12-31&field_meeting_type_value%5BMOP%5D=MOP.
“Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work of its sixty-second meeting”, supra, note 1, para. 10.
Ibid., para. 16.
“Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work of its sixty-third meeting”, supra, note 1, para. 15.
Ibid., Annex 1, Part A. Later numbered Recommendation 63/1.
The provisions and current status of the Kigali amendment are discussed in Ripley, supra, note 1.
Report of MPIC-62, supra, note 3, para. 21; and Report of MPIC-63, supra, note 5, para. 20.
Ibid.
Report of MPIC-62, supra, note 3, para. 24.
Report of MPIC-63, supra, note 5, para. 23.
Libya, which had raised several matters before the MPIC which were still on-going, submitted its report on only two of them: HCFC reduction issues and “monitoring the enforcement of its system for licensing imports and exports of ozone-depleting substances, towards imposing a ban on the procurement of air-conditioning equipment containing HCFCs”. As the third other matter (“a further update on the progress made towards imposing a ban on the procurement of air-conditioning equipment containing HCFCs and towards considering a ban on the import of such equipment”), the date for reporting (March 2020) had not yet passed. Ukraine was similarly placed, not having submitted its Article 7 information, having incompletely reported progress toward the adoption of the law on ODSs and fluorinated greenhouse gases, and being under a duty to report the additional information by 15 March 2020.
Discussed in more detail in Ripley, supra, note 1.
As noted in Ripley, ibid., North Korea continued to press its request at MOP-31, supported by the Executive Committee, which proposed release of further funds to North Korea. Ultimately, the MOP agreed with the MPIC that the Protocol bodies should follow the guidance of the Security Council.
Pursuant to Article 4B(3) of the Protocol, establishment of licensing systems by the Parties is mandated for all controlled substances within three months of the substance being listed.
Secretariat Note. “Possible ways of dealing with illegal production of and illegal trade in controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, identifying potential gaps in the non-compliance procedure, challenges, tools, ideas and suggestions for improvement”. UN Doc symbol UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/63/R.4; and Secretariat Note. “Comparative information on implementation- and compliance-related mechanisms in selected multilateral legal regimes”. UN Doc symbol UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/63/INF/R.3.
Annexes II and III to the Report of MPIC-63, supra, note 5.
The MP is widely celebrated as having achieved universal membership, suggesting that, at least so long as all countries remain members, this ban is not particularly problematic.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Montreal Protocol] Article 8: MOP decisions II/5 (1990), IV/5 (1992) and X/10 (1998) on the non compliance procedure and the Implementation Committee”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[CITES COP] Resolutions 11.3 and 14.3 established the non compliance procedure and vested the Standing Committee with an operational mandate”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Basel] Convention Article 15: the non compliance procedure and the Implementation and Compliance Committee were established by COP decision VI/12 (2002)”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Aarhus] Convention Article 15: the non compliance procedure and the Compliance Committee were established by MOP decision I/7 (2002)”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Cartagena] Protocol Article 34: the non compliance procedure and the Compliance Committee were established by COP-MOP decision BS-I/7”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Nagoya] Protocol Article 30: the non compliance procedure and the Compliance Committee were established by COP MOP decision NP-1/4”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Kyoto] Protocol Article 18: the non compliance procedure and the Compliance Committee were established by decision 27/CMP.1 of the Conference of the Parties, serving as the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Paris] Agreement Article 15: mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance; the Implementation Committee was established by decision 20/CMA.1”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “General Assembly resolution 60/251 and Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 established the universal peer review process and the complaints procedure”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “WTO Agreement Annex 3: established the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the Trade Policy Review Body”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Minamata] Convention Article 15: established the Implementation and Compliance Committee. COP decision MC-1/7 elaborated the operational modalities”.
Citing the following as the legal sources of the compliance process: “[Rotterdam Convention] COP decision RC-9/7 (2019): adopted Annex VII to the Convention and established the non compliance procedure and the Compliance Committee”.
See Juste Ruiz, J. 2020. “Building a Normative Framework for Ecological Sustainability in the Anthropocene” in this issue at p. 35–46.