Climate Change,Public Insecurity and Law: Conflicts Over Water Resources in the Brazilian Context

1 Introduction

Climate change is a phenomenon built by society, yet it strikes back like a boomerang, as that very society suffers the effects of climate change. A significant body of research demonstrates that climate change has dramatic impacts on ecological and social systems, 1 and such impacts are expected to continue rising. Their consequences are disruptive, sometimes potentially disastrous, and increasingly linked to human conflicts, 2 all of which causes social destabilization. Several studies have investigated the effects of climate change on public security, and have revealed a link between the depletion of natural resources and the need for preventive action with regard to a likely exacerbation of violence. 3

In recent decades, research has highlighted two ways in which climate change can aggravate conflicts. First, conflicts can come about as a result of changes in economic policies related to energy resources, in the context of mitigative initiatives to reduce emissions from fossil fuels. 4 Second, conflicts can be stimulated by changes in social systems driven by actual or perceived climate impacts. 5

Climate science has drawn attention to the adverse effects of climate change and its impact on the well-being of humans and other species, as well as their security levels. According to IPCC, 6 human insecurity almost never has a single cause, but instead arises from the interaction of multiple factors. However, there is robust evidence and widespread agreement that climate change is an important threat to human security, as it (1) undermines livelihoods; (2) compromises cultural identities; (3) increases migration that would otherwise be avoided; and (4) challenges the ability of States to provide the necessary conditions for human security.

Taking up this concern, the article examines to what extent the adverse effects of climate change can be considered triggering factors for public insecurity. It investigates the supporting arguments that acknowledge the adverse effects of climate change as factors that can drive conflict and social destabilization. Within this perspective, it highlights the increasingly violent environmental conflicts involving water resources in Brazil, analyzing their impact on the common well-being. The Amazon and that region’s climate vulnerability are given special attention as this is not just a Brazilian problem, but can also be seen as a tragedy of the commons 7 on account of that ecosystem’s importance in a global context.

The article offers new insights into the connection between climate change, violent conflicts and the role of law in the Brazilian context. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is structured around three main topics. The first outlines how the concept of public security has evolved to its present state, in which climate change is taken into consideration. Next, climate change is discussed as a factor that magnifies vulnerabilities, an argument supported by a discussion of concrete events. The third topic highlights the main threats, vulnerabilities and conflicts involving water resources in Brazil, taking a scientific view of systemic risks and precaution. Finally, we propose rethinking the concept of public security in Brazil from a perspective of parameters involving regulations, principles and state initiative.

Climate change and climate variability pose risks to various dimensions of human security, which come about through diverse causal processes, and manifest themselves with different degrees of intensity. These processes also operate across diverse spatial and temporal scales. High levels of complexity mean that no single conceptual model or theory can fully capture the extent of interactions between all aspects of climate change, livelihoods, culture, migration, and violent conflict. However, as IPCC 8 has shown, there are undeniable links between these key elements. The International Organization for Migration is also concerned with the implications of climate change for migration, and the U.S. National Intelligence Council is focused on the risk that climate change will increase political instability and geopolitical rivalry. In this sense, the framing of climate change as an issue of human security calls for conversations across the boundaries of diverse policy communities.

2 Climate Change and the Evolving Concept of Public Security

Three major views of public security can be found in democratic societies. The first centers on the idea of combat, and conceives the institutional mission of the police force in warlike terms. The security policy is formulated as a “strategic war for security”. 9 The second concept conceives of security as the provision of a public service. According to this perspective, the focus is no longer on fighting an “enemy” but on serving a citizen. The democratic police forces are, above all, public service providers. 10

Since the late 1980s, studies have proposed a third and more comprehensive definition of national security, one that encompasses human and social rights, economic well-being and political stability in addition to territorial protection and sovereignty. 11 These studies have approached climate change as a phenomenon holding the potential to aggravate pre-existing problems such as poverty, inequality, injustice, environmental degradation, while at the same time weakening political institutions and threatening the stability of the State. This gradual process, a result of stressors such as floods, storms, droughts, rising temperatures and sea level, leads to further environmental degradation and vulnerabilities, driving both large and small-scale migrations, and spreading diseases, among other consequences. In this perspective, climate change threats to national security represent a combined challenge to environmental, economic and political dimensions, 12 with repercussions both on citizens, whose well-being is dependent on political stability for security and natural capital for subsistence, and on economic growth and development.

Security means protection from danger, material needs or anxiety. The concept relates to the guarantee of well-being and survival. In most constitutions around the world, public security is a fundamental right guaranteed by the State. As such, security is the state of normality that allows the enjoyment of rights and the fulfillment of duties. Any illegitimate alteration of security is a violation of rights, usually accompanied by violence and subsequent events of insecurity and crime. 13

Environmental or climate security is the discipline that examines whether the traditional notion of security (which revolves around military power) should be adapted to include threats arising from population growth, as well as the decrease in the quality and quantity of goods and services and natural services. Lester Brown was responsible for initiating this reflection with Redefining Security. 14 His starting point was the observation of a looming threat to future well-being due to a growing gap between natural resources supply and demand. One of the most interesting aspects of the study is the notion that environmental scarcity is a factor that induces conflicts.

There is nothing new in establishing a link between natural resources and international disputes. However, three factors are different in the current scenario: (i) the role played by population growth in conflicts is widely recognized; (ii) conflicts now stem mostly from renewable, rather than non-renewable resources; (iii) climate change is a factor that increases the scarcity of renewable resources, and consequently leads to more conflicts. While past security studies focused on wars over non-renewable resources, there is currently increased attention to the scarcity of renewable resources such as forests, air, water, fisheries, as well as to disputes over health protection against new viruses.

Therefore, the scarcity of renewable resources can trigger both direct and indirect conflicts. Direct conflict arises due to immediate competition for control or access to resources, while indirect conflict results from the interaction between renewable resources and socioeconomic factors, which escalates friction within or between states. When indirect conflict takes place, environmental factors exacerbate other social phenomena, such as poverty and ethnic tensions. 15 Thus, a new concept of human security has evolved over time, one that identifies security as the condition given when the vital core of human life is protected and people have the freedom and the possibility to lead their lives with dignity.

3 Climate Change as an Aggravating Factor of Vulnerability: The Witness of History

Finding human responses and societal strategies that prevent potential security risks and conflicts of climate change is a major challenge. Environmental changes caused by global warming not only affect the lives of human beings, but may also have larger societal effects, either by undermining the infrastructures of society or by inducing destabilizing human responses and interaction patterns within social systems. The associated socio-economic and political stress can impair the functioning of communities, the effectiveness of institutions and the stability of societal structures. Societies more dependent on the environment tend to be more vulnerable to climate stress. 16 Particularly vulnerable are those societies that are already on the brink of instability, such as States in transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes; States unable to protect their citizens from harm and lacking legitimacy; or failing States facing social fragmentation, marked by weak governance structures and inadequate management capacities. Here even a marginal impact from climate change could make a decisive difference, crippling their ability to address the underlying problems and further dissolving state structures, ultimately leading to their collapse. 17

A series of historical events can help to illustrate this correlation. Werrell has compiled several essays on the Arab Spring, the waves of protests that swept through the Middle East and North Africa between 2010– 2012. Crowds of protesters took to the streets to depose dictators and demand better living conditions. Although none of the essays explicitly claims that climate change was one of the causes behind the Arab revolutions, they do indicate that consequences of climate change were among the stress factors within a volatile mix underlying the revolutionary movements. The proximate and ultimate causes of the Arab Spring may inspire studies for decades. In mapping its social, economic and environmental factors, the impact of climate change on the security of resources must be addressed by new governments. Some further examples illustrate our argument. In Syria, for instance, in addition to the brutality of the Assad regime, climate change may have been a stress multiplier, exacerbating existing environmental and social problems, and thus leading to discontent and the revolution. 18 Other studies have correlated the consequences of climate change with an increase in organized crime. The Islamic insurgent group Boko Haram, for instance, took advantage of severe droughts that shrank Lake Chad in Nigeria and caused severe resource scarcity for local populations to expand their appeal. Economic insecurity, allied with growing clashes over access to water, allowed the group to successfully recruit members and spread from Nigeria to Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The resulting expansion of Boko Haram thus intensified armed conflicts and caused further displacement of people in the region. 19

According to Kelly, 20 there is evidence that the 2007– 2010 drought contributed to the conflict in Syria. The authors identified connections along a continuum ranging from human interference with the climate, severe drought, agricultural collapse and mass human migration. This development occurred within a framework of vulnerability to drought that was encouraged by government policies promoting unsustainable agricultural practices, as well as by the governmental failure to address the suffering of the displaced population. The study highlights the consequences of drought on the ecosystem and its impact on migration, and argues that the rapidly growing urban peripheries of Syria – marked by illegal settlements, overcrowding, poor infrastructure, unemployment, and crime – were neglected by the Assad government and became the breeding ground for the developing unrest.

Another example is found in Guatemala, one of the most violent countries in the world, despite not being formally at war. Decades of civil war in the region have left a legacy of violence and unemployment, providing fertile ground for organized crime. The country is plagued by serious security problems, while NSAGs (non-state armed groups) place governments under increasing pressure. The decrease in rural development, environmental degradation and dependence on climate-sensitive crops make people vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This reality has pushed people into illicit activities and contributed to migration to cities, where they are more exposed to gangs, violence and recruitment by criminal groups. At the same time, Guatemala is among the ten countries most affected by extreme weather events, which puts additional pressure on the state to deal with prolonged violence and crime. 21

While some studies have reinforced the connection between the scarcity of natural resources, previous vulnerabilities and public security, others have established a more significant relationship between disaster and armed violence, but also make reference to resource scarcity resulting from climate change. 22 However, there has been no confirmation of the link between migration and violent conflict. 23 Two recent statistical analyses 24 have linked extreme events and violent conflicts, or more specifically, droughts and local conditions excluding minority farmers from political participation.

Despite the increasing number of studies on the topic, past data is not ideal for future risk management. Other strategies are thus required to evaluate current and new risks. Climate science plays an important role in this context, and its presence is more commonly found in DRR (disaster risk reduction) policies, where the debate on the consequences of climate change has been an important driving factor 25 and has started to play an important role in the broader field of peacebuilding or security enforcement. 26 Furthermore, advances in climate attribution science now showcase the impact of climate change on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather. California wildfires recently killed 85 people, while Hurricanes Dorian, Florence, and Michael ravaged American coastlines. Internationally, we are seeing a clear connection between climate change and environmental degradation leading to drought, famine, and food insecurity. 27

Similar circumstances in different countries serve to focus greater attention on this proposition. Depending on their type and intensity, climate impacts do indeed become a major obstacle to economic growth, both regionally and globally. Different countries do not possess the same adaptability and levels of resilience. Some regions are more vulnerable due to their geographic and socio-economic conditions and their lack of adaptive capabilities. At any rate, the losses, damages and cost associated with the impacts of climate change make all nations susceptible to some kind of social destabilization. The concept of societal stability refers “to the durability of political institutions and to robust social structures”, while destabilization” can be understood as a process that (gradually) causes an originally stable political and social situation to break down.” 28 Societal structures that lose credibility and support from the citizens become weak and unable to maintain order. Individuals who experience personal losses (life, income, property, job, health, family and friends) and find their personal identity at stake, may be more tempted to violate established rules and opt for non-legal actions, including violence, the more so if such actions provide them with benefits and carry a low risk of punishment. As such, personal instability caused by loss of human security could unmistakably trigger societal and political instability, and vice versa. Disruptive climate change could contribute to this process, especially when vulnerabilities are exacerbated. 29 In Brazil, the impact of climate change on pre-existing social and environmental vulnerabilities has had far-reaching consequences.

4 Hazards, Vulnerability, Systemic Risks and Main Conflicts Related to Water Stress in Brazil

Brazil has the largest reserve of surface water on the planet, approximately 19.4% of total reserves, and one of the world’s greatest hydrological potentials. This, however, does not imply the country is in a comfortable position in terms of water availability and location for consumptive and non-consumptive demand. In fact, around 90% of the water is found in the low demographic density hydrographic basins of the Amazonas and Tocantins rivers. Around 90% of the population relies on the remaining water resources. 30 The factors that threaten a desired balance between water supply and demand are population growth, especially in urban areas, and economic growth, which generate increased demand, as well as climate change and its effects on extreme hydrological events. These factors, associated with the absence of planning and coordinated institutional initiatives, as well as the lack of investments in water infrastructure and sanitation, trigger the onset of crises such as those that have affected Brazil in the last seven years. 31

The patterns of rainfall distribution vary naturally and lead to extreme events depending on their excess or scarcity. Droughts, prolonged dry seasons, flash floods and river flooding represent the vast majority of natural disasters that have occurred in Brazil. Of the 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, 2,716 (48.8%) declared an Emergency Situation or a State of Public Disaster due to floods at least once from 2003 to 2018. Approximately 88% (2,392) of these municipalities are in the Northeast, South and Southeast regions. As for droughts or prolonged dry seasons, about 51% (2,842) of Brazilian municipalities declared an Emergency Situation or a State of Public Disaster in the same period. In 2018, about 1 million people were affected by flooding in Brazil, with ten deaths and seven people reported as missing. The most common harm to people affected by floods is the loss of property. More serious damage (deaths, presumed deaths, diseases and injuries) have affected 5% of these people. 32

In 2018, about 43 million people were affected by droughts and prolonged dry seasons in Brazil, almost 30 times more than by floods. A total of 2,516 drought events associated with human losses were reported that year, almost four times more than flood events (538). Looking back over the past few years, human losses recognized by the Civil Defense have grown year after year, with the biggest jump occurring from 2016 to 2017, when the number of those affected by drought practically doubled. 2018 was even more critical than 2017, with five million more people affected by drought events. Almost 90% of people affected by droughts in 2018 live in the Northeast Region. The states of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Ceará and Pernambuco accounted for 75% of the country’s records. In 2018, 38% of recorded drought events reported that the entire population in the municipality was affected by some degreee of human losses from droughts, showing once again that the impacts of droughts are not usually localized but instead have a strong tendency to spread throughout the territory. 33

The combined effect of climate and environmental issues, high population densities and the correspondingly high demand for water resources, which, to make matters worse, in many cases, are affected by pollution, make it a challenge to supply cities with water, which can generate conflicts of use involving both the water quality and quantity. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro together have more than 18 million inhabitants. Only 63.5% of the Brazilian population uses sewage services that are managed in a safe manner, including facilities for washing their hands with soap and water. 34 The growth of water demand in Brazil, as a result of increased population and more intensive use of water for economic activities, has contributed to the increase in water stress over the years. The most critical regions are the Southeast Region, where the use of water for human consumption, irrigation and industry is expressive, as well as the South Region, where the use of water for irrigation is very significant. In fact, the main use of water in the country in terms of volume is currently consumed by irrigation. This application results from the agricultural practice of using a set of equipment and techniques to offset a complete or partial lack of water for irrigating crops, and varies according to the needs of each crop, type of soil, topography, climate and other variables. 35

All these variables have transformed Brazil into the scene of several water conflicts that vary for each of the country’s biomes and their specific situations. In this sense, three types of conflicts related to water resources are worth mentioning. The first arises when water is unavailable for a certain period, whether in adequate volume or quality, to meet the required uses, including the environmental functions contained in the ecosystems associated with the water source. One example is the case of areas where irrigation, industries and cities are disputing ‘scarce waters’, and therefore need to reduce their water consumption. In the hydrographic basin of the Piancó-Piranhas-Açu River (CBHPPA), for instance, compulsory reductions in water consumption have been mandated in times of critical droughts. 36

The second type of conflict arises from sectoral planning disagreements. One such example is when the planned building of a hydroelectric plant faces resistance from farmers in the downstream basin. This is the case of the Zabumbão reservoir, located in Bahia.

A third type of conflict can be illustrated by the debate regarding the potential socio-economic and environmental impact of implementing hydroelectric projects in the Upper Paraguay River Basin, which feeds into the Pantanal further downstream, the largest wetland in the world and one of the most unique biomes of Brazil. In 2016, specialists from the National Water Agency (ANA) conducted studies in the hydrographic region of the Paraguay river to assess the potential socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the implementation of hydroelectric projects in the Upper Paraguay basin. This process even led to the temporary interruption of permits for the right to use water resources for new hydroelectric plants in the hydrographic region of the Paraguay, determined by the ANA Resolution No. 64/2018. According to the document, permits were suspended until May 31, 2020 as a way of complying with the water resources plan for the hydrographic region of the Paraguay, approved in March 2018. By November 2019, however, ANA deemed it had gathered sufficient data to resume issuing Declarations of Water Availability Reserves (DRDHs) and granting water use rights for new hydroelectric projects in part of the tributary basins on the right bank of the Paraguay River. 37

As for socio-environmental impact, rainfall has remained below the historical average for the past six years in northeastern Brazil, where the most common conflicts involve riverine or indigenous populations. A relevant conflict has been taking place in the Xingu river basin and may lead to a loss of hundreds of millions of US dollars to the Belo Monte powerplant. In the course of the plant’s construction, a river diversion was built to generate a 90-meter level difference. To avoid conflicts with the riverside populations that depend on the river for their supply of water, two plans for energy generation were proposed, based either on a favorable rainfall scenario for normal years, or a less favorable scenario when rain was below average. Arguing that privileging the electricity sector would harm the riverside communities and the reproduction of fish, the Public Prosecutor’s Office recently determined the adoption of the scenario giving precedence to indigenous tribes over water supply. Simulations have predicted an average reduction of about 1.5 GW in energy supply capacity under the scenario ordered by the Prosecution. However, Brazil does not apply a methodology to calculate the value of water for all sectors involved in the dispute, which would be a necessary step to take if the aim were to prioritize use according to existing demand in case of scarcity, guaranteeing the human right to water resources without conflict. 38

Climate change scenarios for the Amazon, projected by complex climate models presented by the IPCC, point to an increase in the average air temperature well above 4°C by the end of the 21st century, and up to a 40% reduction in rainfall in the Amazon. This change in air temperature has the potential to generate large imbalances in ecosystems, which are vital for the survival of humanity. According to the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change, South America is the continent with the highest risk of species extinction (23%). 39 Changes to the Amazon climate from global warming and deforestation can affect that ecosystems’ balance and the environmental services it provides. New evidence shows, beyond any doubt, that the Amazon works as the heart of South America concerning one of the resources on which life is directly dependent: water. The destruction of the Amazon forest may have already passed the point of recovery. This means that lack of water could dramatically affect the economy of several countries in the region within a short period of time. 40

The situation in the Legal Amazon – an area of more than five million square kilometers comprising the Brazilian states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins – is even more worrying. The Amazon rainforest plays a crucial role in the South American climate on account of its effect on the regional hydrological cycle. The forest interacts with the atmosphere to regulate the humidity inside the basin. Humidity is transported to the Amazon region by trade winds from the tropical Atlantic. After the rains, the rainforest produces intense evaporation and recycling of moisture, with much of that evaporation returning to the Amazon region in the form of rainfall. 41 Due to its size and properties, the Amazon influences rainfall patterns throughout South America, and an important part of the western world, contributing to stabilize the global climate. In addition, it is the forest with the greatest biodiversity in the world. 42

An example of this systemic influence can be scientifically verified in the Brazilian study “Some Characteristics and Impacts of the Drought and Water Crisis in Southeastern Brazil during 2014 and 2015,” 43 which emphasizes the hydrological context and impacts of the water crisis in other states of the country, such as São Paulo and its 2014-2015 drought.

The Annual Global Risks Report (2019) focuses on the global risks impacting countries and large companies, and assesses the risks to each type of security (water, energy, and food). In the last five years, the lack of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and extreme weather events figure between the top five Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood. 44 Over a ten-year time frame, extreme weather and climate change policy failures are considered to be the most serious threats. In other words, climate change entails and increases additional risks.

The notion of systemic risks is important to understand this relationship, and it also represents a bridge between studies on risk and the science of complexity. “Systemic risks are the consequences of highly interconnected systems and a network of risks created by humans. The fact that networks are interdependent makes them even more vulnerable to sudden failures”. 45 These interdependencies in a hyperconnected world establish hyper-risks, which can lead to great disruption or even to the collapse of an entire system. It is important to keep in mind that complex risks are linked to cascading failures, which are caused by “triggering events”. For example, many of the so-called natural threats are influenced or directly caused by human interventions. 46

Complex systems resulting from non-linear interactions, have some typical characteristics, which instead of presenting an equilibrium relationship, can be shown to be profoundly diversified. This is because in addition to non-linearity, they have inflection points. Thus, the permanence state occurs in an indefinite period, but once it reaches a certain point, everything changes dramatically and in a very short period of time. For this reason, the notion of contingency, represented technically by plans, needs to take into account precaution and the worst possible scenario, considering different types of cascading failures. 47

Perhaps given their complexity, added to the fact that they are neither linear in their cause-effect relationships, nor relatively common, systemic risks are often underestimated by both public officials and society at large. Climate change is a typical example of a publicly-known trigger phenomenon. Both the impact of climate change on water resources and the impact of water resources on public security suffer from the lack of a systemic view of risks.

As we have seen, climate change and climate variability pose risks to various dimensions of human security, which come about through diverse causal processes, and manifest themselves with different degrees of intensity. These processes also operate across diverse spatial and temporal scales. High levels of complexity mean that no single conceptual model or theory can fully capture the extent of interactions between all aspects of climate change, livelihoods, culture, migration, and violent conflict. As IPCC chapter 12 has shown, there are undeniable links between these key elements. 48 The International Organization for Migration is concerned with the implications of climate change for migration, and the U.S. National Intelligence Council is focused on the risk that climate change will increase political instability and geopolitical rivalry. In this respect the framing of climate change as an issue of human security calls for conversations across the boundaries of diverse policy communities. This reality needs to be taken into account in terms of public policy planning, as well as in terms of decision making.

As Taleb explains, decision takers and policy makers tend to assume that all risks are created equal. This is not the case. Traditional decision-making strategies focus on where harm is located and risk is easy to calculate from past data. Under these circumstances, cost-benefit analyses and mitigation techniques are appropriate, because the potential harm from miscalculation is limited. On the other hand, the possibility of irreversible and widespread damage raises different questions about the nature of decision making and what risks can be reasonably taken. This is the domain of the Precautionary Principle, which applies very well to scientific uncertainty scenarios. 49 The Precautionary Principle is intended to deal with uncertainty and risk in cases where the absence of evidence and the incompleteness of -scientific knowledge carries profound implications, as well as in the presence of risks of so-called ‘black swans’, unforeseen and unforeseable events of extreme consequence. 50 “Policy makers have a responsibility to avoid catastrophic harm for society as a whole. This is the domain of collective “ruin” problems”. 51

The Brazilian scenario has sufficiently convincing data on the importance of inserting the climate variable in the debate on the country’s public security, which implies reflecting on the role of law in this context.

5 Rethinking the Public Security Concept in Brazil: The Role of the State, Law and Principles

In Brazil, the concept of public security is included in the Federal Constitution. It is “a duty of the State, a right and responsibility of all, and must be exercised for the preservation of public order and the safety of people and property.” 52 In addition, the Constitution has a chapter entirely devoted to environmental protection, whose article 225 states that “all citizens have the right to a balanced environment, a public good required for healthy living standards, with the public powers and society having the responsibility to defend and preserve it for future generations.” 53

Careful analysis of the two constitutional articles implies that public security and the environment are closely linked fundamental rights and duties. Subsistence in an undignified, unjust and unsustainable environment lessens human dignity, security and public order. Nonprovision of fundamental rights leads to wars, which over the course of civilization have often resulted from cultural issues and lack of access to basic resources. Nothing is more precarious than human or animal nature threatened in its very survival. The interface between the environment, public security and climate change is located precisely at this point.

Moreover, article 5 of the Constitution defines that “all citizens are equal before the law, without distinction of any kind, with the inviolability of the rights to life, freedom, equality, security and property being granted to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country.” 54 In this sense, state and citizens share rights and obligations in seeking a more peaceful existence. However, thirst, hunger, lack of environmental control and education, added to the constant presence of organized crime, lead to renewed conflicts.

Addressing the new climate-security nexus is urgent and brings together three historically distinct areas of law– environmental law, disaster law and national security law. As we have properly conceptualized climate change as a security threat, these three fields of law, once separated from and often in conflict with each other, should engage with each other in new and complex ways. Environmental law and disaster law are complementary, distinguishing themselves by the fact that disaster law represents a portfolio of standards aimed at managing catastrophic risks, such as those related to climate change, also acting in the aftermath of a disaster through instruments that can provide a better response to such events. Both encompass environmental risks and have normative structures and principles that must be assimilated by the public security law. In times of climate change, the coupling of these legal structures is a necessity.

However, law 13.675/18, which regulated article 144, §7 of the Federal Constitution, goes in an opposite direction. The legislation disciplines the organization and functioning of the bodies responsible for public security, creates the National Public Security and Social Defense Policy (PNSPDS), and institutes the Single Public Security System (Susp). This policy has numerous principles and guidelines, but none mentions climate change, or recognizes climate security as a possibility. Article 4 comes near when it defines “efficiency in preventing and reducing risks in emergency situations and disasters that affect life, heritage and the environment” as one of the policy principles. It is surprising that a law promulgated as recently as 2018 should disregard completely the evolution of studies that consider climate change as a factor that can contribute to social conflicts, though in some situations it may not be the trigger itself. Protection of the environment is also one of the principles of that piece of legislation, but it establishes no clear connection between the environment, public security and climate law and their respective policies.

The Brazilian legislation is rooted in traditional public security notions, typically linked to homicides, robberies, and other occurrences representing loss of property and life. However, property and lives have been lost due to a type of conflict systematically neglected in Brazil, namely socio-environmental violence linked to corruption, land grabbing and violence, as revealed by the rise of organized crime in the Amazon. Conflicts in the area cause deforestation, which in turn affects rain patterns and causes droughts. The adverse effects of floods, droughts and related economic costs, including compensation for lost land, are all interconnected, and are further polarizing society and marginalizing communities.

Since 2014, the Global Security Defense Index on Climate Change has articulated that governments should see climate change as a national security problem, and that the military and communities should prepare for its effects. Preliminary results of the studies established that about 70% of nations have explicitly declared climate change as a national security problem. 55 However, government planning must extend beyond humanitarian help after the occurrence of climate-related accidents. Two new climate change assessments — the 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA) and the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel’s Special Report on Climate Change — prominently highlight the multifaceted national security risks posed by climate change.

The situation in Brazil is no different, and emergency measures are required for its biodiversity. If we consider climate change as a national security issue, what actions can (or should) be taken? An important step is developed by Nevitt. 56 According to the author, legal scholarship has yet to adequately address this new “climate-security connection” and has not wrestled with the normative outcomes for the increasingly overlapping fields of environmental and national security law. National security law seeks to protect and preserve national interests, protect the lives of military members, and be prepared for future conflicts. The precautionary principle is a bedrock component of environmental law that seeks to protect the environment. National security law, and military planning more generally, take a similar approach. Just as environmental law and climate change law place a heavy emphasis on changes in the physical environment, national security planners have historically placed a strong focus and emphasis on planning for changes to the operational environment. Climate change is already dramatically transforming the operational environment. 57 In this sense, even if climate change science is considered heavily politicized and likely to undermine governmental action, conceptualizing the phenomenon as a national security issue can play an important role in validating climate change as an issue that demands our attention and resources.

In addition, including the climate as an aspect of public security builds upon two fundamental principles of international law: due diligence and precaution. According to the first, states are required to act with due diligence to halt and mitigate social crises, as well as to prevent losses and damages. Due diligence is the expression usually employed to designate a standard of conduct measuring whether a state has employed its best efforts to address certain risks, threats or hazards. In short, it is a standard of good governance, assessing whether a state has done what could reasonably be expected of it in responding to a harm or danger. This standard is in-built in a series of rules of conventional and customary international law, applying generally to inter-state relations, or specifically to fields such as human rights, international humanitarian law, cyberspace and, most notably, environmental and global public health. These rules typically impose obligations of conduct requiring states to prevent, stop and/or redress a range of internal or transboundary harms, or the risk thereof. 58

An excellent example about state due diligence is found in the Human Rights Committee. The General Comment 59 underlined that the States’ duty to protect life requires them to adopt “appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society that may give rise to direct threats to life”. This duty embraces “efforts to avert the risks of war, and any other armed conflict, and to strengthen international peace and security, are among the most important safeguards for the right to life.” 60 Environmental degradation, climate change, unsustainable development and disasters constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life. 61

In implementing the obligation, States parties should therefore ensure sustainable use of natural resources, develop and implement substantive environmental standards. Laws and regulations serve as a foundation for building community security and resilience. Admittedly, they are not the solution for all problems, but they do serve as guidelines for appropriate behavior. Nevertheless, the implementation of the obligation to respect and ensure the right to life, and in particular life with dignity, depends on paying due regard to the precautionary approach. In this vein, disaster law regulation in Brazil (Law 12.608/12) states that all levels of government (the federated entities) have the “duty to adopt measures to reduce the risk of disasters” (Article 2). “The uncertainty regarding the risk of disaster cannot be an obstacle for adopting measures to prevent and mitigate the hazard situation”(Article 2,§2).

A brief glance at the Brazilian Constitution and the environmental and disaster-related legislation is enough to bring us to the conclusion that neither the Constitution nor the legislation regulating it have taken the best path when it comes to addressing public security. The regulation of state activity in terms of security policies remains inadequate in a number of areas. As a result, a new reform – perhaps this time involving both the Constitution and the legislation – ought to address climate change as a security problem. However, amending the constitution and the legislation to redefine public security is only one component of a broader strategy consisting of several measures to address societal instability that potentially derives from the adverse effects of climate change. On the other hand, the legislative process of amending the constitution is quite complex compared to that of passing a new law, or amending an existing law. Simply adapting the law that regulates public security would greatly contribute to mitigating existing conflicts and preventing their escalation.

In other words, a contemporary interpretation of the concept of public security requires an understanding of new environmental conflicts and their connection to climate change, as well as to criminal activity and the dramatic situation involving prosecution and criminal execution. This is a long and complex process, but a feasible one. The fundamental duties, rights, and guarantees established under the democratic rule of law provide guidance down this path. Such an option would be able to help influence the expansion of citizenry, reduce the culture of fear, and build safer and more environmentally friendly choices.

Environmental conflicts, including climate-related security risks, require a different type of mediation and therapy. Advisory support must be provided in the form of legal expertise and restructured governmental bodies and enforcement agencies. At the same time, initiatives such as providing increased funding and intelligence, investing in data and facilities, changing regulatory frameworks to preempt future issues are crucial. Updating legislation includes ensuring compliance with international agreements, internalizing their objectives, as well as investing in diplomacy and cooperation to minimize the damaging effects of conflicts. Throughout this process, ministries, secretariats, authorities and public bodies must play a role as drivers of sound choices, taking action and refraining from omission, with the aim of building a more peaceful society.

6 Conclusion

Climate change poses a significant threat to security in this century. Its immediate and future effects can have a profound impact on social systems (economics, politics, law) and the environment. As a result, as institutions and governments prove unable to manage risks and minimize losses, social instability increases and the development of a culture of peace becomes ever more unlikely. Extreme events resulting from climate change exacerbate weaknesses and amplify existing vulnerabilities.

Given this reality, the perspective of climate security must be considered one of the goals of public security. From this point of view, climate risks are interpreted and understood as triggers or even drivers of events that can endanger human lives, ecosystems, economies, infrastructure, and health, all of which impact public security levels. In the Brazilian context, an amendment to the constitution that would redefine public security to incorporate the variable of climate safety is one element in a broader strategy that would demand, first of all, a committed government stance, working towards targets that respect science and considering climate adaptation and resilience goals as potential vectors for stability and public security.

The perspective of climate security takes into account the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), implementing the Paris Agreement goals, as well as those in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, all of which requires better govenance (synergy between different institutions, agents, and structures). Events inside and outside Brazil demonstrate that this set of ambitious goals is crucial for building a culture of peace. Less vulnerable nations are less prone to being engulfed in violence. Both the literature and concrete examples show that the adverse effects of climate change exacerbate underlying vulnerabilities and inequalities that drive social conflicts.

In light of the findings of climate science and the insights emerging from the growing environmental conflicts caused, among other factors, by the scarcity of natural resources such as water, mitigation-based approaches and strategies, as well as adaptation plans based on climate risks, have become relevant even as a means of advancing peace within national borders. Awareness of this reality has led nations and multinational organizations to develop scenarios, also economic in scope, which consider climate change as one of the important variables that may bring about improvements in the public security process. Brazil urgently needs to pursue this path, paying special attention to the impacts in the Amazon, given the cross-border relevance of this biome, as well as to the three main types of conflicts currently on the Brazilian water agenda, namely: 1) the scarcity of water; 2) the disputes regarding the planning and construction of hydroelectric dams, as well as their downstream impacts; 3) the socio-environmental impacts resulting from the construction of hydroelectric dams. Both the scarcity and the overabundance of water, which are common consequences of the effects of climate change, have a significant impact on improved water distribution planning, on the future viability of public and private enterprises, and also on the affected local communities and their quality of life. Both of these extreme events, when addressed without taking into account certain systemic risks, contribute to triggering conflicts that further compromise the already inadequate public security scenario in Brazil.