Abstract
BACKGROUND:
The rise of social media has resulted in a dramatic change in citizen engagement in political processes. This raises the question of whether affordances of social network sites motivate alternative politics more than more conventional form of political engagement.
OBJECTIVE:
1) identify differences in social media uses and gratifications among four political personality types (i.e., potential dissidents, allegiants, subordinates, and the alienated), and 2) examine the extent to which political personality types can be discerned using social media uses and gratifications.
METHODS:
313 United States citizens above the age of 18 completed a survey using the revised MAIN model scale to measure social media uses and gratifications. Subjects were categorised into political personality types based on the Gamson Hypothesis and Paige’s conceptualisation of actor types. We developed a multinomial logistic regression model to examine the relationship between predictors (uses and gratifications) and political personality types.
RESULTS:
Potential allegiants and dissidents are driven by a similar set of social media uses and gratifications as opposed to political subordinates and the alienated.
CONCLUSION:
Social media can provide more gratifications for potential dissidents and allegiants, ‘favouring’ personality types with high political efficacy.
Introduction
The rise of social media has resulted in a dramatic change in citizen engagement in political processes. This change can be largely attributed to the fact that social media, as Skoric, Zhu, Goh, and Pang [1] note, offer informational, expressive, and relational uses that can motivate engagement. The current social media discourse includes many studies that examine online political engagement from the perspective of activism and dissidence (e.g., [2–13]). This raises the question of whether affordances of social network sites motivate alternative politics more than more conventional forms of political engagement. Although previous studies highlight the ‘revolutionary potential’ of the Internet, several scholars, those who examine online political polarization and echo chambers in particular (e.g., [14]), indicate that the presence of opposing political perspectives on social network sites is not negligible. Moreover, there is a growing number of research studies that explore online political activity from different points of view, such as Engesser, Ernst, Esser, and Büchel’s [15] study that demonstrates how populist politics manifest on social media, Pearce’s [16] work on the subtle use of social media for authoritarian control, and Groshek and Koc-Michalska’s [17] research on social media support for both Democratic and Republican populist political figures.
Recent research shows that online engagement depends on a range of user-related factors. For instance, Russo and Amnå [18] argue that extraverts and those who are open to new experiences tend to participate in political activity more than conscientious individuals. Bimber, Cunill, Copeland, and Gibson’s [19] study shows moderating effects of political interest on the relationship between digital media use and political participation. Moreover, Boulianne’s [20] work identifies direct and indirect effects of online news consumption on civic and political engagement. While these studies shed light on the topic, there is a dearth of work that connects general social media use, especially uses and gratifications, with political differences. Motivations for social media use span beyond political purposes. While some social media gratifications, such as affection [21], may appeal to those who do not seek to engage in online politics, other gratifications, such as obtaining information and socialising [22], may encourage political engagement. Therefore, differences in perceived uses and gratifications may, at least to some extent, help distinguish between those who have different political attributes. Accordingly, work that examines whether social media serve as venues that facilitate political dissidence should take into account gratifications that motivate such tendencies as well as other types of political behaviour (e.g., allegiance and subordination). This study examines whether social media uses and gratifications can accurately reveal political differences. This can be examined on two different levels. On one level, researchers can examine if social media data can reveal direct attributes, such as the political orientation or party affiliation of users. On a more abstract level, studies can focus on whether social media consumption can help classify users into categories that display distinct political actor types. This study is concerned with the latter. Accordingly, we test differences in social media uses and gratifications between four political actor types (dissidents, allegiants, subordinates, and the alienated). Examining political differences from the perspective of general social media use is important for several reasons. From a theoretical viewpoint, it shows the relevance of constructs which remain beyond the study of political motivations in examining political behaviour. From a policy perspective, such work can help design social media platforms to encourage political engagement among those who have different political attributes.
Related literature
We approach the study of social media uses and gratifications focusing on differences among potential political dissidents, allegiants, subordinates, and the alienated. According to Paige [23], combinations of political trust and efficacy display differences among political actor types (allegiants- high efficacy, high trust; subordinates- high trust, low efficacy; dissidents- high efficacy, low trust, and alienated- low trust, low efficacy). This approach is different from the study of conventional political actors, “individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political power and/or authority in a particular society who engage in activities that can have a significant influence on decisions, policies, media coverage, and outcomes associated with a given conflict” [24, p.1]. Our approach shifts the attention from conventional political actors, such as elected officials and policy makers, to different groups within the general public that display different behavioural patterns. Such work is important for several reasons. First, although social media studies examine online dissidence in a range of contexts (e.g.,[12, 25–27]), the field lacks academic work on the ways in which social media gratify those who have ‘dissident potential’. The need to examine connections between potential dissidence — representing a layer of social media users who may transform into active dissidents in democratic contexts—and new media use relates to the fact that the accessibility and ease of use of those platforms may encourage less active individuals to engage in more active forms of democratic dissidence.
Second, there is a need for studies that focus on political allegiance on social network sites. Social media may provide a range of uses and gratifications for political allegiants –those who trust the existing political system–because, as Rathnayake and Winter [28] argue, social media gratify users with different political attributes. Early work done on mobilization potential [29], as well as subsequent studies [30, 31], provide a theoretical background to capture potential dissidence and allegiance in the context of social media. Third, political subordinates and the alienated remain largely unexplored in social media studies.
Online platforms offer a multitude of benefits for users. For instance, Facebook, ‘the pleasure machine’, as Vaidhyanathan [32] calls it, enables people to derive value from reconnecting, interaction, joining causes, and entertainment. These perceived benefits may help differentiate between different types of users. Uses and Gratifications (U&G), a theoretical approach originating in media studies [33] that captures the essence of benefits perceived by users, views media consumption as a function of the needs it gratifies. Scholars have used this approach to examine social media consumption [34–37]. The U&G approach serves as a foundation for discerning political differences, as it helps understand underlying motivations behind media consumption. Recent work suggests that the field of social media uses and gratifications needs academic work that captures nuances in new media platforms. For instance, Sundar and Limperos [38] show biases in previous literature towards social and psychological factors. This exposes a rich field for potential inquiry, as the fact that social media are a new domain defined mainly based on user-generated content demands more platform-oriented studies that consider affordances of new media. Sundar and Limperos provide a conceptual foundation for such a line of inquiry by proposing an affordance-driven framework, the MAIN model, which captures the ability of social media to create new gratifications. Rathnayake and Winter [39] followed this work by validating their Uses and Grats 2.0 framework.
Social media uses and gratifications
The U&G perspective, a theoretical approach that dates back to the origins of mass communication research [40], holds that media consumption is intrinsically connected with the need for gratification. According to Haridakis [41, p.2], the U&G approach suggests that “people’s social and psychological characteristics influence their needs and desires which are manifested in their motives for using communication channels.” U&G studies include a wide range of research that has evolved with the transformations in media and communication technology. According to Papacharissi [42], a typical U&G study can look at a specific medium, compare it with another medium, and study different aspects, such as motives, social and psychological antecedents, and effects of media consumption. Starting from work that stressed the need for U&G studies in the context of the Internet [33], social media U&G research has expanded rapidly during the past decade, focusing on different platforms and effects of a wide range of variables [e.g., 22, 28, 34, 37, 43–48]. Previous studies have also highlighted different uses and gratifications perceived by social media users, such as information seeking, entertainment, and social utility [31], social interaction, and information seeking [49], and socializing and self-status seeking [22]. There is a growing amount of research examining social media uses and gratifications in the context of politics. Ancu and Cozma’s [49] work, for example, identifies interaction as the primary motive for accessing candidate profiles on social network sites. Park, Kee, and Valenzuela [22] claim that informational uses of social networks are connected to civic and political action, while entertainment does not explain the extent of political participation.
The notion of affordances—the relational structure between user and technology that allows or constrains behaviour within a given context [50]—has permeated research that examines user activity on social network sites. Coined by Gibson [51], this concept suggests that affordances of a given environment should be understood relative to their context. Within the context of social media, new affordances allow a range of new behaviours that were not possible in the conventional media setting. Sundar and Limperos [38] stress the need for conceptualizing uses and gratifications based on new media affordances and argue that many studies have only slightly modified older media gratifications to suit new media. They suggest an affordance-based framework (the MAIN model) that includes 16 gratifications representing four broad classes of affordances (Modality, Agency, Interactivity, and Navigability). Sundar [52] argues that each user is different in terms of the meanings he or she makes from affordances. The MAIN Model suggests that modality cues, agency cues, interactivity cues, and navigability cues embedded in affordances are significant in shaping user assessment of the medium. Sundar argues that the sheer presence of these affordances results in users experiencing media content in a certain way. In general, the MAIN Model rejects the idea that all gratifications relate to innate needs and argues that new and distinctive gratifications can emerge from new media affordances. The model emphasizes the capability of a medium to facilitate certain actions and suggests that the user is an integral element as he or she interprets the affordance. The MAIN model suggested a pool of items that led to the development of an affordance-based scale for social media U&G, which was converted into a social media uses and gratifications scale by Rathnayake and Winter [39]. Validation of the scale led to a revision to Sundar and Limperos’ conceptual framework, as results suggested combining several constructs (e.g., Coolness and Novelty, and Browsing and Scaffolding/Navigation Aids). The revised MAIN framework for social media U&G is presented in Table 1.
The Revised MAIN Framework
The Revised MAIN Framework
Source: Modified from Rathnayake and Winter (2017).
Modality, defined by Sundar and Limperos [38] as “different methods of presentation (e.g., audio or pictures) of media content, appealing to different aspects of the human perceptual system (e.g., hearing, seeing)” (p.512), acknowledges that the Internet can provide users with content in multiple modalities and some of them can be considered unique (e.g., pop-up ads). The modality affordance results in three gratifications (Realism, Coolness, and Being There).The agency affordance of the MAIN Model suggests that the Internet allows users to be agents or sources of information, and this view acknowledges the ability of users to be gatekeepers of content, build communities, and contribute. Agency affordance can lead to Agency-enhancement, Community Building, Bandwagon, and Filtering gratifications. Interactivity, according to Sundar [52], is the most distinctive affordance of digital media and it relates to real-time interaction and activity on a given medium. The revised interactivity affordance [39] includes two gratifications (Activity and Responsiveness). Finally, Sundar and Limperos [38] define navigability as “the affordance that allows user movement through the medium” (p.516). Navigability can include the expectation that users are scaffolded through certain processes (e.g., online transactions) and will encounter some fun elements. Accordingly, the navigability affordance can result in two gratifications (Browsing and Play). Table 1 defines each affordance.
A large number of studies stress the role social media play in explicit political dissent [e.g., 7, 53]. Although social media can gratify users who have different political attributes [28], previous studies pay primary attention to political dissidence. As we argued before, individuals with different political orientations, such as subordinates, are underrepresented in social media research. As Theocharis suggests [54], acts that are considered non-political can be more impactful than conventional forms of participation. In this section, we develop a theoretical basis to identify criteria that can contrast between a range of political personality types.
Early work done by Gamson [29] that highlighted the role discontent — lack of trust in the system—and efficacy — belief that individual actions matter—play in political behaviour provides a foundation for conceptualizing political personality types. Perceived efficacy is characterized by “judgments of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective situations” [55]. Trust, according to van der Meer [56], is a relational notion linking a subject (who trusts) with an object (that is trusted). Gamson [29] noted that the optimum combination for mobilization is high political efficacy and low political trust, and this combination indicates a belief that influence is possible and necessary. This notion, commonly known as the “Gamson Hypothesis”, has received considerable attention during the past several decades. Craig and Maggiotto [30] hypothesized that discontent is related to unconventional political behaviour among those who are dissatisfied with government policy and believe that they should be considered influential political actors. They conclude that the context has mobilized political discontent in the form of “benign” activities such as single-issue advocacy and tax revolt, and although these acts may not be revolutionary, they may have significant political consequences.
Similarly, Shingles [57] examined black consciousness and argued that policy-related participation is encouraged by political mistrust and internal efficacy. Shingles stresses the importance of understanding different types of political activity (e.g., allegiance to regime and country and influence on government and policy) and argues that efficacy can be conducive to high-initiative behaviour (i.e., activities that need active participation and high levels of effort), while mistrust is related to policy-related behaviour (i.e., efforts to influence government and policy). As Shingles notes, “strong sense of self-confidence and a deep suspicion regarding the willingness and ability of government to respond to their needs has proved to be an important catalyst, mobilizing blacks to seek to influence the policy process” [p.89].
Paige [23] examined the relationship between trust and efficacy, considering four types of political systems (democratic, traditional, totalitarian, and unstable). According to Paige, combinations of political trust and efficacy display differences among political actors (allegiants- high efficacy, high trust; subordinates- high trust, low efficacy; dissidents- high efficacy, low trust, and alienated- low trust, low efficacy) in these systems. While a responsive and non-coercive (democratic) regime requires little force due to allegiance, political alienation arises in a totalitarian regime that is unresponsive and coercive. This results in political allegiants being politically active but not radical as opposed to the alienated citizens that are resentful. In a traditional system characterised by a lack of trust but high efficacy, citizens can be seen as passive subordinates who are loyal to the existing political structure. Dissidence arises in an unstable (unresponsive and non-coercive) regime. Paige views this as critical, as revolutionary activity, including riot participation, can emerge. Paige claims that democratic, traditional, and totalitarian societies have been politically stable due to the nature of their constituency or the way they respond to interest groups.
Societies with dissidents, unlike the other three types, are highly unstable, as the mistrust and high efficacy can result in radical actions. The intricate connection between trust and efficacy provides a solid conceptual foundation to identify political personality types. Paige [23] argues that the behaviour of a given regime may move a system towards either democracy or totalitarianism. The above classification [29, p.23] allows considering every social media user as a political actor. For instance, lack of political engagement among a population of social media users may mean subordination or alienation. On the other hand, tendency to critique or support a political system as part of general social media use may indicate dissidence or allegiance. Accordingly, our effort to connect general social media use with political actor types is based on the premise that even the least politically active social media user plays an important role that helps understand the ways in which political activity is embedded in platforms. In particular, a comparative analysis among actors can reveal how general social media uses and gratifications may appeal to certain actor types.
Several researchers have used political efficacy and measures of political disaffection, such as political cynicism, to examine online political activity. For instance, Lee [58] argues that the use of online news and interaction with public agencies can increase internal political efficacy, while visiting websites of public agencies can positively affect internal efficacy. Chan and Guo [59] argue that the effect of Facebook use on political participation is moderated by political efficacy. An effort to directly apply Gamson’s proposition in the context of the Internet was made by Johnson, Kaye, and Kim [60], who addressed different web platforms, bulletin boards, chat rooms, portals, and blogs, and the effects of relying on these platforms. Their work shows that Internet users are equally divided into dissidents and assureds (allegiants). They claim that the results do not strongly support using the two categories (dissidents or assureds) as predictors of reliance on different platforms. However, a recent study conducted by Johnson and Kaye [61] shows that dissidents tend to use more polarizing media sources, such as radio talk shows and political blogs, while assureds avoid those sources. Johnson and Kaye claim that the use of online mainstream broadcast TV news predicts being an assured, while dissidence can be predicted by the use of alternative sources. These findings show that dissidents and allegiants can differ in terms of their use of online sources. However, arguably, any online platforms may have uses for both these parties.
Accordingly, the objective of this study is twofold: 1) identifying differences in social media uses and gratifications among potential dissidents, allegiants, subordinates, and the alienated, and 2) examining the extent to which political actor types can be discerned using social media uses and gratifications.
Method
Data from a sample of 313 United States citizens above the age of 18 (see Table 2 for sample statistics) was collected through Qualtrics survey service. The data collection team was advised to target the general population of the United States, rather than a selected group of strata from the population. They were also advised to continue data collection until a reasonable number of responses were received from different gender and ethnic groups, and individuals representing different age levels, education levels, political orientations, and party affiliations. Respondents were asked to reflect upon their use of Facebook and Twitter as they answered the survey questions. These two platforms were used as the main focus, as political engagement is common on Facebook and Twitter.
Sample Composition
Sample Composition
We used the revised MAIN model scale developed and validated by Rathnayake and Winter [39] to measure social media uses and gratifications. This scale includes 11 gratifications (Realism, Being There, Agency-enhancement, Community Building, Bandwagon, Filtering, Interaction, Activity, Responsiveness, Browsing, and Play) and was built on the Uses and Grats 2.0 framework [38, 52].
Definitions of each construct and gratifications are given in Table 1. The scale includes 66 questions re-written specifically to focus on social media. Cronbach’s Alpha values for all constructs were above 0.7 except for Filtering (Realism: 0.70, Coolness: 0.76, Being There: 0.80, Agency: 0.832, Community Building: 0.787, Filtering: 0.64, Activity: 0.77, Responsiveness: 0.835, Browsing: 0.88, Play: 0.8). A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) indicated reasonable fit, supporting the appropriateness of this scale (Model-fit: χ2 : 768.89, df: 389, p≤.001, GFI: 0.850, AGFI: 0.821, IFI: 0.924, TLI: 0.914, CFI: 0.923, RMSEA: 0.056).
Seven items (Table 3) developed by Johnson and Kaye [61] were used to measure trust and efficacy (Cronbach’s Alpha- political efficacy: 0.805; political trust: 0.654). A CFA that included political trust and efficacy showed adequate fit (Model-fit: χ2 : 42.35, df: 13, p:.000, IFI: 0.956, TLI: 0.928, CFI: 0.956, RMSEA: 0.085).
Political Efficacy and Trust Measures
Subjects were categorised into political personality types based on the Gamson Hypothesis [29], Paige’s [23] conceptualisation of actor types, and related recent work [e.g., 60, 61] that used political trust and efficacy to identify dissidents, allegiants, subordinates, and alienated. While political allegiants indicate high trust and high efficacy, dissidents show low trust and high efficacy. Thus, political trust differentiates between allegiants and dissidents while these two groups share a sense of capability in political engagement. Those who trust the government, but indicate low efficacy, are identified as subordinates. Moreover, the alienated category shows low trust and low efficacy. Item totals were used to classify actors into personality categories. Following earlier work [e.g., 61], for constructs measured using four items (e.g., political efficacy), totals less than 12 were considered low and totals greater than 16 were categorized as high. Similarly, for constructs with three five-point Likert scale items (e.g., political trust), totals less than nine were categorised as low while totals higher than 12 were considered high. Accordingly, the sample included 11 dissidents, 37 allegiants, 50 subordinates, and 32 alienated subjects. A separate category was created for moderates to aid comparison of high and low categories with subjects that have moderate scores. The sample included 183 moderate subjects who did not fall into any of the main categories. This is a reasonable composition, as dissidents are political minorities who attempt to change the system, and it is typical that there are reasonably large groups that trust and support the existing system (allegiants). Moreover, it is possible that there are even larger groups that trust the system but are politically inactive (subordinates), and perhaps smaller inactive groups that do not trust the system (alienated). We used mean ranks and the Mann-Whitney U test to examine differences among political personality types due to unequal group sizes. We develop a multinomial logistic regression model to examine the relationship between predictors (uses and gratifications) and political personality types. Four extra variables (age, political party identification, political self-identification, frequency of social media use) were added to the regression model to improve classification accuracy. Political party identification was measured using a three-item scale (Democratic, Conservative, and Other) and five-item scale developed using the political typology suggested by the Pew Research Center [62] was used to measure political self-identification.
Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for U&G constructs for each political personality type. While both dissidents and allegiants gravitated towards high mean values for some constructs (e.g., Realism, Coolness, Agency, Community Building, and Activity), they appeared to differ in terms of Filtering. However, both allegiants and dissidents had considerably different mean values from subordinates, moderates, and the alienated actors. Charts illustrated in Fig. 1 show corresponding mean values for each actor type.
Means and Standard Deviations
Means and Standard Deviations
Political Actor Category and Uses and Gratifications (Mean Values).
The results of the Mann-Whitney U test (Table 5) show that dissidents and allegiants did not differ from each other in terms of their perception of uses and gratifications, except for Filtering. Allegiants had a significantly higher mean rank than dissidents (mean ranks- dissidents: 136.32, allegiants: 213.55, Mann-Whitney U: 111.00, p < .05) for their perception of Filtering. However, both these groups differed significantly from other groups. For instance, perception of Realism, Coolness, Agency, Community Building, and Activity was significantly different between dissidents and subordinates. Similarly, dissidents and the alienated were different from each other in terms of their perception of Coolness, Agency, Community Building, and Activity. Although dissidents did not differ from subordinates and allegiants for some constructs (e.g., Being There, Filtering, Responsiveness, and Browsing), differences between political allegiants and the two groups with low political efficacy (subordinates and the alienated) were more prominent. For instance, political allegiants and the alienated were significantly different from each other for all uses and gratifications constructs. Similarly, allegiants and subordinates were different from each other for all constructs except Being There. Accordingly, we have convincing evidence to argue that, from the perspective of uses and gratifications, dissidents and allegiants do not differ much from each other, but do differ from other groups, such as subordinates and the alienated. This similarity may relate to high efficacy among dissidents and allegiants. In other words, these results show that social media constitute a ‘level playing field’ for those who believe in the significance of individual actions in politics. Mean ranks given in Table 4 and charts that provide a comparative perspective of mean values (Fig. 1) also showed that potential dissidents and allegiants perceive uses and gratifications differently than the other two groups. This shows that social media can gratify dissidents and allegiants more than subordinates and the alienated.
Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Group Differences
aGrouping Variable: Actor Category.
A multinomial logistic regression model was used to examine the relationship between social media uses and gratifications and political personality types. Age of the respondents, frequency of social media use, political party affiliation, and political self- identification were included to improve the model. The model with the predictors indicated reasonable fit (χ2: 702.874, df: 424, p:0.00, Cox and Snell R2:0.894, Nagelkerke R2:0.981, McFadden R2:0.928). Likelihood ratio test results (Table 6) showed that seven out of thirteen variables (i.e., age, political self-identification, frequency of social media use, Coolness, Filtering, Activity, and Play) included in the final model were significant (p < .05). Classification results (Table 7) show that the predictors can classify users into political personality types with more than 98 percent accuracy. A second multinomial logistics model that did not include political party affiliation and self-identification classified the sample into political personality categories with 92.3% percent accuracy (moderates: 94.5%, dissidents: 100%, allegiants: 100%, subordinates: 74%, alienated: 96.9%) (Model Fit- Log Likelihood: 107.191, χ2: 646.13, df: 408, p:0.00). This demonstrates that a model that does not include predictors related to political attributes of respondents can still achieve high classification accuracy.
Multinomial Logistic Regression- Likelihood Ratio Tests
Classification Results
The above results allow us to make two claims: 1) potential allegiants and dissidents are driven by a similar set of social media uses and gratifications as opposed to political subordinates and the alienated, and 2) social media uses and gratifications can be used to classify political personality types with considerably high accuracy. This answers the general question, ‘can data related to how and why users are driven to use social media accurately reveal political differences?’, in the affirmative. Our results also show that social media can provide more gratifications for potential dissidents and allegiants, ‘favouring’ personality types with high political efficacy. We will discuss below the implications of these findings. Starting from early work that discussed the impact of the Internet on political participation in general [e.g., 63] previous studies have reached into numerous dimensions of online politics. For instance, studies that examine dissidence in different contexts, such as political uprisings and oppression [e.g., 27, 53, 64], provide ample evidence to understand the role social media play in enabling political activity. These studies approach online political dissidence from an issue-based perspective, focusing on specific contexts. In contrast, our aim was to provide a more general view of how political behaviour is connected to social media use. Our approach allows examination of less-oppressive and non-issue-specific political contexts and takes different political actor types, including passive actors, into account.
As Gillespie [65] notes, choices made by platforms regarding the nature of content that can appear, organization and monetization of such content, and prohibition of some information are crucial interventions into the public discourse. However, platforms may not favour certain political ideologies or orientations. Given the vast amount of studies that examine alternative politics such as protest action [e.g., 7, 8, 53, 66–69], social media platforms may seem favourable venues for alternative politics, particularly dissidence. However, arguably, the types of affordances identified by social media scholars (e.g., persistence, replicability, scalability, and searchability, as discussed by boyd [70]), do not appeal in particular to a specific political group. Similarly, informational, expressive, and relational uses of social media that are positively linked to engagement [1] can appeal to users with different political orientations. Moreover, social media uses and gratifications identified by previous studies (e.g., information seeking, entertainment, social interaction, self-status seeking) cannot be limited to specific political ideologies. Therefore, although accessibility of platforms may encourage dissident politics that is less likely to be promoted in broadcast media, the potential for allegiant or pro-regime politics on platforms is not negligible. For instance, as Pearce [16] argues, despite the optimistic view towards the democratic potential of the Internet, social media can make control easy for authoritarian regimes. Similarities in uses and gratifications between potential dissidents and allegiants that we identified above may, therefore, reflect the potential of platforms to enable both pro and anti-system politics.
These results can also explain the intricate connection between political efficacy and online political engagement. Mean values for political efficacy (based on a five-point Likert Scale) were similar between potential dissidents and allegiants (mean = dissidents: 4.36, allegiants: 4.41) and both groups had a mean rank of 24.5 (the Mann-Whitney U test was not significant). As both potential dissidents and allegiants have high political efficacy, they may perceive some social media uses and gratifications more than those who have less political efficacy. This is possible, as social media is characterised by user-generated content and interaction. Differences in uses and gratifications between personality types with high and low political efficacy was clearly noticeable in the mean ranks given in Table 4, as dissidents and allegiants had higher mean ranks for all uses and gratifications than subordinates and the alienated. Partial correlations between Political Trust, Efficacy, and uses and gratifications (Table 8) indicted that, while only one gratification (Filtering) is significantly related to Political Trust, Political Efficacy had significant correlations with all the uses and gratifications variables. This confirms that social media tend to gratify users with high political efficacy more than others. In other words, our results show that social media provide higher levels of gratifications for those who believe in the significance of individual political activity. This observation is consistent with the study conducted by Velasquez and LaRose [71] who highlighted the correspondence between perceived efficacy and levels of agency at which political engagement occurs. Political efficacy influences many aspects of human functioning, such as strategic thinking, optimism or pessimism, choice of course of action, goals, effort put to certain endeavours, perseverance, and resilience [72]. Bandura notes that shared beliefs in people’s collective power to achieve desired outcomes can be seen as a key element of collective agency. Arguably, the ability of social media platforms to allow collective activity may correlate with collective efficacy of social media users. However, effects of collective efficacy on social media uses and gratifications should be examined further as it is beyond the scope of the current study.
Partial Correlations among Political Trust, Efficacy, and Uses and Gratifications
**Correlation is significant at 0.01 level, *Correlation is significant at 0.05 level, Control variable: frequency of social media use.
The above results can offer valuable insight for both governments and platforms, especially in terms of developing policies to encourage democratic engagement. As mentioned previously, social media use is not limited to political motives. Therefore, in contexts where the population is diverse in terms of political position, different groups, including those who have dissident or allegiant tendencies, may find social media sites gratifying. However, as both dissidents and allegiants share a similar set of gratifications, measures taken to encourage or restrict engagement of one group may affect the other similarly. Paige [23] explains that repressive responses to control dissidence may transform an unstable regime into a totalitarian regime. Use of social media for such control may exacerbate the issue as such measures may negatively affect political allegiants. For instance, measures such as access control and limiting opportunity for interaction adversely affect both dissidents and allegiants as they reduce gratifications such as community building, agency, and activity.
This may result in dissatisfaction among allegiants, minimising support for government. Paige describes democratic, traditional, and totalitarian systems as stable, as opposed to unstable regimes characterised by dissidence. In stable, yet democratically unhealthy systems, such as totalitarian political contexts, social media can be used to encourage political engagement among both potential dissidents and allegiants.
The findings discussed above reveal a nuanced relationship between political personality types and social media uses and gratifications. Social media are double-edged swords that not only afford, but also gratify, individuals engaged in anti- as well as pro-system politics. However, they are not necessarily ‘level playing fields’, as they tend to provide more gratifications for those who believe in the value of individual political activity. While this study sheds light on the topic, further work is necessary to examine factors that mediate and moderate the relationships between social media uses and gratifications and political personality types. In particular, work that examines political motivations can help shed light on the topic. Unequal group sizes within the sample also demands similar work in different contexts.
Our classification above reveals the possibility of discerning political differences using data related to social media consumption. This could prove to be problematic, as it helps uncover individuals that support or oppose existing political systems, leading to potential harms. However, this work should not be understood as an attempt to expose political actors, those who have mobilization potential in particular. Instead, our work should be understood as empirical evidence as to the possibility of such exposure using survey data. Nefarious use of such potential indicates democratic decay, and this demands strong policy frameworks for platform use, analytics, and micro targeting.