Abstract
We introduce comparisons w.r.t. information between interpretations in paraconsistent description logics and use them to define bisimilarity for such logics. This notion is useful for concept learning in description logics when inconsistencies occur. We give preservation results and the Hennessy-Milner property for comparisons w.r.t. information in paraconsistent description logics. As consequences, we obtain also invariance results and the Hennessy-Milner property for bisimilarity in paraconsistent description logics.
Introduction
Description logics (DLs) are a family of knowledge representation formalisms, which are suitable for reasoning about terminological knowledge. The basic elements of DLs are concepts, roles and individuals. A concept is interpreted as a set of individuals, while a role is interpreted as a binary relation between individuals. Concepts and roles are constructed from concept names, role names and individual names using constructors. A knowledge base in a DL contains a TBox with concept definitions and terminological axioms, and an ABox with assertions about individuals. It may also contain an RBox with axioms about roles. DLs are variants of modal logics, they are usually designed to be tractable fragments of first-order logic.
Two individuals in an interpretation are indiscernible w.r.t. a description language if they are bisimilar w.r.t. that language. In modal and description logics, bisimilarity is defined using bisimulation, which is a useful notion for both mathematical and computational investigations. There are many works on bisimulation in modal logics and for labeled transition systems [1], but bisimulation in DLs received considerable attention from researchers only recently [2, 9]. Apart from analyzing expressiveness [5, 8], bisimulation is also useful for concept learning in DLs [6, 21].
Using the traditional semantics, any conclusion can be drawn from an inconsistent knowledge base. In order to avoid that trivialization, paraconsistent semantics/reasoning can be used. Extensions of DLs with paraconsistent semantics and reasoning methods for them have been studied by a considerable number of researchers [10–13, 23]. In [17] Nguyen and Szałas discussed earlier work on paraconsistent DLs and studied a large family of paraconsistent semantics for the expressive DL . They compared the strength of those paraconsistent semantics. Given two paraconsistent semantics and , if is stronger than and a knowledge base
In this work, we study bisimilarity for paraconsistent DLs. The notion is useful for concept learning in DLs for the case when a given interpretation, treated as a training information system, contains inconsistent information. Dealing with noise or inconsistent information has been investigated in traditional machine learning. However, as far as we know, it was not studied before for concept learning in DLs. As bisimilarity is the notion for characterizing indiscernibility in DLs, bisimilarity for paraconsistent DLs is worth studying.
Due to the nature of the considered paraconsistent semantics, we define bisimilarity for paraconsistent DLs by introducing and using comparisons w.r.t. information between interpretations in paraconsistent DLs. Comparisons w.r.t. information differ from bisimulation-based comparisons studied in [2, 3] (also called directed simulations in [7]) in that the former use the information ordering and preserve information (about truth and falsity) in paraconsistent DLs, while the latter use the truth ordering and preserve semi-positive concepts in traditionalDLs.
The DLs considered in this work extend the basic DL with features among inverse roles, nominals, qualified number restrictions, the universal role and local reflexivity of a role. The paraconsistent semantics we use for them are the ones from [17], but with a slight modification. We give results on preservation of concepts, TBoxes and ABoxes as well as the Hennessy-Milner property for comparisons w.r.t. information in paraconsistent DLs. As consequences, we obtain also invariance results and the Hennessy-Milner property for bisimilarity in paraconsistent DLs.
This work is an extension of the conference paper [14]. In comparison with [14], it additionally provides full proofs for all of the results, a discussion on applications, and more explanations.
The rest of this structure is as follows. In Section 2, we specify the paraconsistent DLs studied in this work. In Section 3, we define comparisons w.r.t. information and then bisimilarity for the considered paraconsistent DLs. We provide results about preservation and invariance in Section 4 and results on the Hennessy-Milner property in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss applications of bisimilarity to concept learning in paraconsistent DLs. We conclude this work in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Syntax of the description logics
Let Φ be a set of features among I (inverse roles), O (nominals), Q (qualified number restrictions), U (the universal role) and
Assume that our language uses a countable set
Roles (of ) are defined as follows: if r ∈ if I ∈ Φ and r ∈ if U ∈ Φ then U is a role (the universal role).
Concepts (of ) are defined as follows: ⊤ and ⊥ are concepts, if A∈ if C, D are concepts and R is a role then: ¬C, C ⊓ D, C ⊔ D, ∀R . C, ∃R . C are concepts, if O ∈ Φ and a ∈ if Q ∈ Φ, R ≠ U and n is a natural number, then ≥ n R . C and ≤ n R . C are concepts, if
We use letters like C, D to denote concepts, and letters like R, S to denote roles. Given a finite set Γ = {C1, …, C n } of concepts, by ⊓Γ we denote C1 ⊓ … ⊓ C n , and by ⨆Γ we denote C1 ⊔ … ⊔ C n . If Γ =∅, then ⊓Γ =⊤ and ⨆Γ =⊥.
A terminological axiom, also called a general concept inclusion (GCI), is an expression of the form C ⊑ D. A TBox is a finite set of terminological axioms. An individual assertion is an expression of the form C (a), R (a, b), ¬R (a, b), a ≐ b or a ≠ b, where R ≠ U. An ABox is a finite set of individual assertions. A knowledge base is a pair consisting of a TBox and an ABox .
Paraconsistent semantics for description logics
In this subsection, we specify a family of paraconsistent semantics for DLs, which is based on [13, 17], but has a slight modification for semantics of number restrictions. Each paraconsistent semantics from the defined family, let’s say , is characterized by four parameters, denoted by , , , , with the following intuitive meanings: specifies the number of possible truth values of assertions of the form A (x), where A∈ specifies the number of possible truth values of assertions of the form r (x, y), where r ∈ specifies which from two considered semantics is used for concepts of the form ∀R . C, ∃R . C, ≤ n R.C or ≥ n R.C. specifies one of the three semantics for general concept inclusions: weak (
In the case , the truth values of assertions of the form A (x) are
(true) and
(false). In the case , the third truth value is
(inconsistent). In the case , the additional truth value is
(unknown). When , one can identify inconsistency with the lack of knowledge, and the third value
can be read either as inconsistent or as unknown. Similar explanations can be stated for .
We identify with the tuple . The set of considered paraconsistent semantics is thus
For , an -interpretation is a pair , where is a non-empty set, called the domain, is the interpretation function, which maps every individual name a to an element , every concept name A to a pair of subsets of , and every role name r to a pair of binary relations on such that: if then if then if then if then .
,
,
,
} defined below:
Informally, can be thought of as the truth value of . Note that
{
,
} if , and
{
,
,
} if . The intuition behind is similar, and under which
{
,
} if , and
{
,
,
} if . ■
The interpretation function maps a role R to a pair , defined for the case R ∉
For a set Γ of concepts, we denote , and . Observe that, if Γ is finite, then .
Remark 1 applies also to complex concepts. For example, we say that if and . Note that is defined in the standard way [10, 23] for the case C is of the form ⊤, ⊥, ¬D, D ⊓ D′ or D ⊔ D′. When , and are defined as in [10, 23], as in [13, 17] when , and as using semantics A of [19]. When , and are defined as in [13, 17] when and as using semantics B of [19]. The parameter also denotes the way of defining and . In the case , and are defined as in [10, 23], but for the case , they are defined differently in order to guarantee the following properties:
, , , , , , , , , , , .
In this figure, a notation x : A f (resp. x : A t , x:A_i) means A (x) is false (resp. true, inconsistent), and a normal (resp. dashed) edge from a node x to a node y means r (x, y) is true (resp. inconsistent). Inside an -interpretation, if there is no edge from x to y, then r (x, y) is false.
Regardless of , we have that: , , , , , , , . if , and if . ■
However,
Observe that if then is not essential. Also, De Morgan laws hold for our constructors w.r.t. any semantics from . The following proposition of [17] means that: if and then is a three-valued semantics; if then is a two-valued semantics.
Let and let be an -interpretation. We say that: -validatesC ⊑ D, denoted by , if: case : case : case : and is an -model of a TBox , denoted by , if it -validates all axioms of ; -satisfies an individual assertion φ if , where
is an -model of an ABox , denoted by , if it -satisfies all assertions of ; is an -model of a knowledge base if it is an -model of both and ; a knowledge base is -satisfiable if it has an -model.
Theorem 4.3 of [17] is a result about comparing the strength of semantics and from for the case . Analogously, it also holds for the case .
Comparison with respect to information and bisimilarity for paraconsistent DLs
Let Φ ⊆ {I, O, Q, U,
For example, if Φ = {I, Q} and , then only the conditions (2)-(6), (9) and (10) are essential.
We write to denote that there exists a -comparison w.r.t. information between and . For and , we write to denote that there exists a -comparison w.r.t. information Z between and such that Z (x, x′) holds.
If Z is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and , then {〈u, u′〉, 〈v, v′〉, 〈w, v′〉} ⊆ Z and Q ∉ Φ. The pair 〈u, u′〉 must belong to Z due to the condition (2) and the facts that and . Consequently, the pairs 〈v, v′〉 and 〈w, v′〉 must belong to Z due to the condition (5). Conversely, if Q ∉ Φ, then {〈u, u′〉, 〈v, v′〉, 〈w, v′〉} is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and . If Q ∉ Φ and {I, O}∩ Φ ≠ ∅, then there are no more -comparisons w.r.t. information between and . If {Q, I, O}∩ Φ = ∅, then {〈u, u′〉, 〈u, v′〉, 〈v, v′〉, 〈w, v′〉} is another -comparison w.r.t. information between and . If Q ∈ Φ, then due to the condition (9), and hence the condition (2) does not hold and . Z = {〈u″, u〉, 〈v″, v〉, 〈v″, w〉} is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and if {Q, and , regardless of Φ, and . Z = {〈u″, u′〉, 〈v″, v′〉} is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and , regardless of Φ, and . ■
If and , then we say that and are -bisimilar to each other and denote this by . For and , if and , then we say that x and x′ are -bisimilar to each other and denote this by.
Observe that the union of a non-empty set of -comparisons w.r.t. information between and is also a -comparison w.r.t. information between and . Thus, if there exist -comparisons w.r.t. information between and , then the relation is the largest -comparison w.r.t. information between and . In the case , such a relation always exists and is called the largest -auto-comparison w.r.t. information of and denoted by .
Given an -interpretation , we define
A concept C of is said to be preserved by -comparisons w.r.t. information if, for any -interpretations , and any -comparison w.r.t. information Z between and , if Z (x, x′) holds and , then .
A TBox in is said to be preserved by -comparisons w.r.t. information if, for every -interpretations and such that , if , then . A similar notion for ABoxes is defined analogously.
Case C = ∃ R . D: Since , there exists such that holds. Since Z (x, x′) holds, by (5) and (12), there exists such that Z (y, y′) and hold. Since Z (y, y′) holds and , by the inductive assumption, . Therefore, . Case C = ∀ R . D: Let y′ be an arbitrary element of such that (resp. ) if (resp. ). We need to show that . Since Z (x, x′) holds, by (6), (7) and (13), there exists such that Z (y, y′) holds and (resp. ) if (resp. ). Since , it follows that . Since Z (y, y′) holds, by the inductive assumption, it follows that . Case O ∈ Φ and C = {a} (resp. C = ¬ {a}): Since , we have that (resp. ). By (8), it follows that (resp. ). Hence holds. Case Case Q ∈ Φ and C = (≥ n R . D): Since , there exist pairwise different y1, …, such that hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since Z (x, x′) holds, by (9), there exist pairwise different , …, such that and hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since holds and , by the inductive assumption, . It follows that. Case Q ∈ Φ and C = (≤ n R . D): For a contradiction, suppose . Thus, there exist pairwise different , …, such that (resp. ) if (resp. ), and , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. Since Z (x, x′) holds, by (10) and (11), there exist pairwise different y1, …, such that holds and (resp. ) if (resp. ), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, since holds and , by the inductive assumption, , which means . Therefore, , a contradiction. ■
all TBoxes in are preserved by -comparisons w.r.t. information, if is a TBox in and , are -bisimilar -interpretations, then iff .
An -interpretation is said to be -unreachable-object-free if every element of is reachable from some , where a ∈
An -interpretation is said to be strongly Φ-unreachable-object-free if every element of is reachable from some , where a ∈
This corollary follows from Theorem 2.
contains only assertions of the form C (a), O ∈ Φ and , O ∈ Φ and does not contain assertions of the form ¬R (a, b).
As a consequence, if one of the above conditions holds and , are -interpretations -bisimilar to each other, then iff .
Case φ = (a ≐ b): Since , we have that . By (2), and hold. Since , by (8), it follows that . Hence . Case φ = (a ≠ b): The proof is similar to the above case (with the three occurrences of = replaced by ≠). Case φ = C (a): By (2), holds. Since , . By Theorem 1, it follows that . Thus . Case φ = R (a, b): By (2), holds. Since , holds. By (5), there exists such that and hold. Consider C = {b} (the assumption O ∈ Φ is used here). Since and hold, by Theorem 1, , which means . Thus, holds, i.e., . Case φ = ¬ R (a, b): We must have that O ∈ Φ and . By (2), holds. Since , holds. Since holds, by (7), it follows that holds, otherwise there would exist such that and hold, which implies and that does not hold (a contradiction). Therefore, . ■
The Hennessy-Milner property
An -interpretation is said to be modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 1 if: for every , every role R of different from U and every infinite set Γ of concepts of , if for every finite subset Λ of Γ there exists such that and , then there exists such that and ; if Q ∈ Φ then, for every , every role R of different from U, every infinite set Γ of concepts of and every natural number n, if for every finite subset Λ of Γ there exist n pairwise different such that and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then there exist n pairwise different such that and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if U ∈ Φ and is not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free then, for every infinite set Γ of concepts of , if for every finite subset Λ of Γ, then .
An -interpretation is said to be modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 2 (resp. kind 3) if: for every , every role R of different from U and every infinite set Γ of concepts of , if for every finite subset Λ of Γ there exists such that (resp. ) and , then there exists such that (resp. ) and ; if Q ∈ Φ then, for every , every role R of different from U, every infinite set Γ of concepts of and every natural number n, if for every finite subset Λ of Γ there exist n pairwise different such that (resp. ) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then there exist n pairwise different such that (resp. ) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if U ∈ Φ and is not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free then, for every infinite set Γ of concepts of , if for every finite subset Λ of Γ, then .
We say that an -interpretation is strongly modally Φ-saturated if it is modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. all of the kinds 1, 2 and 3.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward.
An -interpretation is finitely branching (w.r.t. Φ) if, for every and every role R of different from U, the sets and are finite.
The following proposition gives examples of modally Φ-saturated interpretations. Its proof is straightforward.
Let and be -interpretations, and . We say that: x is less than or equal tox′ w.r.t. concepts of and the semantics , denoted by , if, for every concept C of , implies ; x is -equivalent tox′ w.r.t. concepts of , denoted by , if, for every concept C of , iff .
For the main theorem of this section, we need [2, Lemma 4.6] and recall it below. The lemma allows us to check the conditions (9)–(11) in another way.
is modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 1, if (resp. ), then is modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 2 (resp. kind 3), if U ∈ Φ then either both and are strongly Φ-unreachable-object-free, or both of them are not strongly Φ-unreachable-object-free, or both of them are finite.
Then, for every and , iff . In particular, the relation is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and when it is not empty.
Conversely, let and assume that Z is not empty. We show that Z is a -comparison w.r.t. information between and . The condition (2) immediately follows from the assumption of the theorem. Consider the condition (3). If Z (x, x′) and hold, then by the definition of Z, holds. Consider the condition (4). If Z (x, x′) and hold, then holds, and by the definition of Z, holds, which means holds. Consider the condition (5). Suppose Z (x, x′) and hold. Let . We show that there exists y′ ∈ Consider the conditions (6) and (7). Suppose that Z (x, x′) holds and, if (resp. ), then (resp. ) holds. Let (resp. ). We show that there exists y ∈ Consider the condition (8) and the case O ∈ Φ. Suppose Z (x, x′) holds and (resp. ). Since (resp. ) and , it follows that (resp. ). Therefore, (resp. ). Consider the condition (9) and the case Q ∈ Φ. Suppose Z (x, x′) holds, i.e., . Let and . Let y1, …, y
n
be pairwise different elements of Consider the condition (10) (resp. (11)) and the case (resp. ) and Q ∈ Φ. Suppose Z (x, x′) holds, i.e., . Let and (resp. and ). Let be pairwise different elements of Consider the condition (12) and the case U ∈ Φ. If is strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free then (12) follows from (2) and (5). Consider the case when is not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free and not finite. Thus, is also not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free. Since Z is not empty, there exists 〈y, y′〉 ∈ Z. We have . Let . For a contradiction, suppose there is no such that . Thus, for every , there exists a concept Cx′ of such that but . Let . For any finite subset Λ of Γ, since , we have that , which implies that (since ), which means . Since is modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 1 and not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free, it follows that , which contradicts the fact that for every . The case when is finite can be proved analogously as for the above case. Consider the condition (13) and the case U ∈ Φ. If is strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free then (13) follows from (2), (6) and (7). Consider the case when is not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free and not finite. Thus, is also not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free. Since Z is not empty, there exists 〈y, y′〉 ∈ Z. We have . Let . For a contradiction, suppose there is no such that . Thus, for every , there exists a concept C
x
of such that but . Let . Consider any finite subset Λ of Γ and let C = ∃ U . ⊓ Λ. Observe that , hence . Since , it follows that . This implies that . Since is modally Φ-saturated w.r.t. kind 2 or 3 and not strongly Φ-unreachable-objects-free, it follows that , which contradicts the fact that for every . The case when is finite can be proved analogously as for the above case. Consider the condition (14) and the case Consider the condition (15) and the case
This corollary follows from Theorem 4.
On applications
In this section, we first mention some cases when one may deal with paraconsistent interpretations. After that we discuss concept learning in paraconsistent DLs.
Consider a domain with individuals described by unary and binary predicates. In the DL language, such predicates are concept names and role names, respectively. The domain can be described by different sources. For example, the individuals can be some objects in an area on the Earth and the information sources can be computer systems of different satellites, the objects are described by some Boolean attributes (standing for atomic concepts) and binary relationships between them (standing for atomic roles). Another example is as follows: some banks cooperate with each other in sharing information about their clients to some extent; the clients of banks are individuals; atomic concepts can be credibility, wealth and financial discipline; atomic roles can be some relationships based on transfers. The sources may provide assertions consistent or inconsistent with each other. Based on them, a paraconsistent interpretation can be created as an integrated information system.
Another situation of dealing with paraconsistent interpretations occurs when an inconsistent knowledge base is given. Such a knowledge base may result from combining or merging different knowledge bases, i.e., ontologies. Usually, matching or merging ontologies is done semi-automatically (by people using software tools). However, when the considered knowledge bases are dynamic, the automatic mode is unavoidable. In general, there are situations in which the considered knowledge base is inconsistent and one still wants to use it to derive only meaningful consequences. Having a knowledge base, sometimes we want to generate its models. For example, for concept learning in DL from a knowledge base
Now, consider the concept learning problem set as follows. We are given a training information system with noisy and/or incomplete data, which is a (paraconsistent) -interpretation, together with two subsets E+ and E- of , which consist of positive examples and negative examples of an unknown concept C. We want to learn that concept C. We may be told that C is in a restricted language and the learnt concept is allowed to have some small error rate. Restricting the language is not a problem, and for simplicity, we assume no language restrictions. The non-exact learning assumption means that need not to be the same as (E+, E-), but just approximate (E+, E-) closely.
We can compute the relation (e.g., by the method stated in Remark 2). During that process, we maintain a concept C
x
for each so that and, for every , 〈x, x′〉 ∈ Z iff . At the end of computing , the relation (defined by (16)) is an equivalence relation with the following property: the equivalence class for any is characterized by C
x
in the sense that iff . Among the concepts Cx′ with we can choose any one to characterize (some measure can be used here). If for some concept C, then each of E+ and E- is the union of some equivalence classes of . We can approximate C by a concept built from the concepts that characterize those equivalence classes. To do so we need the concepts
(inconsistence) when , and
(unknown) when , with the following denotation:
Δ and
Δ. Details are left for future work.
Conclusions
We have introduced the notions of bisimilarity and comparisons w.r.t. information for paraconsistent DLs. We have given preservation results and the Hennessy-Milner property for comparisons w.r.t. information in paraconsistent DLs. We have obtained also invariance results and the Hennessy-Milner property for bisimilarity in paraconsistent DLs. The Hennessy-Milner property shows that our notions of bisimilarity and comparisons w.r.t. information for paraconsistent DLs are proper. As future work, we intend to extend these notions for more expressive paraconsistent DLs and apply them to concept learning in paraconsistent DLs.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by VNU Grant QG-15-22 and done in cooperation with the project 2011/02/A/HS1/00395, which is supported by the Polish National Science Centre (NCN).
