How logical is safety? An institutional logics perspective on safety at work

1 Introduction

Occupational accidents are still commonplace in contemporary workplaces, despite increased understanding of safety, human psychology, and human-technology interaction [1–3]. Researchers and practitioners not only struggle to understand, reduce and prevent occupational accidents but also seemingly view such events as a result of irrational behaviours and decisions [4]. However, dismissing behaviour as irrational is ‘simply an admission that the behaviour is inexplicable in terms of the concepts to hand’ [4, p148], which subsequently makes it difficult to develop policies and interventions to counter (unsafe) behaviour. In the present study, we propose that the perspective of institutional logics [5–7] can be used to uncover, illustrate, and explain dynamics that are overlooked by traditional methods of studying occupational safety. We have three aims with this introduction of logics in the safety context. First, to reveal the different logics at play when safety is discussed. The multiplicity of logics and their settlement in organisations enables us to better understand why occupational safety often fails. Second, to explain how employees apply different logics and thereby differ in terms of their approach to occupational safety, which can be traced by seeing how they explicitly articulate their logic. Third, to increase current understandings of the various logics in order to help find solutions that minimise the amount of conflict within organisations, which depends on the manners in which the multiple logics are treated in a given situation.

2 Theoretical framework

Behaviours and decisions at a given moment are based on the knowledge, perspective and understanding people have of the situation at that time, something that is called ‘local rationality’ [8]. Viewing occupational safety issues through the lens of different institutional logics provides a pragmatic avenue for identifying such local rationalities and analysing the complexities associated with them, as there are distinct logics present in organisational contexts that each provide their own coherent rationale for safety [9].

Institutional logics are ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ [10, p804]. Greenwood et al. [6, p318] summarise the content of this pattern by describing how institutional logics ‘provide guidelines on how to interpret and function in social situations’. Such institutional logics define what is considered valuable within a cultural system [5, p232] and what is considered the most rational choice to make. Combined, these cultural systems, or institutional orders, ‘compose the key cornerstone institutions of society’ [7, p53]. Logics are the more subtle and abstract underlying mechanisms that guide institutional orders and social meaning [11]. A logic ultimately comes down to the root metaphors that people use to view reality [5]. This creates a coherent logic as people define rationality from a certain perspective. The use of an institutional logics approach thus allows for the explanation of behaviour beyond the assumption that people think alike about the consequences of working unsafely. Depending on the specific dominant logic, people will differ in their assessment of what is (in)appropriate, (ir)rational, and (un)safe in the safety context.

The most widely accepted set of ideal types of institutional logics, which we therefore also apply in the present study, was proposed by Thornton et al. [7]. This set comprises seven institutional orders: the market, the profession, the corporation, the state, the family, the community, and the religion. Each of these orders has its own distinct logic that provide guidelines for the interpretation and functioning in social situations [6, p318]. This set of logics has proved effective in a variety of studies [cf. 12–14]. The institutional logic forms the basic unit, and field logics, organisation logics, and individual logics emerge from there and are ‘nested within these societal-level logics’ [15, p366]. We will summarise each of the orders and their application to the safety context (see Table 1).

3 Method

The data reported in this manuscript were collected as part of a larger project regarding the role of occupational safety in managers’ work. In the current analyses and report, the focus is exclusively on data concerning institutional logics and logic multiplicity in the occupational safety context.

4 Results

The analysis identified three logics in the data: the logics of the market, the profession, and the corporation. First, the emergence of each of these logics will be illustrated and explained (4.1). Second, the presence of logic multiplicity and conflicting logics will be analysed and presented (4.2).

4.2 Logic multiplicity

The previous section already demonstrated that multiple logics are core to occupational safety. In addition to these examples, which each reflect a single logic, examples that reflected complexity that arose when incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics were encountered also emerged in the data. Examples of complexity between the institutional orders of the market, profession, and corporation were present (see Fig. 1). Within each quote, the part referring to a particular logic is underlined. Words or sentences referring to the market logic are underlined with a , those referring to the profession logic are underlined with a dotted line ................. , and those words and sentences referring to the corporation logic are double underlined .

OPEN IN VIEWER

Fig. 1

The institutional orders of the market, profession and corporation and the complexities arising from incompatible prescriptions between them.

4.2.1 Logic of the market versus logic of the profession

When the orders of the market and the profession ................. collide, actors face the market logic’s self-interested focus on increasing (efficiency) profits and the profession logic’s focus on delivering high-quality work and personal expertise.

‘This year, we have cancelled our bids three times. [Researcher: Yes, but I assume there are just so many times you can cancel your bids on work?] [...] Even if we have to do it a hundred times, that does not matter. I will not make concessions to work when the electricity is running. I just do not. Very simple; we simply do not ................. . And, that is also something that the customer has to learn. And, if that means that our organisation does not have any work in the Netherlands for a while, but you have to be able to explain it as management.’ –M12, Higher-level manager

In the above quote, the professional is not willing to make concessions to working safely. Based on his knowledge, he judges that working when electricity is running is unsafe, despite the apparent wish of the client. The interviewee in this example solves the complexity arising from the collision of the logic of the market and the logic of the profession by stating that the client (market) has to learn that the professional will not make concessions to working safely. He implicitly stresses the legitimacy of his choice based on his expert knowledge about work safety.

4.2.2 Logic of the market versus logic of the corporation

When the market logic collides with the logic of the corporation, actors face the market’s self-interested focus on increasing (efficiency) profits, while at the same time, they have to uphold their status in the managerial hierarchy and their bureaucratic roles, and they must think about the market position of the firm:

‘A few years ago, we sometimes thought we just bid on a work and then we will see what happens; we pressure the customer; it is his problem. Well, the customer responded “you have accepted the job, it is your problem”. [...] I am responsible for the people that work here; well, a safe workplace must be present; we must have validated that in the tender phase. If not, we are going to question it, and if that question is answered unsatisfactorily, we will not make a bid on that work.’ –M12, Higher-level manager

The interviewee describes that initially, he was more motivated by increasing efficiency, but when confronted with the self-interest of the client reasoning from the same market logic, he turned to the corporation logic and took responsibility for his subordinates. This example illustrates that the interviewee tried to solve the complexity initially by leaving things implicit, reckoning that the client would take responsibility. However, when the safety question was made more explicit, complexity arose, and in this instance, the parties involved were forced to settle the responsibility question. As the client refused to pick up the glove, the interviewee was almost forced to do so.

4.2.3 Logic of the profession versus logic of the corporation

When the order of the profession collides with the order of the corporation, actors are confronted with the managerial hierarchy and the organisational culture (corporation logic) on one hand and personal expertise and reputation (profession logic) on the other:

‘Well, we solve a lot of things ourselves here, ................. and that is something we shouldn’t do. You try to have a solution-focussed stance, and sometimes you do things that are not possible. And, when you don’t do [solve] them, you are a dick, ................. but if you do [solve] them and something happens, you are screwed. And, those are seemingly very small things, but they can have far-reaching consequences’ –M24, Group leader

The interviewee describes that –following from the logic of the profession –there is a certain willingness to get the work done, which is also expected from them. However, getting the work done requires professionals to use their expert knowledge to make a translation from the general applicable rules and routines of the corporation to an approach that fits with the specific situation. In the process of doing so, they are likely to deviate from and violate those corporate routines, and inherently the corporation logic. Making this translation is accepted –and perhaps even expected by managers –but only as long as things go well. When things go wrong, managers will use their hierarchical power to protect themselves, hiding behind corporate routines that should have been followed.

5 Discussion

The aim of this study was to increase our understanding of what drives safety-related decisions and behaviours. We proposed that the discourse of institutional logics could be used as a lens to uncover, illustrate, and explain rationales for safety-related behaviours and decisions that are otherwise left uncovered or dismissed as irrational [cf. 4, 25, 26].

This study makes several contributions to the field of occupational safety. First, it demonstrates that an institutional logics perspective can be effectively applied to empirical data and used to uncover and identify the easily overlooked differences between the rationales that people employ to justify their views about occupational safety. By applying the institutional logics perspective to the descriptions of safety issues by managers, we were able to uncover the logics of the market, profession, and corporation. Within this study, the market logic was reflected in the use of safety performance as a means to increase consumer preference and the effects of market competitiveness on safety. The professional logic led managers to prioritise staying safe over getting the work done, whereas others prioritised the timely completion of work over standard operating procedures that should keep them free from harm. The logic of the corporation was reflected in the means in which managers made use of their hierarchical power to determine the content and planning of work. These examples demonstrate that an institutional logics perspective can be used to identify different rationalities underlying behaviours and decisions and how those different logics lead to differences in approaches towards safety.

Second, in addition to illustrations of individual institutional logics in the data, examples of logic multiplicity between the logics of the market, profession and corporation emerged. Here, people use the same words but speak different languages. Complexity between the logics of the market and the profession arose due to the incompatibility of the market logic’s self-interested focus on increasing (efficiency) profits, whereas the professional wanted to adhere to high-quality work standards. In this situation, the manager resolved the conflict by stating the client had to learn from the professional’s personal expertise regarding how to keep the work safe. The complexity between the logics of the market and the corporation occurred as result of the market logic’s self-interested focus on increasing (efficiency) profits, whereas managers have to uphold their hierarchical status and responsibilities. Initially, the solution to complexity was sought in leaving the responsibility for occupational safety implicit. However, when the client made this issue explicit and refused to take responsibility, the manager was forced to do so. The complexity between the logics of profession and the corporation arose as a result of rules and routines that are prescribed by the corporation that were incompatible with the work that was expected to be done. The group lead tried to solve the complexity by using his expert knowledge to translate the general rules and routines to fit with the specific situation.

The new concepts (i.e., the various logics and their associated elemental categories) introduced by the institutional logics framework provide both researchers and practitioners with a discourse that allows them to study and analyse occupational safety in new manners. These concepts not only allow for providing meaning to seemingly irrational behaviours [4], but also provides a means to break down the complex structure of behaviours rooted in various rationales into manageable pieces [cf. 22–24]. Additionally, these concepts complement the local rationality principle that Dekker [8] introduced to explain human error and further it by illustrating that similar people in similar situations can reach different conclusions based on the prevailing institutional logic [22].

Third, the framework designed Besharov and Smith [15] proved to be a useful tool to indicate the degree of conflict within the organisation. As multiple logics were core to the safety-related decisions and behaviours (i.e., a high degree of logic centrality) and provided contradictory prescriptions for action (i.e., a low degree of logic compatibility), the organisation in this study can be categorised as a contested organisation. In line with the results, this implies that members of the organisation ‘hold competing expectations about appropriate organisational goals and lacking a clear guideline as to which goals should prevail’ and that the organisation encounters extensive conflict [15, p371]. The contradictory prescriptions for action and the resulting competition between organisational goals jeopardises occupational safety. If safety is not beyond a doubt the number one organisational goal, employees cannot be expected to maintain workplace safety at all times. The ability to predict the degree of conflict within an organisation and to understand how this conflict originates provides managers with opportunities to minimise such conflict and its impact on performance and stability [15, 40].

In sum, the demonstrated usability of the institutional logics perspective in studying and analysing occupational safety provides both researchers and practitioners with new means to explore and address human and organisational safety issues.

The demonstrated usability of an institutional logics perspective for occupational safety also has implications for practice. First, managers should be aware that people can have different underlying rationales for their safety-related thinking, decisions and behaviours. Second, in addition to this awareness, the ability to identify the different logics at play allows managers and safety professionals to minimise the impact of speed on accuracy in times of haste and crisis. Third, through awareness and identification of the different logics, managers and safety professionals can help in exploring misunderstandings in conversations between different actors, in addition to uncovering the nature of these misunderstandings through articulating the various logics. Fourth, the discourse of logics can be used in the analysis of occupational safety incidents. As Dekker [8] notes, no one comes to work to do a bad job, and what they do and decide makes sense to them in that specific situation. In the case of a safety incident, the institutional logics perspective can shed light on the motivations and rationales that drove employee decisions and behaviours instead of dismissing the accident solely as caused by human failure. Finally, the discourse of logics provides (safety) managers with the ability to recognise, articulate, and discuss the different rationales for occupational safety that are easily overlooked by traditional management approaches. In doing so, it not only contributes to the understanding of employee functioning in terms of occupational safety but also provides managers with opportunities to engage with employees by articulating the divergent rationales they apply and to use the discourse of logics by adapting their arguments in such a manner that they are in line with the dominant logic of their conversation partners, thus increasing their intelligibility and persuasiveness.

Although we are convinced that the findings presented in this study contribute to the current knowledge and understanding of safety-related decisions and behaviours, there are some limitations that must be addressed. First, the group of managers participating in this study was limited in size, especially considering the limited number of managers that made implicit references to institutional logics. Future research should therefore further explore the presence of (conflicting) institutional logics concerning occupational safety with larger research samples and in organisations operating in other sectors. Second, although the state logic seemed to emerge from the data, it proved difficult to unequivocally interpret these units of analyses. The wordings used by interviewees did not clearly allow for a definite answer regarding the origins of the referenced rules (i.e., state or corporation), which led us to adopt a rather conservative approach and exclude all related quotes. Future research should therefore explore whether references to the state logic can be interpreted more clearly.

6 Conclusion

The current study demonstrated that the institutional logics perspective is a valuable lens that provides new methods to uncover, study, and explain the different rationales underlying occupational safety. It allowed us to uncover the logics of the market, profession and corporation in occupational safety-related thinking, decisions and behaviours of managers. Such insights into and understanding of the various rationales underlying safety can help in the prevention and analysis of accidents, ultimately leading to safer workplaces.

Conflict of interest

None to report.