Armed Forces & Society

The Lebanon war (June 1982 to June 1985) is the first one in the history of Israel that gave rise to the phenomenon of conscientious objection. Given the particularity of this phenomenon to this war, this article addresses those sociomoral factors that may have contributed to the decision of 36 reserve soldiers to dissociate themselves from their fighting units during the first year of the war. It is suggested that the main factors were the objectives of the war, its moral reality, the aftermath of the soldiers' experience in the occupied territories, the general atmosphere of protest, and the inability in battle to differentiate between terrorists and innocent civilians.

This article examines the U.S. Navy's effectiveness in achieving affirmative action goals-increased minority representation in petty officer ranks. Data used for the study were the aggregated number of white, black, and Hispanic males in Navy occupational specialties in 1976, 1979, and 1982. Control for the aptitude required to qualify for occupational specialties is included. The study tests a model that attempts to account for the distribution of blacks, whites, and Hispanics in core and peripheral technology occupations. Findings suggest that when aptitude required for entrance into occupational specialties is controlled, blacks and Hispanics are overrepresented in support occupations and underrepresented in occupations representing naval core technology.

The recent evolution of West German arms transfer policies is related to legal stipulations, socioeconomic interests, local politics, a need for anonymity in controversial dealings, and particularly to a more autonomous foreign policy. New 1982 guidelines allowed increased arms sales flexibility to conflict-ridden and strategic regions such as the Middle East. Despite government attempts to limit terrorists' access to arms, international arms production remains largely unregulated. The Foreign Ministry has the prime role in controversial sales authorizations, but Germany's many interlinked private arms contractors and subcontractors, lured by relatively high profits, do most of the promotions. Local and national political factions are keenly interested in the disposition of contracts and regulations. Future arms sales will depend on Europe's and Germany's increasing foreign policy assertiveness, and on the direction of European weapons technology.

The debate about the origins of the First World War has been rekindled with numerous new articles and books on the subject. Discussion of the war's outbreak remains a strategist's battleground. Fritz Fischer's interpretations of the causes of the war have dominated the debate for nearly two decades. His principal thesis is that economic and societal pressures propelled Germany into war in 1914. These interpretations are too simplistic and contain a number of errors. As evidenced in the recent literature, the Fischer thesis has skewed our understanding of the origins of World War I. Research into the neglected questions of the policies and the decision making of the other powers reveals at least a corresponding lack of resolve to avoid war.

The dilemma of whether or not to deploy cruise missiles in the Netherlands led to widespread protest; at one stage, it threatened a breakdown of civic order. In June 1984, the Dutch government came up with a complex decision, which aimed at eventual deployment while disarming the potent peace movement. This article discusses the decision both from the wider perspective of the alleged decline of party systems in Western democracies and their potential impotence in the face of the many extraparliamentary action and protest groups and from the aspect of postindustrial agenda issues. It concludes that the history and tradition of Dutch pluralist democracy not only inspired the successful strategy of the Dutch government in its cruise missile quandary, but it also offers wider lessons for viable party politics in postindustrial societies.

While most of us recognize the concept of heroism, an operational definition has remained elusive. The body of published literature on heroism likewise does not focus on the personal attributes that predispose an individual to heroic acts. In this study, a body of work not previously analyzed-citations of Medal of Honor awardees-was used to develop and rank dimensions of military heroism, following Flanagan's critical incident technique. These dimensions then compared definitions of heroism across conflicts. Essentially, three dimensions were derived and served as a basis for examining military heroism. As an initial effort, this study directs our thoughts to an operational definition of military heroism.