Armed Forces & Society

We present a statistical model that predicts the force size of United Nations peacekeeping operations, relying on experiences from thirty-nine peacekeeping operations over the period 1945-1994. As we expected, the type of mission performed by the peacekeeping operation was a major factor in determining force size. Although the second-generation mission category includes a panoply of different mission types, these new peacekeeping operations still on average require almost 12,000 more personnel than observer operations. Our results indicate, however, that the size of a peacekeeping operation is not solely a function of mission type; the context of the conflict situation matters as well. Specifically, the severity of the violence in the crisis precipitating UN intervention has a significant effect, as does the addition of more actors to the conflict. In general, the geographic characteristics of the area (except the size of the deployment area), the type of conflict (civil or interstate), and superpower involvement had no statistically significant effects.

One of the little known specifics of the democratic transition in South Africa during 1990-1994 is its system of early warning about political violence. The strong role that grassroots organizations played in monitoring affected communities and suspected perpetrators set it apart from systems that are driven primarily by academics, although academics were important for the analysis of the violence reports collected by the popular movement and for formulating warnings on trends and hot zones that the transitional government as well as the media actively demanded. This article describes the mechanisms of early warning and analyzes data from the province of KwaZulu-Natal, where high levels of political violence continued for much longer than in the rest of the country. Using regression techniques, we show that the violent behavior of the main political antagonists changed significantly after the April 1994 national elections. Also, the violence followed different causative patterns in the various subregions. Profiles derived in 1994 and 1995 informed the government's decision to postpone regional elections in KwaZulu-Natal three times before they could be held in June 1996 in a climate of relative tranquillity.

This article explores the theoretical and practical considerations of establishing democratic civilian control over the post-communist military in Poland. It argues that problems with civilian control lie not only within the military establishment but within the political system. It highlights the difference between simple civilian control and democratic civilian control and points out that there can be systemic obstacles to moving from one to the other. It is impossible to establish democratic control over the military until there is a consensus among the population and the politicians about where the locus of that control should lie. In the case of Poland, the military has been used by the president in his attempts to sway the public in favor of a presidential system. The article argues that perhaps the single largest factor in keeping the military out of politics is the development of a stable political system.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has expanded its role in peacekeeping operations around the world. However, budgetary pressures in the late 1980s led to a reduction, beginning in 1987, in the size of the active force that increased its dependency on reserve forces. This article presents an analysis of data on American soldiers in two different units, one reserve and one active duty, to determine the attitudes of soldiers in each unit toward peacekeeping norms of impartiality and the use of force, the role of the military in peacekeeping, and whether such missions are appropriate for their unit. Differences between reserve soldiers' responses from those of the active duty unit are discussed. In general, soldiers in both units accept most peacekeeping norms. Although both units felt that peacekeeping was not appropriate for their unit, soldiers in the reserve unit generally had more constabulary attitudes than those in the active duty unit. These findings suggest that members of the reserve components may be regarded as an appropriate source for peacekeeping personnel in the future.

This article compares the socioeconomic benefits of reservists with prior active military service (PS) and reservists with nonprior service (NPS). The economic theory of investment in human capital, the sociological concept of higher educational attainment, and the social psychological theory of the development of personality traits associated with PS are employed to develop a conceptual framework. The "bridging" argument of greater gains to nonwhite reservists is also tested for data for the All Volunteer Force era. Regression analysis of the Defense Manpower Data Center's Reserve Components Surveys (n = 8,000) revealed that individual and family earnings of PS personnel were higher by 6.8% and 3.5%, respectively, compared to similar earnings of NPS reservists. The results also found some support for the bridging hypothesis in that nonwhite reservists had higher family earnings and higher home ownership relative to white reservists. Limitations of the article for generalizability of the results to all veterans relative to nonveterans are also discussed.

The enlisted force will face changing roles and responsibilities as we move into the future. A central issue is whether the current management system will adequately meet these new challenges. In order to answer this question, we need a critical evaluation of how well the current system has functioned in the past. This article focuses primarily on the management of the experience and grade distribution-arguably one of the most difficult and least successful policies in the history of enlisted management. Its main thesis is that factors other than management policies and practices have had an important impact in shaping the force and that the inability to manage to stated goals may not be entirely the fault of the managers. Unless these trends are factored into future decisions regarding enlisted force management, future policies are likely to be as unsuccessful as they have been in the past.