Arts and Humanities in Higher Education

Humanistic studies cultivate types of conceptual fluency and modes of awareness important to thought concerning values. Not all knowledge is scientific knowledge. There is genuine comprehension of some valuative matters – they are not all to be interpreted in expressive or subjective terms. Education in the humanities can encourage value-relevant types of discernment, awareness, and articulateness in uniquely effective ways. Though important kinds of thought concerning values may lack formal, theoretical elaboration they involve genuine standards of intellectual responsibility. Engagement with the humanities does not ensure development of sound valuative thought and judgment – nothing ensures it – but can have a crucial role in shaping it. Moreover, intellectual and moral imagination should not be constrained by boundaries of academic specialization. Specialization has several merits but it can motivate inappropriately reductionist claims and theoretical over-extension. Often, sound normative understanding is not dependent upon explicit theoretical justification or a specific inquiry’s explanatory idiom.

Given the academic specialization endemic today in humanities disciplines, some of the most important work of humanities centers has become promoting education about the humanities in general. After charting the rise of humanities centers in the US, three characteristics of centers that enable their advancement of larger concerns of the humanities as a whole are discussed: location, flexibility, and broadened perspective. Independence from departmental demands and responsibilities allows humanities centers to reach diverse public audiences, to explore new paradigms and alternative structures for knowledge, and to overcome the intellectual divisions created by organizational structures of the contemporary university.

The article discusses the nature of humanistic knowledge. Analyzing the relation between aesthetic judgment, literacy and knowledge as defined by the French seventeenth-century Jansenist school of Port-Royal, the article argues that Port-Royal’s interpretation of the enthymeme can be used to define the cognitive basis of aesthetic judgments in the various disciplines of the humanities. The article concludes with arguments that the literacy provided by the humanities explains their value as a necessary foundation for understanding the global world.

In the past, humanists and scientists have held very different views about the role of collaboration in scholarly research. From the point of view of a Principal Investigator in a scientific laboratory, this article examines the increasingly dominant role of collaboration in scientific research. In contrast to the ‘consensus research’ model of the sciences, humanists have often viewed the role of collaboration in research with considerable skepticism and have placed greater value on the traditional model of the solitary scholar pursuing knowledge and truth. An examination of some of the distinctive cultural differences between the humanities and sciences suggests that the benefits of collaboration may come to play an increasingly significant role in the future of humanistic research.

More collaborative work in the humanities could be instrumental in helping to break down the traditional rigid boundaries between academic divisions and disciplines in modern universities. The value of the traditional model of the solitary humanities scholar or the collaborative science paradigm should not be discounted. However, increasing the use of collaborative and interdisciplinary research models in the humanities would promote new forms of scholarship and also help to create a better, more integral and inclusive world.

In an era in which the imperatives of global economic competition prompt institutions of higher education to promote vocational practicality and efficiency over all else, advocates of the humanities have struggled to articulate the distinctive value and contribution of our disciplines. This article seeks to develop an argument directed not at fellow academics, but at friends and parents who ask incredulously, ‘What are you going to do with a degree in that?’ After discussing the historical shifts that have led to the present-day predicament in which majoring in English, philosophy, religion, art or a foreign language seems supremely impractical, I argue that the most important resource necessary to succeed in today’s competitive marketplace is a clear, eloquent, impassioned voice. The learning exercises at the foundation of excellent humanities-based education may appear to lack any utilitarian benefit, but their long-term effect is the development of each student’s individual voice, which is priceless.

The calling of public scholarship is inherently multifaceted, and often inherently controversial; public scholars have to accommodate different spheres of society, different cultural values and goods, and even different political agendas in their work. Unlike academic workers, public scholars rarely have the opportunity to do work that is driven primarily by intellectual agendas, yet they also have to sustain fidelity to the ideas, values and standards of the disciplines they practice – even when sustaining fidelity means criticizing the most cherished tenets of the disciplines themselves. To be successful, public scholarship must be animated by a pluralist conception of society, a vision of the social world that recognizes that all of us live among different and incompatible cultures and that even the cultures we claim as our own have incommensurate and incompatible standards.

This article raises a number of questions that the author believes need to be addressed in order to defend and justify the teaching and practice of the humanities in an age when they continue to face swingeing cuts and unreasoned attacks from many quarters, both inside and outside the Academy. They are questions that have to do with the uniqueness of the humanities, its role in teaching values, the objectives of research, the connection between research and teaching, the value of an education in the humanities for society overall, and the ways in which humanists can play a useful public role. In sum, the author advocates for a coherent justification for what the humanities, plain and simple, are (or is).

This article begins by acknowledging the general worry that scholarship in the humanities lacks the rigor and objectivity of other scholarly fields. In considering the validity of that criticism, I distinguish two models of learning: the covering law model exemplified by the natural sciences, and the model of rooted particularity that characterizes the humanities. With those two models set forth, I defend the humanities against the general challenge of lack of rigor by showing how objective standards of evaluation are to be understood within the particularity model. I then discuss the distinct benefits offered by that model of learning and conclude by showing how the skills and temperament associated with that model can be usefully deployed to illuminate Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.