The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

The Spanish-American War heralded the beginning of America's global role and its preoccupation with the Caribbean area. There are a host of theories to explain U.S. involvement in the Caribbean, but over time, the whirlpool pattern of intense involvement followed by disinterest suggests that security considerations have remained paramount. U.S. policy in the twentieth century can be divided into three periods: the protectorate era (1898-1933); the Good Neighbor Policy (1933-53); and the Cold War (1953-90). Whether the United States will be able to escape the unproductive and erratic relationships of the past depends on whether it uses the post-Cold War era to develop a collective defense of democracy and a social safety net for the poor people in the countries of the region.

Most Caribbean states have produced new political leadership that is significantly different from the last generation in a number of ways. Relying more on the projections of technical competence than on charisma and gratitude, these new leaders face volatile domestic situations in which they find themselves challenged by increasing drug problems, local political indifference, weak party organizations, and a world dramatically altered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the precarious internal economic situation of the United States. The United States remains inordinately important as the major market for Caribbean products, although trade with the region represents only a small part of American foreign trade. The diversity of the various states makes unanimity in matters of foreign policy difficult among Caribbean leaders. Differences in scale will affect foreign policy concerns, although, on many major issues, Caribbean political leaders must work closely with the United States. The primary challenge will be to balance equitably their local interests with those of the larger state.

Emphasis is on the five major insular migrations arriving in the United States during this century: Cubans, Dominicans, Haitians, Jamaicans, and Puerto Ricans. We briefly examine the historical origins of these outflows, focusing on the role of shifting external hegemony over the region and the resulting changes in economic structure. The long relationship of the United States with its southern periphery has had the most diverse effects on these countries. In the case of the small Caribbean nations, a common pattern of U.S. hegemony interacted with very diverse colonial experiences to produce different political and economic structures. The latter have been reflected, in turn, in the character of Caribbean migration flows and the relative success of the ethnic communities that they spawned. Contrary to common stereotypes, immigrants from the island-nations of the region are not solely unskilled workers but comprise a diversified lot that includes entrepreneurs, professionals, technicians, and skilled workers as well.

At the dawn of the 1990s, Dominicans are one of the fastest-growing and most conspicuous immigrant groups in the United States. In contrast to the prevailing conception of migrants as forming a stream of people, this article explores the U.S.-linked Dominican migration as a distinct social group, clearly distinguishable from its nonmigrant conationals and functioning in a transnational milieu. The article examines the group's own socioeconomic, cultural, and political characteristics and its relationships with the two national states. Because of the migrants' binational character, instead of espousing policies aimed solely at affecting their mobility, the U.S. and the Dominican governments would be better advised to foster connections between the resources and demands generated by these binationals and the development efforts in the Dominican Republic and in Dominican settlements overseas.

During the 1980s, successful new offshore financial centers developed in the British colonies and the Dutch Antilles. Their growth derived from the general transnationalization of investment and finance in the world economy, but it also became closely linked with the incidence of drug trafficking and criminal money laundering in the region. The United States was inevitably drawn to take an increasing interest in the affairs of the European dependent territories but has had to come to terms with the fact that it cannot regulate the offshore Caribbean without the consent of sovereign European governments. A part of the Caribbean is thus off-limits in respect of the traditional unilateral exercise of U.S. power in the region. The long history of Anglo-American cooperation in the Caribbean and elsewhere has proven useful in respect of the British colonies but now needs to be extended into a broader dialogue embracing the other European powers—including France—to explore what the metropolitan countries can collectively contribute to the security and development of their Caribbean territories.

This article examines current trade patterns of the Caribbean Basin and the likely impact that changes in the international trade environment will have on them. The numerous bilateral and subregional preferential agreements that sustain the region's economy will be the framework in which Caribbean trade is examined. Also examined are the threats posed to these relationships by the implementation of free trade arrangements and the changing political alliances throughout the global community. We conclude with an evaluation of potential Caribbean responses to the challenges of the international economy of the twenty-first century.

U.S. military policy in the Caribbean after the Cold War faces two nontraditional security threats: drug trafficking and illegal migration. Haiti and Cuba are the worst possible scenarios. This policy is being formulated and furthered by the U.S. Atlantic Command in conjunction with regional security forces but without adequate civilian participation and public debate in the Caribbean. This policy contradicts stated U.S. goals of promoting democratic practices and institutions in the region. U.S. military policy in the Caribbean is analyzed within a historical context that divides the U.S. military presence—in terms of installations and armed forces—in the Caribbean during the twentieth century into five phases, with emphasis on the Cold War and its aftermath.

Throughout the past decade, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Caribbean have been attempting to redefine their role vis-à-vis the state and civil society in order to be able to contribute substantively to the regional debate on development strategies. Their role has most often centered on both political and economic priorities, in contrast with the position of most international NGOs, which tend to stress their own apolitical character and to define Third World requirements in terms of economic rather than political necessities. This has meant a rethinking of the relationship with the state, promoting a debate between NGOs concerning the question of how NGOs should interact with the state.

The global trend toward increased involvement by non-governmental agencies and private parties has enriched the mix of actors operating at all levels of interstate and intersociety relations in the Caribbean. While many of these new relations persist in the traditional ties with the former colonial metropolises, there is evidence of new relations in the political, economic, gender, academic, and environmental areas. Even as this article examines many of these transnational relationships, it is not sanguine about the disappearance any time soon of the linguistic, ethnocultural, and political barriers that have historically kept the Caribbean balkanized.

One key factor, maybe the crucial element, in the future of the relationship of the United States with the Caribbean is the future of its political relationship with Puerto Rico. What the island and its metropolis do, together, will have a decisive impact on the future shape of the Caribbean. This article examines the geopolitical and economic context of that relationship, departing from a paradigmatic distinction between the territory and its people, which has determined the history under the hegemony of the United States. A brief economic history is followed by the political-economic foundations and a description of the traditional political views on the relationship. A new paradigm is proposed, based on a new understanding of the people, the society, and the culture. The aspects of migration, exile, and return as well as the role of state and clandestine violence are examined. Finally, the article reviews the metropolitan view of the relationship and the political dimensions of the present situation, and it makes a policy proposal for a new option for Puerto Rico and the United States.

A central weakness in U.S. policy toward Cuba has been the undervaluation of the utility of negotiation and the overvaluation of the utility of penalties. The tendency has been to adopt symbolic policies toward Cuba in response to domestic political pressures in the United States. The record after over three decades, however, is plain: negotiation accomplished U.S. goals whereas exhortation and confrontation did not.

This article argues that U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin is dominated by domestic political forces and by the history of our nation's involvement in the internal affairs of the nations in the region to such a degree as to make our relations with the region fundamentally different from our relations with the rest of Latin America. It opens with a brief history of the evolution of U.S. geopolitical schemes concerning Latin America to indicate that there are idealist and realist traditions that agree on U.S. exceptionalism and on the importance of the region for our nation's strategic interests. This brief history also indicates the significance of past episodes of intervention both for local politics in the region and for the nature of domestic political debate in the United States. The remainder of the article explains how domestic political forces are linked to foreign policy toward the region and then uses four case studies—Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Cuba—to explain how domestic political forces become involved in foreign policymaking and how they influence the contours of crises in the region and the U.S. response to crisis management.