The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Al Qaeda today is a resilient organization, as evidenced by the London attacks of 2005, its resurgence in Pakistan, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, and its influence on the war in Iraq. While al Qaeda is not strong enough to launch an attack inside the United States in the next five years, it will continue to train militants for successful attacks in Europe. Al Qaeda's leadership is likely to remain in place for years, and it is unlikely to lose its safe haven on the Afghan-Pakistan border in the near term, although it has suffered real reverses in Iraq. Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups will, in the long term, implode because of their unrestrained violence against fellow Muslims and lack of a real plan for governance, both of which make it difficult for them to transform into a genuine, political mass movement.

Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of terrorist violence, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of terror aimed at advancing its national security interests. Over the course of the past three decades, Pakistan's army has built a complex network of relationships with numerous jihadist terror groups, including the Taliban, and with terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Fear of India is the driving force behind the army's pursuit of these relationships. For the next American president, there is no issue or country more critical to get right, which means developing a policy that will move Pakistan away from being a hothouse of terror. Engaging Kashmir should be part of that new approach.

Since the invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda has used “franchises” to expand its global reach. Al Qaeda offered these franchises very little, except its name, reputation, and ideology. Because of al Qaeda's minimal investment, destroying the franchise groups will accomplish very little against the mother organization. Instead, the United States should use al Qaeda's franchises as a vehicle to attack al Qaeda's name, reputation, and ideas. Al Qaeda's franchises are more prone to strategic mistakes than their namesake; those errors should be used as the cornerstone of a narrative to highlight al Qaeda's ideological failings. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been particularly mistake-prone. Three mistakes in particular offer opportunities to undermine al Qaeda's ideology: attacks against Muslim civilians, the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq, and infighting with other Iraqi insurgent groups.

This article argues that the problems facing Iraq could have tremendous consequences for the broader “war on terror,” particularly if they return to or exceed levels seen at the height of the violence in 2006. Salafi militants, followers of an extreme interpretation of Islam who want to use violence to unite Muslims under religious rule, have been fighting in Iraq and may use the country as a base for operations and attacks elsewhere in the region. In addition, refugees from Iraq might spread terrorism, radicalize neighboring populations, and contribute to strife and instability throughout the region. While a U.S. troop withdrawal may inspire fewer young men to take up terrorism against the United States, it would also increase militants' operational freedom in Iraq itself, allowing terrorist groups to recruit, train, and plan with relative impunity. As a result, if the United States withdraws from Iraq without leaving behind a stable Iraqi government, it should still maintain a regional military presence and help bolster other regimes in the Middle East from the threat of terrorism from Iraq.

Counterterrorism capacity in Southeast Asia is improving, reducing the likelihood of a major attack on Western targets in the near term. However, jihadi ideology has taken root in Indonesia, and while the region's largest terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, appears to be more interested in rebuilding than mounting operations, its members still constitute an important recruitment pool for other groups. Most Indonesian jihadis appear to be more focused on local than foreign targets, but that focus can aid recruitment and facilitate alliances with other organizations. While the Iraq insurgency has not attracted Southeast Asian participation, the resurgence of the Taliban on the Afghan-Pakistan border could. The United States, under the next president, could help develop better information sharing between South and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia may not be the “second front” that many feared after the first Bali bombs, but the terrorism threat in the region has not gone away.

Attempts to profile terrorists have failed resoundingly, leaving behind a poor (and unfair) impression of the potential for a sound psychological contribution to understanding the terrorist. However, recent work in the area has delivered promising and exciting starting points for a conceptual development in understanding the psychological process across all levels of terrorist involvement. Involvement in terrorism is a complex psychosocial process that comprises at least three seemingly distinct phases: becoming involved, being involved—synonymous with engaging in unambiguous terrorist activity—and disengaging (which may or may not result in subsequent de-radicalization). A critical implication of these distinctions is the recognition that each of them may contain unique, or phase-specific, implications for counterterrorism. An argument is made for greater consideration of the disengagement phase with a clearer role for psychological research to inform and enhance practical counterterrorism operations.

The realities of a globalized society now allow international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda to dramatically expand their potential reach by courting sympathizers in dark corners around the world and teaching them how they can best serve al Qaeda's interests—without necessarily visiting an actual military training camp or even speaking directly with al Qaeda. In fact, despite their somewhat haphazard outward appearance, homegrown terrorist cells often possess a remarkable shared connection through reliance on particular al Qaeda training manuals, audio and video recordings, and even Internet chat forums. While these young men (and, increasingly, women) may have no formal contact with any terrorist organization, they can become virtual partners of al Qaeda by carefully studying its online knowledge base and executing terrorist attacks against its enemies. Recent law enforcement investigations have uncovered a surprisingly sophisticated network of budding terrorist “entrepreneurs” lurking in a host of major cities across Europe and North America.

Prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States and the international community had undertaken only limited measures to address terrorist finance. Seven years later, despite vast efforts and stronger counterterrorist finance regimes, major gaps in regulation and enforcement remain. Funds still reach terrorist groups through state sponsors, charities, and criminal activities. In Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and beyond, terrorist financing remains a huge problem. The next administration must do seven things to address terrorist finance: first, implement country-specific strategies to ensure global cooperation, particularly with state sponsors; second, undermine terrorist-affiliated charities by replacing the social services they provide; third, make U.S. law enforcement a truly global entity; fourth, regulate all domestic financial sectors; fifth, address smuggling of bulk currency and high-value commodities; sixth, reinvigorate the UN's support for counterterrorist finance regimes; and finally, improve U.S. domestic enforcement and communication with the American public and the world.

The intelligence community has evolved significantly since the failures of 9/11 and the inaccurate assessments on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Congressional action has resulted in multiple far-reaching reforms and tectonic organizational shifts. On the strategic level, however, counterterrorism intelligence policy has been muddled during the past eight years. The Bush administration, for example, called on the intelligence community to “bolster the growth of democracy.” The next president should cast aside political ideology and build on reform efforts to empower top-notch leaders. Strong new leaders in the intelligence community must energize the National Counterterrorism Center and provide the president with comprehensive and policy-relevant intelligence analysis. The United States cannot eliminate the global terrorist threat alone—the next president must boost cooperation with liaison security services. Finally, the intelligence community must bolster its operational capacity to find and detain terrorists around the world.

From Guantanamo Bay to Abu Ghraib, the history of the United States's handling of combatants in the Global War on Terrorism is filled with episodes that have diminished its reputation and influence in the world. Most military and intelligence professionals now agree that presenting a more positive vision of American values is critical to success over terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. Developing a coherent and effective human rights policy raises important questions: about the efficacy and legality of torture and extraordinary rendition, the use of military instead of civilian courts to prosecute suspected terrorists, and whether some prisoners can be held indefinitely without charge or trial. Considering both morality and strategy, the next president should issue an executive order that categorically forbids torture, end the use of secret detention, close the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, and seek to release or transfer to home countries detainees who cannot be prosecuted by the United States.

If the United States were subject to a terrorist nuclear attack, its president would face overwhelming political pressure to respond decisively. A well-prepared response could help both to prevent additional attacks and to bring the perpetrators to justice. An instinctive response could be cataclysmically ineffective, inflicting enormous collateral damage without achieving either deterrence or justice. An international security doctrine of Mutually Assured Support can make the response to such attacks more effective as well as less likely—by requiring preparations that reduce the threat. The doctrine requires all subscribing nations to mobilize fully in support of the attacked nation, in return for a promise of nonretaliation. It provides a vehicle for domestic and international leadership, allowing the president to engage the American people, from a position of strength, around an issue that has had little public discussion. The authors describe its rationale, implications, and implementation.

After nearly three decades of antagonistic rhetoric and diplomatic estrangement between the United States and Iran, the next president has the opportunity to set a new course for relations between the two countries. When the next president takes up residence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Iranian officials will be listening. The president must implement a policy of engagement that encourages moderates in Iran without implying tolerance for Tehran's historic support of terrorist activities. This strategy will require patience and sensitivity to the complex political realities inside Iran. To successfully chart a new course for U.S.-Iranian relations, the next president must (1) tone down rhetoric; (2) establish a direct dialogue with Tehran, including comprehensive, private discussions and deployment of a special envoy; (3) encourage greater assimilation of Hezbollah into Lebanon's political system; and (4) offer carrots in addition to sticks, including consideration of legitimate Iranian concerns on regional security issues.

The U.S. government needs a new, two-pronged approach to counter radicalization in many parts of the world, particularly when confronting the “enabling environment.” Those inhabiting this environment include potential sympathizers in the Arab and Muslim world who may not themselves use violence but either endorse the arguments and platforms of the terrorists or are intimidated into silence. This wider community needs to be won over so that they oppose terrorism in their neighborhoods, cities, and states and, critically, in the virtual world, where many of the battles are taking place. Appealing to the enabling environment may be the only way in the long term to isolate terrorists and end terrorism. This two-part approach includes (1) a prioritized development strategy (with an emphasis on good governance, anticorruption, and social service provision) and (2) innovative tools and new partners to implement and disseminate it.

While the “Global War on Terror” has succeeded in constricting al Qaeda's ability to operate, it has not eliminated the threat. Al Qaeda is stronger and more resilient than at any time since 2001 due to its ability to adapt, innovate, and reconfigure its resources in response to a hostile counterterrorism environment. This article presents a new framework for considering the war against al Qaeda. Policy makers must recognize that the current conflict is not a single conflict, but rather three conflicts: a war of action, a war of networks, and a war of ideas. Viewing al Qaeda in this manner will facilitate the integration of counterterrorism policy and strategy from the tactical to the strategic level. Furthermore, the failure to understand why al Qaeda has survived and prospered precludes the development and deployment of a cogent counterterrorism strategy. Finally, the authors present a set of policy recommendations structured around this framework.

This article addresses the critical role that public diplomacy plays in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the Muslim world. The authors argue that both public diplomacy and policies, including those on civil liberties, are vital to U.S. success in the war on terrorism and that the next U.S. president must designate this effort as a matter of highest national security importance. Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terrorism is essentially a war on Islam; this view impedes the success of an effective foreign policy strategy. Previous efforts of public diplomacy have lacked funding, energy, focus, and an integrated strategy. The authors define six principles to improve America's security through winning the war of ideas, including addressing civil liberties concerns, and engaging diverse constituencies in the Muslim world. Finally, the authors describe ten public diplomacy initiatives to improve U.S.–Muslim world relations.

The U.S. strategy for combating international Islamist terrorists must be based on an understanding of the terrorists' behavior and the process of radicalization to violence. This process includes four dimensions: a sense of moral outrage, interpreted in a specific way, which resonates with one's personal experiences, and is channeled through group dynamics, both face-to-face and online. The threat has evolved over the past decade. The process of radicalization continues in a hostile physical environment, but it is enabled by the Internet, resulting in a disconnected, decentralized social structure. The threat of this “leaderless jihad” is self-limiting because of its confining structure and the lack of appeal of its utopian ideal. It will probably fade away for internal reasons, if not sustained by overly aggressive tactics construed as a “war on Islam.” The appropriate strategy against this threat is to contain and neutralize the radicalization process along its four dimensions.

Since September 11, 2001, al Qaeda has attempted to morph into a popular movement—what some have called “al Qaeda 2.0.” If the United States is fighting against a global campaign of terrorism and classic insurgencies (or an attempted global jihadist insurgency), then it should employ a global counterinsurgency strategy to combat al Qaeda 2.0. This article recommends such a strategy, including the following suggestions: develop the military, intelligence, and language capabilities needed to win the conflict; improve counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and eliminate safe havens in Pakistan; expand counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq; manage “blowback” and monitor ungoverned regions; develop an Internet-based strategy to attack the jihadis; start fighting the “war of ideas” like we mean it; adopt a more proactive foreign policy; and better secure the U.S. homeland.