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Conventional approaches to public administration are subtly being undermined by the steady expansion of "government by proxy": the provision of government goods and services through proxies such as contractors, grantees, and recipients of government tax breaks and guaranteed loans. Privatization advocates claim that such government by proxy improves the effectiveness and responsiveness of public programs, but a closer look reveals that the issue is far more complicated. The expansion of government by proxy is producing important changes in the government's work force and is multiplying administrative pathologies. New approaches to the theory and practice of public administration offer promise in better managing these emerging policy strategies.
This article deals with the problems of regulating executive branch advertising and publicity programs. Over the years, these programs have been the object of several laws intended to restrict their growth. However, the volume of these activities, along with specific examples of agency circumvention of limitations, shows that the general legal restrictions have not been effective. The Reagan Administration has developed a model control system to deal with executive branch publicity activities. It, too, is found wanting by the authors. They suggest that a number of persistent unresolved problems will have to be addressed in developing laws and regulations in this area.
This paper examines the management improvement efforts of recent Presidents, focusing on the initiatives of the Reagan administration under the banner of REFORM 88. It analyzes the principal thrusts of REFORM 88 and contrasts the form and substance of the project with similar undertakings during previous administrations. The author details some of the systemic factors that have traditionally combined to limit the effectiveness of such efforts to improve management in the federal bureaucracy, and describes how REFORM 88 deals with these factors. Particular attention is directed to the roles played by the President, the White House Staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and agency management officials. An attempt is also made to assess the impacts of REFORM 88 in terms of reduced costs and improved effectiveness. The paper concludes that while REFORM 88 some what resembles previous management improvement initiatives, it has several distinctive characteristics that would appear to enhance its chances of success, namely, a healthy reliance on agency initiative and existing management systems.
In 1960, Samuel Huntington noted that governmental decision-making was quite similar in the executive and legislative branches. Huntington went so far as to suggest that the decision process is legislative rather than executive in character. Thus, the governmental executive lives in an environment which is as much "legislative" as "executive." However, by training and professional orientation that official perceives that legislative process as confusing, irrational and contradictory. The result is threefold. First, the role of the legislature in executive activities is downplayed. Second, the political powers of the executive agencies are marshalled to thwart what is regarded as unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion. Third, and most important, the role of agency politics is misunderstood because the administrator's concept of politics is shaped by the caricatures and misleading views developed during the period when the politics-administration dichotomy was the dominant view.
Huntington's comments deserve more consideration. This paper suggests a framework by which to yield lessons for practice based upon Huntington's perspective. The legislative process should not be examined because it is different, but precisely because aspects are so similar. Further, in examining the legislative decision process and administration, those who have sought change from the rigid adherence to "bureaucratic norms" should find support for alternative styles. Politics, as played out in the legislative organization, incorporates many of the elements required for successful management. Further, factors not suggested there, such as an altered understanding of communication and the inclusion of multiple perspectives, promote management. Concepts such as consensus, value judgment and expertise carry a different connotation in the legislative arena. By accepting those connotations the executive can begin to recognize the legislative element in his/her decision-making.
The prevailing approaches to retrenchment are across-the-board-cuts, voluntary attrition, and expenditure deferment. Frequently these are adopted because they are expedient, but they do not represent a sensitive response to citizen priorities. The paper presents a procedure for allocating resources during periods of retrenchment, so they reflect citizens' wants and needs. The procedure consists of four sequential stages: (1) identifying those services that should be considered as possible candidates for retrenchment; (2) evaluating each of these services to determine if retrenchment is appropriate; (3) retrenchment implementation; and (4) facilitating the implementation decision.
Industrial revenue bonds have been criticized either because too much IRB money funded retail or commercial projects rather than industrial or manufacturing projects or because large profitable corporations were the major beneficiaries of the bonds. These criticisms, however, were often supported by random citations of questionable cases rather than a thorough investigation of bond usage.
This paper investigates IRB usage in Kansas between 1962 and 1983. It particularly focuses on bond usage in the state's largest cities where bonds are categorized by purpose and by recipient to determine the pattern of economic development and the major beneficiaries. This study found that many of the criticisms of industrial revenue bonds were applicable to the Kansas pattern of usage.