Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

In analyzing Russian organized crime, the authors describe and classify the four major forms of organized crime: 1) political-social, 2) mercenary, 3) in-group, and 4) syndicated. Though the first three classifications of the aforementioned types of organized crime existed throughout Soviet history, it was the syndicated form that began to emerge in the late 1950's, expanding during the corrupt Breznev years (1964–82), exploding during perestroika, and reaching pandemic levels after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The abrupt transformation of the Russian society from a centralized command economy to one driven by the forces of market capitalism created the socio-pathological conditions for the malignant spread of mercenary and especially syndicated organized crime. New criminals syndicates were created by an alliance of criminal gangs/groups and former members of the Soviet Union's communist nomenklatura (bureaucracy) and the consequence was the criminalization of much of the Russian economy. The social structure of these syndicates is based on a loose association of patron-client relationships rather than a centralized hierarchical system; their function is to provide illicit goods/services desired by the people. The authors conclude their study by emphasizing that what has taken place in Russia is not peculiar to the Russian people, but exemplifies what can happen to societies that experience rapid and intense social change.

This paper examines the criminalization of the privatization process now occurring in the former Soviet Union. The different means by which the economy has been criminalized and its impact on the citizenry are examined. This paper argues that former Communist Party elite and organized criminal groups have purchased the majority of the state's assets. The absence of careful planning and proper legal protections in implementing the massive privatization program are given as important explanations for the failure of this process. Though special attention is given to Russia, this analysis applies to the other states of the former Soviet Union as well.

The function and structure of Sicilian institutions provide an historical lesson in how and why the Mafia flourished to the extent that attempts to imprison its leadership have threatened the stability of the very government that is tolling its death knell. Extrapolating from that experience, the work of Follain, Jousten, Varese and others provide the authors with a theoretical framework for understanding the dependency between the liberal democratic system being introduced in Russia today and the current mafia activity in that country. Crime, be it “organized” or not, is not new to Russia. Until ther breakup of the Republics, Western researchers knew little of its nature or its scope. Should the violence associated with Russian crime continue it may overwhelm the entire society or we may see an alliance of wealthy elites and multi-layered criminal conspiracies justaposed but miles apart from the non-criminal, “ordinary” citizens. The authors proffer from their experience in and with Russia several predictions for the future of this new mafia, indeed, for the future of Russian society.

Russian law enforcement agencies, security organs, and intelligence services, far from being reliable instruments in the fight against organized crime and corruption, are institutionally part of the problem, due not only to their co-optation and penetration by criminal elements, but to their own absence of a legal bureaucratic culture and their use of crime as an instrument of state policy.