
Editorial
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Leading police associations in the United States and the United Kingdom have advocated that law enforcement adopt an intelligence-led policing model (ILP). Much like the situation with community policing, there does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of ILP nor of the practical implications for police agencies' mission, structure, and processes. This article presents a model of ILP that builds on community policing, problem solving, and continuous improvement business models that have been adopted by police departments. Examples of these practices are reviewed as a method of illustrating the promise of an ILP approach. A broad conceptualization of ILP is presented under the belief that ILP will be most likely integrated into law enforcement and will have the greatest impact if it is adopted from an “all crimes” perspective. The article concludes with illustrations of the utility of ILP for addressing threats of domestic and international terrorism.
This study examines the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on organizational development of American state and local law enforcement agencies. Content analyses of police discourse in two practitioner magazines spanning from 1999 to 2004 are used to determine specific organizational changes that have been triggered by 9/11. Findings from our analyses indicate that changes have occurred and continue to develop mainly in organizational structures and processes. Changes in internal structures, such as the creation of a counterterrorism unit, tend to occur only in larger metropolitan and state police agencies. Changes in organizational processes or operations tend to be far more universal and typically involve an increased collaboration among police departments, specifically greater openness toward information sharing. Implications for future research are discussed.
A major terrorism event has several important consequences for officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities. Such events are likely to bring increased scrutiny by both public policy officials and the media. The article uses data from the American Terrorism Study to compare the period before and after two of the most dramatic terrorist events on U.S. soil: the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks. The results suggest that whether intentional or not, major terrorism events result in the government's pursuing cases that are generally less serious and less complicated, and those cases are treated much more like “traditional” crimes by the prosecution. Following the aftermath of a major event, terrorist defendants are more likely to behave like traditional offenders and are less likely to be convicted as a result of a trial than are terrorists who are indicted before major events.
In the post—9/11 period, the United States government employed alternate methods to deal with those accused of pursuing terrorism or aiding the nation's enemies. In an effort to thwart terror attacks, officials employed both civilian and military authority to investigate, apprehend, detain, and prosecute terror suspects. At first the Bush administration was granted considerable deference by the public and other branches of government on a wide variety of measures, including detainments. Eventually, both the courts and Congress reasserted themselves to limit the broad authority that the administration initially wielded over suspected terrorists. In particular, the ability of the military to detain American citizens in most circumstances was all but eliminated, and its near complete authority over noncitizens was significantly restricted as well.
