Comparative Political Studies

This study examines the determinants of public expenditures in advanced market economies by simultaneously assessing the impact of domestic political institutions and globalization. A distinction is made between collective veto points and competitive veto points, demonstrating that not all veto points have restrictive effects. It is shown that public expenditures are significantly and positively affected by collective veto points, whereas the oppositeis true for competitive veto points thereby indicating that not all veto points are created equal. In addition to veto points, the effects of globalization are also assessed revealing that globalization is exerting little reform pressures on the welfare state with strong evidence indicating that more globalization buoys public expenditures. Current disbursements and social transfers are both positively influenced by globalization. These findings suggest that domestic political institutions continue to shape policy trajectories in this purported global age.

Existing work on the politics of stabilization has failed to find compelling evidence of a regime-type effect. This article reformulates and reevaluates the regime-type hypothesis. It is argued that regime type does not have an independent impact on the timing of stabilization. Instead, regime type influences the extent to which societal opposition and distributive conflict will delay stabilization. Societal opposition and distributive conflict are likely to delay stabilization in democratic regimes, because governments must worry about maintaining power. Such societal dynamics are less likely to delay stabilization in authoritarian regimes. Using a sample of 92 high-inflation episodes, precisely these regime-specific dynamics surrounding the politics of stabilization were found. Governments in democratic regimes want to stabilize rapidly but often cannot overcome societal opposition and distributive conflict to do so. Authoritarian regimes are substantially less constrained by societal opposition and distributive conflict but have less incentive to stabilize rapidly.

Western models of popular support for economic integration usually stress costs and benefits. This article suggests that one cannot ignore the predominance of socialist-economic values in East-Central Europe. Consequently, it is argued and supported that (a) individual-level support for foreign ownership is best explained by ideological commitments to market ideals; (b) publics in more economically liberal countries more strongly support the idea of foreign ownership; and (c) citizens who reside in democratic countries, which experience greater controversy over foreign ownership, are less likely to accept the idea of foreign ownership just as they have a more negative image of the European Union. Theoretically, the study documents the limited applicability to Eastern Europe of Western-based models. Practically, it helps explain opposition to foreign ownership and, more generally, increasing controversy over the EU in first-wave accession states.

This article looks at the effect of democratic institutions on the size of government. With the help of the ordinary least squares regression analysis of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1974 to 1995, the study provides considerable evidence that the variance in the type of democracy, measured by the Lijphart index of majoritarian/consensus political institutions, has a systematic effect on the variance in the size of government, measured both by total government outlays as well as total government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product. The article further argues that such institutional effects on the size of government are strengthened by partisan politics. More specifically, the analysis demonstrates the presence of the multiplicative interaction effect of the mutually reinforcing nature between the institutional structure and partisan composition of government in their association with the size of government.