European Journal of Industrial Relations

This article starts with a brief review of the European Employment Strategy (EES) and a general evaluation of its scope and limitations, then provides an assessment of the five-year review conducted by the European Commission. It examines the new form that has been given to the EES for the 2003 exercise, on the basis of the conclusions drawn from the five-year review. It argues that this change involves more than mere presentation, but fails to address the inherent limitations of the EES as currently constituted. Lastly, the article compares the employment guidelines with the original proposals made by the Commission, and draws conclusions regarding the balance of interests and forces in the policy-making process.

Equal opportunities has constituted one of the four pillars of the European Employment Strategy (EES) as approved at the Luxembourg summit in 1997. However, there are tensions between the EES and the imperatives of budgetary restraint (which have caused job losses in public services, where women are disproportionately employed) and between quantitative targets of increasing women’s labour-force participation and qualitative targets of overcoming gender segregation. This article explores these tensions, drawing evidence from comparative European research and the particular experience of Sweden.

The extension of European Works Councils to central and eastern Europe is a rare attempt to create transnational employee representation covering both low- and high-wage areas. Research carried out in Poland in 2001 provides a quantitative estimate of such enlargement and a qualitative assessment of its effects. The evidence undermines fears of ‘social dumping’ and reveals indirect effects definable as ‘short circuits’.

This article examines social dialogue in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the three Baltic states. It argues that social dialogue in these countries does not measure up to the minimum criteria for effectiveness and has failed to counteract serious reductions in real wages and employment opportunities. It presents ideas on how to improve the social dialogue and suggests how these improvements might be initiated. However, many of the proposals face difficulties because of the weak organizational capacities of the state and especially of the social partners. It is therefore unlikely that these countries will be capable of substantially improving the social dialogue using their own resources; this would require more forceful intervention by the European Union.

This article uses the concept of ‘designing institutions’ and a heuristic model of strategic options to address two questions. First, what institutional changes support a social Europe? This question is examined on the basis of recent developments in the European Union regarding macro-economic dialogue and the unions’ own policies of European coordination. Second, what is the influence of these changes on national trade unions? The conclusion is that institutional changes are limited, and strong national unions remain the central agents of transnational coordination. The European Trade Union Confederation and the European Industry Federations administer the new coordination procedures, but their status is not enhanced structurally.

This article deals with the rules designed to enforce European Union labour law in the workplace. Directives do not normally provide specific rules on procedures and sanctions according to which their substantive provisions are to be enforced. Instead, domestic rules are to be applied. The European Court of Justice, however, has developed some requirements that limit the autonomy of the Member States in this area. The aim of this article is to evaluate the principle of effective enforcement in the field of labour law, in the light of actual enforcement procedures in the Member States.