European Journal of Personality

In this paper, arguments are presented for considering the subject as co‐investigator in personality research. A review of current research methods suggests that personality psychology is well on its way to recognizing the individual as an expert on his or her own self and situation. This means that the subject should also be allowed to take a much more active role in psychological research. It is argued that the ideal methodology for accomplishing this integration of the individual into psychological research is to establish a dialogue between psychologist and subject, allowing each to contribute to the scientific process from his or her own perspective and on the basis of his or her own expertise. The present approach calls for greater emphasis on the organization and coherence of personality as a system, greater openness and sensitivity to the particular world of the individual, and an even more dynamic conception of individuality than is currently found in our field. An important implication of the open system approach advocated in this article, the reduced role of prediction in personality research, is discussed and, finally, a preliminary list of expected gains and losses is presented.

Recent developments in self‐research show the self to be increasingly conceived as an organized and highly dynamic phenomenon. In combination with the arguments presented in the preceding article, these developments are a good reason for adopting a method in which the psychologist and the subject work together in the study of the self: The self‐confrontation method and the theory on which it is based—valuation theory—are presented as an example of such an approach. This method construes the self as an organized process of valuations, a valuation being any unit of meaning that the person finds of importance in thinking about his or her life. Formulated in the language of the person him‐ or herself; these valuations and how they develop over time are considered in a dialogue between the psychologist and the subject. For the purposes of demonstration, two phenomena that are not easily observedare discussed here: (a) the existence of an imaginal figure not visibly present but functioning as a signifcant other in the person's daily life, and (b) the presence of a character in a recurring dream, which later gets included as an integral part of the self: Finally, the present approach is briefly discussed as representing a constructivist view of personality psychology.

This article presents an invited commentary on the two previous articles by Hermans and Bonarius (1991) and by Hermans (1991). Primary focus is placed on certain enduring confusions regarding the historic ‘nomothetic vs. idiographic’ controversy in personality psychology, the traces of those confusions in the writings of Hermans and Bonarius, and the importance of eliminating those confusions if the full potential of valuation theory and the self‐confrontation method is to be realized, not only as a means of gaining idiographic knowledge and clinically helpful insights, but also as a means of gaining genuinely nomothetic knowledge in the domain of personality.

In reply to Lamiell's (1991) criticism, we argue that his notion of nomothesis reflects a Newtonian, mechanistic notion of lawfulness and that his otherwise justified attack on the individual differences paradigm is an overreaction to an era that is dominated by this paradigm.

This study assesses the impact of non‐specific epistemic needs—the need for structure and the fear of invalidity—on expectancy of control and performance following unsolvable problems. Subjects answered a questionnaire tapping their non‐specific epistemic needs and were exposed to either no feedback or failure in unsolvable problems. Then their expectancies of control and performance were assessed. The results showed that a high need for structure was associated with a transfer of the expectancy of uncontrollability and worse performance following failure. The results are discussed in terms of Kruglanski's lay epistemic theory.