European Union Politics

Much previous research on popular support for European integration assumes that support is a function of economic calculations. I propose a different model, in which support is the consequence of the interplay between supranational and national politics: the higher citizens' opinion of the functioning of supranational institutions and the lower that of national institutions, the greater their support for integration. This is so because the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe. In order to illustrate this hypothesis, I show that levels of national support for integration are higher in those countries that suffer greater corruption and have less-developed welfare states. Through an ordered logit analysis of one Eurobarometer survey, I test this political model at the individual level. Finally, I draw some conclusions from the empirical analysis for current discussions on the possibility of a European democracy.

Using public approval for the President of the European Commission as an example, we investigate whether there are economic effects on public support for political authority: (1) when democratic accountability is absent; and (2) when public information about authorities is low. We find that economic effects as traditionally defined are weak, but that people make utilitarian assessments even when authorities cannot be held directly accountable. Moreover, the analyses suggest that voters with low levels of information, interest or awareness behave in ways that cannot be empirically distinguished from the behavior of well-informed voters. The findings imply that citizens employ utilitarian considerations when assessing political authorities even when they cannot hold them accountable or when they have little information about them.

This article addresses the question of whether European integration leads to convergence in the domestic policies of the member states of the European Union. Some recent studies claim that as a result of European integration the national policies of the member states are becoming more alike. The existence of various exemptions and `flexibility' arrangements in the revisions of the Treaty of Rome as well as problems with implementation seem to contradict this view. In this article we offer a model based on insights from game theory and analytical politics, which aims to explain the conditions under which convergence may occur and the limitations of this process at the legislative and implementation stages of European policy making.

Which combinations of values and perceptions constitute the arguments in the debate on European integration? Using survey data from Norway's 1994 EU referendum, this article explores Norwegian voters' support for these arguments. Thus, the article highlights the perceptions and arguments of the EU debate, rather than support for European integration. Furthermore, the article explores how these arguments are structured in a multi-party context: Did voter arguments reflect the multi-party competition or the frontlines of the referendum? With the elite discourse as a starting point, I present hypotheses on polarization of arguments between pro- and anti-EU voters, standardization across party lines and the impact of cross-pressure. The hypotheses are generally supported by survey data, with the exception of arguments about national culture. Finally, I argue that research on conflicting perceptions of the EU will yield useful insights and bring political factors into the study of opinion regarding the EU. Divergent perceptions of the EU's policies and political order may be a fruitful subject for cross-national studies.