European Union Politics

Scholars assume that transnational terrorism has culminated in policy securitization with expansive restrictions on migration. I evaluate the impact of transnational terrorism on asylum recognition among European Union and Schengen member-states from 1980 until 2007. I unpack the impact of terrorism according to the location of incidents. The article illustrates that policy tightening is more pronounced when recipient states experience terrorism on their own soil or against their citizens. In contrast, measuring transnational terrorism as attacks worldwide mutes the impact of security concerns. The findings show that policy stringency is not directed against particular sources of terrorism and demonstrates that the humanitarian principles underpinning asylum recognition have not been eroded by terrorism. The article thus represents an important step in differentiating between channels of impact whereby transnational terror shapes policy outcomes.

According to the logic of standard veto bargaining models with complete information, bargaining in the European Union should never reach the second reading of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). Even so, non-agreement at the first reading occurs frequently in European Union decision making. How can this be explained? Drawing upon game theory on bargaining with incomplete information, two specific predictions with regard to the occurrence of first-reading non-agreements can be generated. First-reading agreements are less likely to occur (1) the greater the distance between the ideal point of the Council and the ideal point of the European Parliament and (2) the greater the salience attached to the proposal. This article combines positional and proposal-specific data and finds robust support for both hypotheses in two different empirical tests.

The European Parliament (EP) has one of the highest proportions of women in its ranks, with over a third in 2009. Although previous research has pointed to the use of proportional representation (PR) in European elections as ‘friendlier’ to women, few have looked at differences in the types of PR rules in use in each country. In this article, we argue that the conventional wisdom according to which institutional design—the choice of electoral rules—should shape the composition of the EP does not hold, and suggest that the well-documented empirical connection between electoral rules and descriptive representation might in fact be an endogenous rather than a causal relationship.

A superordinate identity reduces bias and facilitates intergroup cooperation. This suggests that getting European Union (EU) citizens to identify with Europe will decrease outgroup hostility. Is European identity thus a superordinate identity? Using Eurobarometer data, I determine which level of identification is the most inclusive for individuals' immigration attitudes. Those who feel European hold more favorable views toward immigrants—an effect that is amplified under conditions of cross-cutting cleavages and where country length of European Union membership is greatest. In contrast, strong national identity is associated with more negative immigration attitudes; regional identity has no effect. A subsequent test confirms that the benefits of identifying with Europe extend most strongly to immigrants of European Union origin, although positive effects are observed toward non-European Union migrants as well.

What triggers the information exchange among the regional offices in Brussels? To answer this question, we develop a framework based on network theory and present the first large-N quantitative study on European Union-level inter-regional networks. Our results show that information exchanges take place predominantly among regions from the same member state. Furthermore, the likelihood of regular information exchanges between two regional offices depends on the resources invested in regional representation, the joint involvement in inter-regional associations, and geographical proximity. In contrast to our expectations, our findings refute the hypotheses that more regional autonomy and more experience in Brussels increase the propensity toward cross-border inter-regional networking, a practice that might potentially contribute to the fragmentation of member state representation.

Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration.

What effect do online public consultations have on legislative duration in the European Union? While scholars are divided on whether consultations speed things up or slow things down, they agree that consultations affect how decision-makers think about legislative proposals. I argue that this is only part of the story: the impact of consultations on legislation duration is also a function of the administrative capacity of decision-makers and their staff to process consultation submissions. I test this argument using a unique data set of over 750 legislative proposals in the period 2009–2013. I find that consultations tend to have a negative impact on the time it takes to pass legislation. However, this negative effect is less pronounced when decision-makers have sufficient administrative capacity to process submissions.