European View

The current economic crisis has wrought havoc on Europe. However, the crisis has also given the leaders of Europe an opportunity to re-evaluate European society and the process of European integration. The time is at hand for Europe to create a new strategic outlook for the future. The Europe 2020 strategy could provide the impetus to create a more prosperous Europe that helps citizens and makes them more dynamic in the new world order.

The European Union risks entering a long period of relative economic decline unless it meets the challenges of global competition, climate change and severe pressure on public finances. With a reinforced commitment to the market economy, Europe will make progress. The key lies in political will.

With the relative decline of the European economy, the governments of Europe have used deficit spending to shield themselves from structural economic change. This deficit spending has proven unsustainable and European governments need to seriously re-evaluate public expenditure. There is a need to re-evaluate how public services such as health care and education are funded, and to better manage the Eurozone so as to avoid a second debt crisis. European states need to re-examine how public money is spent, and the current economic crisis could be the catalyst for the necessary structural changes.

The current economic crisis has revealed the shortcomings of the current global financial system, and it is clear that there must be a fundamental shift in the approaches to global financial governance. The seeds for a more comprehensive global system have been sown, as evidenced by the increasing amount of international dialogue, not only amongst the global economic giants but also amongst emerging economies. However, there is a need to develop mechanisms for high-quality regulation rather than falling into the trap of reacting to the current crisis.

In March 2010, the Europe 2020 strategy was released as the follow-up to the very ambitious Lisbon Strategy. Like its predecessor, the strategy aims to increase Europe's competitiveness in the world economy. Also like its predecessor, Europe 2020 is likely to be ineffectual. The strategy focuses too much on areas that are outside the EU's legal competence, it lacks recourse for non-compliance and it contains goals that have very little to do with increasing competitiveness. The probable failure of Europe 2020 could have been avoided had the European Commission focused on policy areas over which the EU has competence, and had been given the tools to accomplish the goals that were outside its competence.

During the lead up to and assessment of the Copenhagen Climate Conference in November 2009, the effects of the celebrated Kyoto Protocol were often overlooked. Although the aims of the Kyoto Protocol can be relegated to the dustbin of history, the targets set out in the agreement allowed Europe to put itself in a dominant position. Not only did the Kyoto Protocol force Europe to invest heavily in green technologies, but in addition it led to the creation of a European energy policy with the aim of reducing Europe's dependence on fossil fuels which can be seen, from a strategic point of view, as an undesirable dependence on sources abroad.

Europe's economic growth has never been jeopardised by lack of energy security; however, that situation may have come to an abrupt end. Falling energy production, increasingly strict environmental standards and an ageing energy infrastructure are all threats to Europe's energy security. The EU has taken steps to ensure its energy security; however, the ‘Europeanisation’ of energy policy remains weak. Coordination among EU Member States is required not only to create an internal energy market, but also for the external dimension of the EU's energy policy. Liberalisation of energy markets and mediation of the Ukraine–Russia gas crisis have shown that such coordination is indeed possible.

Despite the ascendance of other regions in the world, the transatlantic relationship remains paramount. The cultural, historic and economic links between the US and Europe are strong and important. Notwithstanding the strength of these bonds, Europe has lost currency for US foreign policy as it has moved its focus to Asia. This can be attributed to the lack of coordination on the part of the Europeans and preoccupation with the EU's institutional debate. Now that the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified, the institutional debate is in the past and the EU must redouble its efforts to strengthen the transatlantic partnership. Going forward, the only way that the transatlantic partnership can be strengthened and for prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic to be assured is the removal of all trade barriers and the introduction of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour across the Atlantic.

The increasing number of agreements between the EU and African states reveals a trend toward a ‘One Europe, One Africa’ policy. The EU has gained from the Lisbon Treaty new competencies for independent external action, and coordination on Africa policy has increased in the Council, mainly due to convergence between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, EU policy towards Africa still lacks coherence and direction and many EU Member States still privilege bilateral links with African countries. There is still an opportunity for the EU to increase its ‘actorness’ in Africa. First, the EU should take advantage of the economic crisis to create new institutional links between the EU and Africa. Second, the EU should focus on its visibility and act to strengthen private and civil society ties. Despite weaknesses, there are clear indications that the coherence of the EU's Africa policy is improving.

There is a robust consensus among EU Member States about the need to identify the complex links between the threats and challenges to the EU's security. The new institutional framework for the EU's external action will allow it to make further progress in developing a comprehensive security policy, integrating both internal and external dimensions of security and mobilising the policies and instruments required to effectively respond to security threats. New initiatives could pave the way for a more cooperative management of ‘global home affairs’.

In Europe itself, the EU has been a success. But its new challenges are mostly global: the rise of Asia, climate change, the end of the industrial age, the information revolution and an ageing population. To address these effectively, the EU should draw strength from its values of human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and care for people and the environment. In the years to come, it will need to rely increasingly upon three key resources: the people, the sun as an energy source, and the Union itself. The EU has been perfected through generations. Its strength lies in its openness to enlargement and its readiness to deepen its structures. Rather than going through another institutional change, it should learn to use the tools it has to deepen the common market and extend it to vital new areas of competition.

Europe has a special responsibility towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority, not only because the EU is the largest aid donor in the region, but also because of Europe's historical legacy. Europe can provide a roadmap on how a region is able to pull itself from centuries of violent conflict to peace and stability through economic cooperation. Granted, European integration cannot be transplanted to the Middle East; however, the plan set in motion by Robert Schuman 60 years ago can provide a starting point for regional cooperation in the Middle East.

In the current economic and social crisis affecting Europe, dialogue is of great importance. The reaction of the EU to the present situation is evident from various discussions and documents. Following the ambitious Lisbon Strategy, a document created during a period of economic growth for most of the Member States, we now have before us the Europe 2020 Strategy. In this article, the author explores the contents of this strategy in light of the implementation of its goals of multilevel governance.

The gains made by the European People's Party (EPP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections have given the party a new opportunity to advance its message. In the face of the weaknesses of current social models made apparent by the recent economic crisis, globalisation and changes in European society, Christian democracy could provide an alternative that balances the demands of a globalising world order and the desire to preserve the European social model. Further policy research is needed; however, recent socio-economic challenges and the political success of the EPP have shown that Christian democracy has a bright future.

According to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, world peace is based on the pillars of security, development and human rights. The defence of human rights is a particular foreign policy strength of both the EU and Germany. Despite advances, human rights are currently under threat from two angles. The first is a tendency to demand so much in the realm of human rights that, in the end, very little is achieved. The second is a growing movement that prioritises the rights of the collective over individual rights. However, it is individual human rights that are paramount and it is possible to extend individual rights without trampling cultural diversity. Given Europe's history of freeing itself from the shackles of dictatorship, its role in the defence of human rights is invaluable.

This article examines the extent to which the European Union can be considered to suffer from a crisis of legitimacy, a common refrain in recent years. It argues that critics inappropriately compare the EU with the standard democratic governance arrangements of a Member State, when the EU is a sui generis entity; a peculiar mix of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Nonetheless, the article assesses the EU against the criteria for a democratic legitimacy and finds that there are no obvious fundamental failings. That said, the EU is not perfect, and the article argues that it must address its communication deficit and begin a sustained period of real dialogue on its future direction and end point, territorially and constitutionally.