International Political Science Review

The area bombing of Germany in 1942-43 brings into relief several important issues that arise in the study of political psychology. The area bombing issue illustrates the importance of personality: when powerful institutional forces are in conflict; when the situation is highly ambiguous; and when the actor has special access to the ultimate decision-makers and can limit access by others.

The policy advocated by Churchill's scientific adviser, Professor Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), was particularly congenial to Cherwell's temperament. The consequences of the adoption of this policy are still not easy to assess, though post-war appraisals tend to question its military effectiveness.

The lack of any agreed conclusion about its worth underlines the inherent ambiguity of the situation confronting British policy-makers in 1942, and the opportunity this provided for the impact of personality.

Models of the decision-making process assuming the rationality of the major actors are not apt to explain actual decision making between states when major values are at stake. Situational, domestic political and bureaucratic constraints, as suggested by this case study of the US response to Iran's taking of American hostages, constrain choices. Beyond these factors, the chief executive's own personality is apt to have an impact on policy, especially when he has considerable authority to act independently in the foreign policy arena. His responses may to some extent show good reality testing, as evident in Jimmy Carter's rejections of military sanctions and his initial search for a diplomatic resolution of the hostage issue. But threats to major values can bring out more ego-defensive traits, as evident in Carter's inflation of the hostage issue, his avoidance of questions about the viability of the rescue operation and his difficulties in confronting incompatible policy goals. The result in this instance was a failure to fully consider policy options, otherwise feasible, that might have entailed fewer risks for the American national interest.

Lasswell's efforts in the 1930s to use the findings of psychoanalytic case studies for understanding personality patterns in political leadership have been followed only by slow progress. Some obstacles to such application are identified. Case material from the psychoanalytic treatment of a small number of patients whose fathers were absent in wartime is used to exemplify certain promising strategies for overcoming such obstacles. The discussion suggests the need for the psychopolitical investigator to examine closely the details of various intrapsychic responses to early family experience. For this, the study of clinical literature is the best resource.

This essay presents a framework for analyzing the effect of presidential personality on policy making, while avoiding the fallacy of simply "reducing" the explanation of presidential performance to the president's individual characteristics. Using an approach that simul taneously takes account of the larger political environment, and the president's constellation of immediate associates (the "institutionalized presidency"), as well as the president's individual characteristics, we present data comparing presidential decision-making with respect to Vietnam in 1954 and 1965. All three levels of evidence must be examined to establish why the United States did not inject military force in 1954 at the time of the fall of Dienbienphu and did in 1965, in the face of the incipient collapse of South Vietnam.