International Political Science Review

Bio-political philosophy can today confront the perennial questions of philosophy in the light of a wide range of evidence from the natural sciences. Observation seems to verify that humans are normative animals; although this characteristic of our nature is often traced to ratio nality, a reconsideration of Hume's critique in the light of biology suggests that the ultimate origin of our "normativeness" is far more primordial and less calculated. This suggests that the content of human value systems might be more constant and consistent than they at first appear. I bluntly contend that the Ten Commandments are an example of a moral regimen, not of how human believers can win salvation and eternal life, but rather of how human beings have thus far successfully guaranteed their earthly existence. In short, what we call our human normative systems spring from that same selective biology that sees us as the evolved creatures we are today. They are at one and the same time a cause and an effect of our human condition.

Traditional ethics has established itself as an independent disci pline by postulating a "good" independent of all particular desires. It has been assumed that this "good" was something beyond nature, and that man had the capacity to reach out for it by transcending his natural incli nations. In this article, the traditional picture of morality is confronted with modern evolutionary biology. It is shown that goal-directedness, choice, and social behavior can be accounted for in a naturalistic frame work. The purport of concepts like free will, good, and the meaning of life, however, changes dramatically. Specifically, our tendency to objectify values, to postulate an absolute good and an ultimate meaning of life, is unmasked as a strategy of mental territoriality which reveals us as typical participators in the struggle for existence.

Evolutionary biology explains why humans hold two kinds of morality: standard morality (based on the Golden Rule) and group moral ity. Group morality causes us to switch off our standard morality, such as our prohibition on killing, when we are threatened by an enemy or rival group. A new recognition of our psychological predilection to divide moral ity into these two codes of practice reveals the "real" reason behind the scholarly fact/value distinction in International Relations (IR) theory. Namely, "value" belongs to standard morality thinking and applies uncom fortably to the behavior of states. Academics defer to the state as the all- important entity on the world stage "factually" without realizing that they are thereby choosing, endorsing, and valuing group morality. They thus take a position that opposes (rather than merely ignores or disqualifies) standard morality; hence they are not "value-free."

This article defends Aristotle and sociobiology against their feminist critics by arguing that a biological conception of human nature rightly understood can support feminism. Aristotle's telelogical biology is not sexist. On the contrary, his biology suggests lines of argument that could vindicate feminism in some form. By arguing for marital friendship as the standard for judging spousal relationships, and by defending family life, and particularly maternal caregiving, as the natural root of all social ity and politics, Aristotle elevates the claims of women and suggests that the fullest human excellence would combine masculine and feminine incli nations.

Aristotle's functional teleology sustains a conception of natural human needs and powers as universal despite the variability of cultures. Without such an understanding of a universal human nature, feminists are tempted to adopt a cultural relativism that renders their critique of patriarchy incoherent. Furthermore, this defense of Aristotle applies as well to socio biological accounts of human sexual nature.