Irish Theological Quarterly

This article examines two distinct responses to the reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century: the Bonaventurean and the Thomist.The outcome of this debate (and the Condemnations of 1277) led to the modern separation of faith and reason. Rather than seeing voluntarism and nominalism as the cause of the modern separation of faith and reason, and theology and philosophy, it will be suggested that it is actually the other way around: the Bonaventurean response indirectly resulted in the growing separation of faith and reason, which led, in turn, to voluntarism. It is important not to confuse the Thomist and Franciscan responses, as sometimes happens in recent scholarship, including in the work of Gavin D’Costa, as will be shown. Both the Thomist and the Bonaventurean approaches are legitimate resources to respond to the (post)-secular context in which we find ourselves, and the former should not be reduced to the latter.

This article explores basic insights from René Girard and Bernard Lonergan on the ‘structure’ of evil in human living. For Girard, the root of human evil lies in rivalries, affections of the human heart that lead to mimetic competition, and in the extreme, to the scapegoating of innocent or vulnerable people. For Lonergan, evil is the opposite of the good, so that there is a sense in which he identifies evil as it opposes the good at every level of its structure. In the case of both thinkers, the hope of a solution to the persistence of evil lies in the positive mimesis or imitation and participation in the Triune life of God.

Does the notion of ‘Trinitarian persons’ have any practical value for the lives of Christians today? While theologians such as Karl Barth and Karl Rahner have famously argued that ‘person’ is an outdated term that can no longer adequately speak to contemporary Christians because of shifts in the term’s meaning, others like Wolfhart Pannenberg are convinced that these shifts are the precise reason that the term ‘person’ is more valuable than ever for trying to understand God and the divine/world relation. This article seeks to set out a clearer definition of Pannenberg’s use of the term ‘person’ in contrast to the definitions set out by Barth and Rahner and will use this definition to demonstrate the significance of Trinitarian personhood for theology.

The author explores some of the connections that can be made between the concept of the common good and the capabilities approach to development. Although widely used in the social teaching of the Church, the definition of the common good found in the social encyclicals is often vague and requires further explanation. In drawing from the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum the author seeks to show how the idea of capabilities can assist our understanding of the common good. In addition, it is suggested that the language of capabilities and the common good could contribute significantly to current public debate. Both concepts place an emphasis on integral human development which provides a starting point for a more holistic social discourse.