Journal of Contemporary History

To varying degrees the contributors to this symposium on The Holy Reich challenge both its arguments and its findings. Taking issue with its methodology, pointing to what they believe are fundamental mistakes, errors, and other shortcomings, they argue the work reflects tendentiousness and a lack of originality; a refusal to explore countervailing evidence or to acknowledge prior work. The author analyses these critiques comparatively and from multiple perspectives, and offers rejoinders point by point. What appear to be comprehensive and authoritative critiques are, upon closer inspection, a series of misinterpretations, and too often (as is demonstrated through close scrutiny of their arguments and evidence) distortions and fabrications. As is demonstrated, some of the respondents do not actually address the evidence provided in the book, while others extrapolate from minor points of evidence and analysis to cast unfounded doubts upon the soundness of the author's scholarship. Most problematically, their attempts to provide their own countervailing empiricism are frequently sloppy or simply wrong. The author compares the respondents and finds revealing patterns that help the reader understand the nature of their frequently groundless criticisms.

This article explores how, in the wake of civil war and continued instability, Éamon de Valéra attempted to stabilize parliamentary democracy in Ireland through the introduction of a new constitution in 1937. This constitution has been seen as a product of his uniquely conservative personality, but Irish constitutional developments between the wars reflected the tensions of an era in which liberal constitutionalism proved unable to meet the challenges posed to it. This article constitutes an attempt to put the constitution into its appropriate European context.

In May 1938, Italians and the world were treated to the spectacle of Adolf Hitler's visit to Italy. The visit was a prime example of overheated Fascist propaganda. For seven days, Hitler was feted in a manner that was far removed from a normal state visit. Yet, for all the pomp and ceremony, nothing was accomplished to further the Axis alliance, even though the Germans came prepared to sign a full military alliance. For this reason, the Hitler visit has always been seen as nothing more than an anecdote or colourful backdrop to the years leading up to the Second World War. Left unanswered is why the Fascist regime went to such extraordinary lengths to impress the German leader, even if it meant alienating the Vatican, the monarchy, and the Italian people. Why did Fascism risk losing the consensus it had worked so hard to gain in the years following the conquest of Ethiopia? This article argues that the visit broadcast Italy's intention to move on a more radical, pro-German path in the following years while leaving the Fascist regime free from having to make any binding commitments that would threaten domestic consensus. The careful planning of the visit was aimed at sending a clear message to Italians and the world about where the Fascist regime intended to go in the following years.

How serious was the threat of pre-war Japanese espionage and clandestine operations to western interests? The question, constantly asked before 1941, was rarely addressed afterwards. Across the USA, European colonies in Asia, Australia and European capitals, the widely held belief that a sustained and well-orchestrated campaign of Japanese intelligence-gathering during the interwar years reflected Japanese covert intentions had a significant impact on official as well as popular perceptions. Given limited understanding of the wider Japanese context, a few counter-espionage successes, such as the Rutland case and code-breaking achievements against Japanese ciphers, appeared to validate the fear that Japanese espionage was a widespread threat. After 1945, investigations suggested that pre-war spy hysteria had had surprisingly little grounding in fact. This was potentially a major political embarrassment. The impact of a disproportionate fear of espionage on the international isolation of Japan might imply at least a degree of Allied culpability in the origins of the war, and in the USA highlighted the injustice of the decision to intern Japanese- American citizens. The 1988 US government apology for this failed to reveal the British evidence contributing to the security rationale behind President Roosevelt's decision: the real if poorly substantiated fear, based on the com-plex mix of limited known facts and widespread fantasy, over Japanese espionage that contributed to the outbreak of the second world war in the Pacific

In this article, the author traces the main contours of the emergence of the concept of 'enemy nationalities' in the Stalin era, 1937-45. By 1938, 'fifth columnists' - suspected agents of foreign governments - dominated Soviet arrests of internal enemies. This xenophobic wave corresponded with the emergence by the eve of the Second World War of a Soviet policy that targeted ethnic minorities living in strategic borderland zones. Stalinist deportation policies in 1944-5 represented a continuation of these pre-war initiatives. The article focuses on the Soviet struggle against Chechen mountain guerrilla forces during the Second World War. By 1939, the Caucasus had become a vitally important Soviet strategic zone that supplied more than 90 percent of Soviet gas and fuel reserves. Hostile mountain conditions and tremendous popular sympathy facilitated tactical manoeuvring of guerrilla forces, who by and large eluded or successfully ambushed Soviet units. The Soviet secret police therefore relied heavily on dezorganizatsiia: disorganization of the Chechen national movement from within. Stymied on the battlefield, Soviet police won the war in Chechnya during 1942-4 by playing Chechen leaders off against one another; by sowing dissension in their ranks; by leaking false rumours about Chechen leaders; by pressuring family members and religious leaders; and by isolating Chechen guerrillas from their base with the mass deportation of the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus in 1944.

It has long been assumed that inattention to matters of consumption contributed to the collapse of the centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc. In Poland, the party-state followed a productivist model which occasionally paid lip-service to the consumer but which ultimately focused on the dictates of production. Yet, by 1981, there existed an organized consumer movement (Federacja Konsumentów) which emerged amidst the broader challenges to the state associated with Solidarity. In the transition to democracy, a form of consumer agency developed in Poland concerned less with the relative benefits of capitalism or communism in supplying consumer wants and desires, and more with a less overtly ideological notion of rights and protection promoted at the global level. This article demonstrates that Polish consumers and their expert representatives, both within and beyond the state, were capable of exercising an agency more complex than the negative one of frustration and recourse to alternative forms of provisioning usually associated with a command economy.

This article examines the role of Airwork Services Limited in the Saudi Arabian Air Defence Scheme, a package of military aircraft, air defences and support services provided by a consortium of British companies to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1966 to 1973. It argues that Harold Wilson's government saw the scheme as a means of boosting British exports while maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia, in the context of growing limitations to Britain's military presence East of Suez. Ultimately, however, Airwork, the principal service provider, proved unable to meet Saudi demands, necessitating the intervention of the British government on a scale it had originally hoped to avoid. In addition to shedding light on Anglo-Saudi relations, the article provides insights into the benefits and limitations of private military companies as tools of foreign policy.