Journal of Contemporary History

While there is a consensus among historians that Argentina's Last Dictatorship was one of the most radically right-wing regimes in modern Latin American history, the question of whether this regime's ideology was informed by fascist ideology has remained, to a large extent, open. This article explores the relationship between the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (PRN) and Argentina's fascist movement, self-labeled the ‘nacionalistas’. It begins by examining how, in the 1970s, this movement's ‘revolutionary’ sectors resurged in demand for a constitution of a totalitarian and corporatist regime in Argentina. The study then illuminates which components of the nacionalista doctrine the PRN chose to incorporate into its public discourse, particularly in its early and more ideologically foundational years. Finally, the article explores the strained relationship between the PRN and nacionalistas amid the regime's neoliberal reforms. The article's findings suggest that, despite its murderousness, the PRN was of the least indebted to neo-fascist ideology of the military regimes that had ruled Argentina since 1943.

The ascent of Argentina's civilian-military dictatorship in 1976 heralded a significant transformation in the country's economic policies and prompted a neoliberal turn. Focusing on the acquisition of the Compañía Ítalo Argentina de Electricidad (CIAE) in 1978, the article explores the relationship between the dictatorship, private enterprises, and foreign capital. It reveals intricate connections between Argentine officials and Swiss private owners, shedding light on the interplay of international finance and national policymaking. Additionally, the study unveils an unexplored dimension of Switzerland and Argentina's diplomatic and financial ties, underscoring the significant role of Swiss business interests in the country and their impact on international relations. It also shows the longstanding partnership between crucial binational members of the domestic political and economic elite with Swiss business interests in Argentina.

This article aims to analyze the nuclear policy of the last Argentine dictatorship between 1976 and 1983. During that period, the Nuclear Program secured both political and financial backing from the government through the 1979 Nuclear Plan. Paradoxically, this process coincided with the fiscal cut and the destruction of local industry promoted by the Ministry of Economy, headed by the liberal economist José A. Martínez de Hoz. In Martínez de Hoz’ view, inflation and government deficit were identified as the main obstacles to economic growth, and both state intervention and industrial promotion policies were seen as the cause of inefficiency. While the Nuclear Program depended almost entirely on public entities, it is worth asking why it did not suffer the same fate as the rest of the public sector.

This study proposes that the 1979 Nuclear Plan largely represented the maturation of the planning initially laid out by CNEA prior to the dictatorship, in 1968. The autonomy granted to this ‘agent’ empowered scientists and specialists to shape the nuclear agenda. In this context, Castro Madero's role as an interlocutor with the government was crucial in ensuring sustained and effective communication between both spheres.

All studies of the last military dictatorship in Argentina have underlined that in December 1983 a constitutional government that assumed office when democracy was restored faced a chaotic macroeconomic situation in a heavily indebted country. Most relevant writings, however, have not examined in detail how and why this regime was unable to solve this problem. This article therefore examines a short period during which minister of economy Roberto T. Alemann, an influential orthodox representative of Argentina's establishment, tried to consolidate Argentina's foreign debt and rebuild relations with international financiers. It is based mainly on recently declassified primary sources from British and Argentine archives. A first section focuses on the reasons of his rise to office and some relevant traits of his early economic program. Thereafter the impact of an unexpected war with Britain, and how and why the minister's emergency foreign debt policies hastily substituted for his initial program are examined. Finally the epilogue assesses the record of an aborted interlude which was the springboard for the outbreak of one of the most notorious foreign debt crises of the early 1980s, and a millstone for the incoming constitutional government in 1983.

In April 1982, war broke out between Argentina and Great Britain over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. While the military regime channeled nationalist fervor through spectacles like the televised program 24 Hours for the Malvinas, this narrative often overshadowed other grassroots mobilizations. This article examines one such case: a music festival organized by the town band in a small rural community in Santa Fe province. While the event shared a similar patriotic impulse with the state-sponsored program, it differed in three key ways: it was locally driven, without military involvement; it took place in a remote town with little media influence; and it occurred on 26 June, 12 days after Argentina’s surrender, raising questions about meaning and memory in the postwar period. The article also explores the return of the town’s only war veteran and how the community processed this event. Drawing on oral histories and local archives, it highlights the cultural and civic role of the Music Band, everyday nationalism, the emotions stirred by the war, and the impact of the veteran’s return on the community’s transition to democracy, revealing a more complex war and postwar landscape.

Since December 10, 1983, following the restoration of democracy in Argentina, the country has implemented a diverse range of public policies aimed at addressing the systematic human rights violations that occurred during the seventies, including various memory initiatives. A truth commission was established to investigate the fate of the disappeared and subsequently published its report known as ‘Nunca Más’. The trial of the military juntas was conducted, resulting in the punishment of those responsible for the repression, and ongoing criminal trials are being pursued against those accountable for the disappearances. These initiatives were not consistently linear, laws were enacted and presidential pardons were granted which, for over 15 years, impunity. Policies promoting reconciliation, ‘pacification and forgetting’ were advocated and, even recently, the crimes of the dictatorship have been relativized by the executive power. Within this framework, the article reviews, through the examination of testimonies and documents, the struggles for memory in Argentina in the last 40 years. It proposes that the political and economic crises that the country went through were the frameworks that made possible significant changes in public policies on this past and these policies were driven by civil society organizations rather than by the State.

This article aims to assess the impact of the 1976–83 dictatorship on the lifeworld of Argentine citizens, as reflected in testimonies and allegations during the oral phase of the 1985 trial of the military commanders responsible for masterminding policies of massive detention, torture and loss of life of thousands in Argentina. The text addresses the sequence of democratic breakdown, military rule, regime collapse and the transition to democracy, with a focus on one of the initial policies of post-transitional justice reported in El Diario del Juicio, a publication selling 250,000 weekly copies between May 1985 and January 1986. After years in which the public order imposed by the military government had been welcomed, tolerated, or ignored by majoritarian sectors, the testimonies and statements at the trial of the armed forces commanders certified the extent of abusive repression and allowed assessing the shifts many citizens experienced in their lifeworld and belated awakening from the narrative of the military government. In spite of the early closure of that initial stage of post-dictatorial justice, the trial managed to project the discourse of human rights onto the center of the public agenda in the transition to democracy.