24:I[63208,["8920","static/chunks/8920-efbff8517d590b7e.js","9097","static/chunks/9097-7e60ff382fede0de.js","5914","static/chunks/5914-356082358a498a0b.js","9903","static/chunks/9903-11222066602aad8e.js","5438","static/chunks/5438-cfc6cd3ec63ed58c.js","3851","static/chunks/3851-d9d99b9df58ccefb.js","4621","static/chunks/4621-60797c2425663d2a.js","6871","static/chunks/6871-85cb03c97585f46a.js","6736","static/chunks/6736-932312a004c99faf.js","4550","static/chunks/4550-0bf059e3050c08b3.js","688","static/chunks/688-a6a2ac7bff269cd3.js","3984","static/chunks/3984-063c0b62f32133c7.js","7038","static/chunks/7038-4f87670d4e55ef18.js","9039","static/chunks/9039-75366c62dc7d0d0e.js","4563","static/chunks/4563-ad980d1babbf7b0b.js","6761","static/chunks/6761-0c10d1446de7ae1c.js","744","static/chunks/744-1e76229abb9e297b.js","7342","static/chunks/7342-1586df78600bf911.js","3617","static/chunks/3617-1f62a097637f4747.js","5895","static/chunks/5895-caa6c774914eb108.js","7481","static/chunks/7481-3b84c503a2ebfb3f.js","3668","static/chunks/3668-7dab69e4121c33af.js","39","static/chunks/39-e93a27d0920e6d92.js","2881","static/chunks/2881-445cc2384af2c6f9.js","2364","static/chunks/2364-e83d52fb21729d99.js","3208","static/chunks/3208-e65462d166bd3688.js","7582","static/chunks/app/toc/%5Btla%5D/%5Bvolume%5D/%5Bissue%5D/page-694a0e465c2c1334.js"],"default"] 25:T436,

Peacekeeping mitigates killing, but nonlethal violence also influences both positive peace and stability. We evaluate peacekeepers’ effect on one such type of abuse, sexual violence. We posit that peacekeepers raise the cost of abuses and foster institutional and cultural changes that curb violence. We find that missions both reduce the chance of any violence and limit its prevalence; larger deployments and multidimensional missions are more effective. Governments curtail violence more quickly than rebels do in response to military contingents; rebels are especially responsive when missions include large civilian components. These findings contribute to our understanding of peacekeeping in three primary ways: we expand the evaluation of peacekeeping to consider nonlethal violence; we draw attention to mission size, capacity to use force, and civilian-led programming as determinants of effectiveness; and we demonstrate how addressing nonlethal violence requires similar tools as lethal violence but is further enhanced by specific civilian-led initiatives.

26:T431,

Why do fraudulent elections encourage protesting? Scholars suggest that information about fraud shapes individuals’ beliefs and propensity to protest. Yet these accounts neglect the complexity of opinion formation and have not been tested at the individual level. We distinguish between the mobilizing effects of actual incidents of election fraud and individuals’ subjective perceptions of fraud. While rational updating models would imply that both measures similarly affect mobilization, we argue that subjective fraud perceptions are more consistent predictors of protesting, also being shaped by attitudes, information, and community networks. Our empirical analysis uses geo-referenced individual-level data on fraud events, fraud perception, and protesting from the 2007 Nigerian elections. Our analysis yields two main findings: proximity to reported fraud has no effect on protesting and citizens perceiving elections as fraudulent are consistently more likely to protest, and more so if embedded in community networks.

27:T411,

Militant groups are usually committed to violent tactics to pursue their goals. Yet, in certain cases, militants adopt nonviolent tactics and desist from violence. As internal conflict rarely remains isolated from outside influence, I argue that external supporters affect militant groups’ tactical considerations. I expect that different external benefactors will have different effects on the probability of switching to nonviolent tactics. The focus here is on diaspora and foreign states as external supporters, and I conduct a large-N anal