Journal of Classical Sociology

This article presents selected pertinent instances of the influence of (especially classical) sociological theory on economics. Its explicit justification and goal is to detect and illustrate the almost unknown, ignored or dismissed bearing of sociological theory on its economic counterpart. Its implicit justification is given by the epistemological principle of the unity of knowledge, especially of social science, serving as an analytical framework or master narrative for exploring these relations, which extends the scope of the article beyond simply a history of ideas. The key finding is that the influence of sociological theory on economics is related to the project for unification of social science and thus the epistemological principle of the unity of knowledge. As a rare attempt at exploring the theoretical impact of sociology on economics, the article aims to help abridge a gap in the current literature.

The article considers two forms of relativism: cognitive and cultural. It is critical of the impact of ‘the new sociology of science’ which in the hands of Paul Feyerabend and others exaggerated the claims of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. The article argues that a distinction between scientific and nonscientific arguments can be, and must be, sustained. Secondly, cultural relativism is also considered and criticized. The article considers the legacy of Montaigne, Hume and Weber on modern, primarily anthropological, theories of cultural relativism. Anthropologists are fond of demonstrating that, for example, Western indignation over genital mutilation is only or merely the consequence of socialization into a particular culture. It is argued that, while some rituals may be necessary to inculcate young people into a community, there are rational grounds for rejecting mutilation where alternative rituals would be equally effective. The article therefore rejects both cognitive and cultural relativism as resting on exaggerated or hyberbolic versions of the sceptical consequences of the critical rationalism of Montaigne, Hume and Weber

Max Weber’s ambivalent attitude to the application of the concepts of selection and adaptation to the study of cultural and social evolution is readily understandable in view of his scepticism about the reducibility of sociology to biology and his suspicion that selectionist explanations will turn out on close inspection to be either value-laden or circular. His concerns can be dispelled with the help of developments in evolutionary theory which he could not have anticipated in his lifetime but which enable the basic agenda of his sociology of religion to be reformulated in more rather than less persuasive terms. That, however, requires his metaphor of ‘elective affinities’ between religious ideas and the behaviour of ideal-typical agents to be replaced by empirically testable hypotheses linking the adaptiveness of specific religious memes to the adaptiveness of specific economic practices.

Scholars have concentrated on Max Weber’s notions of traditional and bureaucratic authority because these figure prominently in his lifelong concern with the rise of Western rationality. However, Weber himself often characterized what something is by showing what it is not. In his discussions of the third type of authority, charisma, he demonstrates what charisma is not then what it is. He contrasts the permanence, rules and impartiality of bureaucratic authority with the changing, arbitrary and personal characteristics of charismatic leadership. Weber also opposes the ‘everydayness’ and economic concerns of the bureaucratic and traditional authorities with the ‘extraordinary’ feature and otherworldly indifference of the revolutionary nature of the charismatic leader. I contend that his examination of charisma is not merely another of his important sociological studies; in addition, it has far-ranging implications for showing the strengths and weaknesses of the religious and especially of the politically charismatic leader.

The term ‘generation’ in everyday language is unsuitable for the analysis of temporal connections from a sociological perspective. Understanding these generational linkages, their strength, content and quality, their variability by class, sex, locality, culture, stages in the life course, education, material position and liability to modification by political action, is a fundamental requirement for the analysis of individual behaviour, and is a point of departure, some would say the point of departure, in understanding all social behaviour. Recognition of the centrality of generation to social structure was a basic component of John Locke’s theory of liberal rights and property and of Robert Filmer’s theory of patriarchy and authority. Generation as a tool of analysis should therefore be of intellectual concern to classical sociological theory.