Amelia Correa, Romar Correa, D. Tripati Rao , [...]
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Abstract
We formulate and solve the Pasinetti (1962) model as a dynamic game played between capitalists and workers. The interest rate is shown to be bounded above. If the discount rates of capitalists and workers required to sustain cooperation between them exceed this interest rate the Nash equilibrium unravels. We introduce a bank whose sole objective is to lower the rate of interest. The financial intermediary cannot ensure the equality through time of the supply of and the demand for assets in general.
Research article
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published January, 2003pp. 13-33
Agency theory has focused attention on the role conflict between the interests of managers and owners plays in a firms’ financial performance. It could be claimed that the management buy-out is the most effective weapon in the war against agency problems. This paper investigates the reasons behind the continuing popularity of buy-out funds and how they generate superior financial performance by aligning the interest of managers and investors. It follows the buy-out market from its origins to the present, and points to pitfalls for investors in a market that is now reaching maturity. In particular the popularity of buy-out funds as an investment choice has led to an oversupply of funding and signs are emerging that the market has become overheated. Deals are being done that lack the characteristics that are indicative of successful buy-out performance due to agency problems inherent in the way that buy-out funds are remunerated.
Research article
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published January, 2003pp. 35-60
This paper formulates a theory of policy leadership based on propositions that relate to the conditions under which rival leadership coalitions engage in a contest for authority over the system-wide direction of the policy process and differentiate themselves according to distinctive styles in respect of which the demand shifts due to the endogenous accumulation of disappointment over distinct phases of a process of paradigmatic policy change. It both draws from concepts familiar to policy theorists and the work of economic revisionists who have sought to make the expressive dimension of phenomena such as leadership more amenable to deductive analysis.
Review article
Restricted accessReview articleFirst published January, 2003pp. 61-71